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ABSTRACT 
.. 
This t~esis examines the question of or~anisational closure. 
Britain with its economic probler!ls has, over recent years, seen 
an unprecedented number of factory closures as firms have collapsed 
or rationalised manufacturing operations in attempts to naintain 
profitability. Attempts to control inflation have led successive 
governments to reduce expenditure. Consequently, nationalised 
industries, local goverp~ent. the civil service, and education, 
health and social services have also had to face reductions in 
manning and other facilities. 
This research addresses a very real empirical problem which faces 
contemporary Britain. It focuses on the response to closure. 
Closure, undoubted~Yt represents a traumatic experience for those 
involved. Despite this, it would appear that many closures go 
ahead quietly a'1.d, from a managerial vie'l.<1point, successfully r In 
contrast, however, a few closures have provoked well-publicised 
resistfuLce campaigns. In an attempt to explain why these responseS 
should arise, the research has focused on the management of clo3ur'e 
and the power relations of the groups involved. Closure represE:l1ts 
an arena in which power and politics are brought into play. T-#o 
aspects of pO'lller have been found to be significant. Overt pO'Vier 
is used when parties are engaged in open conflict. Unobtrusive 
power, on the other hand, is used more subtloly to legitimise 
actions so that opposition does not arise. In the case of 
closure. groups have been found to use devices to legitirr.ise and 
justify closure, thereby gaining acceptance of it or, in the caSe 
of opposition, IIdelegitimise" it in an attempt to prevent it. 
The methodology has been qualitative. It is argued that, by 
collectinQ unstructured in~depth data from different examples 
~C> 
of closure and comparing them, the nuanceS and subtleties of 
unobtrusive pm'fer have been brought to light and the limited 
kno"'lled,ge of closure greatly extended. 
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GLOSSARY OF TERJ.IS 
Occupation: a situation where employees occupy a factory 
or hospital (or offices in the unit) to 
prevent a closure or some other managerial 
decision. Also knovm as sit-ins - where 
employees physically occupy the unit in 
question - and work-ins - \'lhere employees 
continue to work as well as occupy. 
Payment-in-lieu of Notice: Employers are obliged to give employees 
3 months notice of impending redundancy 
Rationalisation: 
Redep loymen t: 
Redundancy: 
(if more than 100 are involved). Employers 
may make compensatory payments if they are 
unable or unwilling to give notice. 
here the term has been used to refer to 
reductions in the number of sites where 
products are made or services provided. The 
manufacture of these products and the 
provision of these services are 
subsequently concentrated on a smaller 
number of sites. 
refers to the situation where a worker who 
is theoretically redundant is '-'lbose job has 
ceased to exist, is given another job. 
usually' i.t refers to ne\1[ jobs inside the 
company, and for which the company is 
responsible. 
a worker is made redundant when his job 
ceases to exist. This may b~} the result of 
closure and reductions in production/services 
but it can also be the result of technological 
changes \<Thich reduce manning requirements. 
Redundancy Compensation: An errq:>loyer is obliged to compensate 
workers \'1i th more than two years service for 
their lost jobs. The state requires Yz \'Teeks 
pay per year of service for employees aged 
18-21, 1 weeks pay per year of service for 
employees aged 22-40 and Jj~ weeks pay per 
year of service for employees aged 41-65, 
up to a maximum of 20 years service. 
Approximately half this is reimbursed by the 
state. Payments above this amount do not 
receive any additional reimbursement. 
Severance Terms: 
ix 
the actual amolU1t of raoney a redundant 
en~loyee receives when he leaves his 
employment. It will include redundancy 
compensation and payment-in-lieu of notice 
if applicable. 
\'Jorker Co-operative: an employee-o.:Jned and managed concern 
usually !£lade possible with government funding. 
Five such co-operatives received \·:idesprec::.d 
coverage in the early seventies: Upper Clyde 
Shipbuilders - which resulted from an 
occupation of shiPyards near Glasg01H in 1971; 
Fakenham - established by \I[omen shoe workers 
in Norfolk; Kirkby - t.'IO occupations a..'"1d 
attempts at establishing a co-operative at 
a Thorn Lighting factory in Liverpool; 
r.1eriden - established at the Norton-Villiers-
Triumph factory near Coventry; Scottish Daily 
News - a newspaper co-operative in Glasgow. 
BRITISH ENTERPRISES 
British Steel Corporation: nationalised steel industry. 
British Leyland: nationalised car firm. 
Cadbury Schvreppes : multi-product soft drinks/confectionery manaufacturer. 
Courtaulds: British textile firm. 
Iqperial Chemical Industries: chemical manufacturer. 
Morning Star: newspaper of the British ComrntUlist Party. 
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Chapter One 
INTRODUCTION 
• 
Anyone who is familiar with the industrial scene in Britain 
\'Iill be well aware of the term "closure" and what it signifies. 
The economic problems, which have confronted this country in 
recent years, have led to more and more people losing their jobs 
as firms have closed down and factories have shut. Unemployment. 
has risen almost continuously during the seventies. Insolvencies 
increased nearly three-fold between 1973 and 1980. Large 
companies like Chrysler, Singer, Courtaulds and ICI (Imperial 
Chemical Industries) have closed down manufacturing sites. The 
British Steel Corporation (BSC) shed more than 130,000 jobs in 
the ten years from 1968. More than 17 steelworks have closed 
since 1974. British Leyland (BL) shed 12,000 jobs in 1978 
alone. In the public sector, government policies involving 
massive expenditure cuts have led to redundancies. In the 
health service. hospital closures have become relatively 
commonplace. Closure and redundancy· have become common and 
frequent events in contemporary Britain. Yet, despite their 
importance. academic interest has been relatively limited and 
there are, as a result, significant gaps in the literature. 
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The Causes of Closure 
This area has been examined, usu ... ly in terms of a particular 
firm or industry such as, for exru:-ple, the steel industry 
(Jones, 1974; Bryer et~, forthcoming) and Upper Clyde 
Shipbuilders (UCS) (Paulden & Hawkins, 1969; Alexander & 
Jenkins, 1970). l~ore general models of collapse and closure 
have been developed by Boswell (1973), Argenti (1976), Miller 
(1977) and Altman (1971). Hall (1976) has considered the demise 
of the Saturday Evening Post from a systems perspective. 
Another approach to organisational success and failure has 
been to link it to environmental difficulties (for example, 
Burns & Stalker, 1961; Emery & Trist, 1965; Terreberr,yt 1968; 
Lawrence & Lorsch, 1969; Galbraith, 1973; Ansoff, 1975, 1978). 
These authors argue that orga.11.isations may fail as a result of 
their inability to respond to environmental pressures and 
uncertainties which require more sophisticated and flexible 
measures. 
Closure Decis ion-Making 
This is a neglected area - there is virtually nothing document-
ing the processes which result in a decision to close a firm, 
factory, school or hospital except, perhaps, for Nees's 
research into divestment decision-making (1978-9). Literature 
does exist in related fields. There is, for example, crisis 
\ 
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decision-making (Herman, 1964, 1972; Fink, 1971; Ansoff, 1975. 
1978; Starbuck, 1978). This describes how decision-mru<ing is 
often adversely affected by crisis conditions. 
There may be something to be learnt from related literature 
but closure decision-making has not been analysed in the same 
way as, for example. investment decision-making has by 
Aharoni (1966), Ackerman (1968), Carter (1969) and King (1976). 
There is in America a relatively new field of literature 
under the heading of the management of decline which encomp asses 
the causes of and responses to decline. \'Jhetton (1979 a, b) 
has attempted to draw this rather diverse body of literature 
together. He argues that there are two main approaches: the 
cross-sectional analysis of popUlations of organisations. 
showing which survive and which die; and the study of 
individual organisations, examining how the process of decline 
manifests itself. The dominant perspective in the former 
approach is that of the natural selection/population ecology 
model (see Aldrich & Pfeffer, 1976; Aldrich, 1979). This type 
of research attempts to identifY the characteristics of failing 
organisations as opposed to surviving ones. The second area 
is more concerned with processes within organisations as they 
face decline. Common perspectives here are the resource-
dependencY models (for example, see Yuchtman & Seashore, 1967; 
Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and the political-economy models 
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(see Benson, 1975; \'Jarmsley & Zald J 1973) in \,lhich managers 
are assumed to take actions to maintain adequate supplies of 
political legitL~acy and economic resources in efforts to assure 
the continuance of their organisation. 
This field of literature is slowly accumulating enough case-
study material to identify the sources of decline J the resp onses 
to it, and the effects of decline on other organisational 
activities. This is a body of research \'lhich may prove 
fruitful in the future. However, as Whetton points out: 
"the literature related to organisational 
decline is very broad and diverse. 
Unfortunately, very little of this material 
reports empirical research. Instead the 
literature is dominated by case-study 
descriptions of declining organisations, 
armchair analyses of the causes of declLle 
based on reviews of published case-
studies, and prescriptive guidelines for 
preventing or coping \,lith decline" 
Whetton (1979a) p 347. 
This is an area \'lhich is only just beginning to gather 
momentum. So far, studies have only been able to draw attention 
to the fact that decline is becoming a more common phenomenon 
and that management should be geared up to the dynamics of 
decline in the s arne way as it is to growth. The reliance on 
single descriptive case-studies, however, (see Boulding, 
1975; Freeman & Hannon, 1975; Behn, 1976, 1977, 1978; Cyert, 
1978; Glassberg, 1978) has done little to provide a cornprehen-
sive theoretical frame\<lork. This appears to be also true of 
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research into the causes of closure - there is either not 
enough research or it is of the Wrong kind to build up a 
theoretical approach. 
Redundancy fu"ld Closure 
There are also problems with research into the implementation 
of closure decisions and the subsequent after-effects. 
Redundancy is one aspect of this which has been the subject of 
a great deal of investigation. See Wood (1980) and Wood & Dey 
(unpublished) for comprehensive reviews of the redundancy 
literature. Research has concentrated on a number of 
different issues, for example, some writers have chosen to 
identifY the practices used to select those being made redund·· 
ant (see Acton Society Trust, 1958; Smith, 1966). There are 
tips for managers on how to handle redundancy (see Pocock, 
1972; Gill, 1975). By far the most comprehensive coverage, 
however, has been given to the plight of the redundant 
srployee (Acton Society Trust, 1959; lI/edderburn, 1964, 1965; 
Karill, 1964; Barrat Bro\~, 1967; Sams & Simson, 1968; Department 
.. 
of Employment, 1970; Mackay, 1971; Mackay & Reid, 1972; 
Daniel, 1972). The Redundancy Payments Act has also been the 
focus of research (Parker, 1971; Daniel, 1971). There has 
been research into how redundancy has been or should be fought 
(Newens, 1969; Bail~y j Clarke, 1979). Wood (1980a, b) and 
'vlood & Dey (unpublished) have examined the acceptance and 
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resistance of' redundancy in a series of case-studies. 
The vast maj ori ty of the studies on redundancy hq,s been in the 
form of single case-studies and this has made it difficult to 
dr~# comparisons and build on theoretical conc~pts. This is 
also true of much of the literature specificallY concerned with 
closure. Many worker co-operatives have been studiej in this \'1ay, 
such-as Upper Clyde Chipbui~ders (UCS). (Se,~ Buchan, 1972; 
Thompson & Hart, 1972; Trade Union Register, 1973; Johns, 1973; 
Eaton ~ al), -Fakenham (Hardman, 1975), Scottish Daily News (SDN) 
(Bradbury, 1978),. and Kirkby (Clarke). Coates (1976) has edited 
a series of articles on worker co-operatives including Meriden and 
t."le Scottish Daily News.. Hemmingway & Keyser (1975) and 
GreenwooG (1977) have provided some comparative analysis on 
factory occupations. 
There have been some case-studies of concerns which have closed. 
Most notable of these are, perhaps, those by Fm: (1965), 
Loasby (1973), f.Iartin & Fryer (1973) and Beynon (1978). 
Others include those by Cooke (1964), Eldridge (1968), Peers 
(1974) Sully (1974). Birmingham Community Development 
Project (1977) and Benwall Community Project (1980). All these 
represent single case-study descriptions of a particular 
closure. Rainnie & Stirling (1981) have edited a series of 
such cases of closure. In the ~~S. hospital closures have 
been virtually ignored apart from a case-study in the Royal 
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COr.1mission on the NBS (1978) and parnphlets produced by the 
occupation committees of some of the threatened hospitals. 
The criticisms directed at the literature discussed earlier in 
this section are much the s arne here: there is not enough 
err:pirical, comparative, analytical research. There are also 
t" .. ~o significant gaps where little research, of any kind or 
calibre, has been undertaken; in the processeS leading to 
closure decisions; and in the implementation of those decisions. 
The former has-proved to be outside the terms of reference of 
this study, although I have mentioned it because I feel it is 
an issue which warrants more attention. The implementation of 
closure and its effects, however, form the basis of ,this 
research. 
As has already been indicated, previous research has been 
largely confined to descriptive case-studies. Furthermore, 
these studies have often ignored the process whereby closure 
(and redundancy) is imp lemented - ie the management of 
closure. 
"In economics, the manage~ent of redundancy 
is accorded little or no significance since 
it is irrelevant to the fact of its 
occurence. In the sociological w~itings 
\lJhich assume redundancy is a m2jor 
radical ising event again this process is 
treated of little significanca" Uood (1980) 
p 6 21. 
This shortcoming has been compounded by the fact that previous 
research has tended to focus on the interesting but "abnormal" 
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exar.:ples such 2.S the \'Torker co-operatives. Consequently, there 
is no theoretical apparatus to explain the 'vIide variety of 
responses \'lhich actually occur. As '-'lood & Dey point out: 
"recent events in Britain underline the 
comple.."{ity and diversity of workers' 
reactions" \lJood & Dey (tmpublished) 
p 7. 
There have, for example, been cases of successful worker 
resistance as illustrated by the worker co-operatives. other 
attempts have failed, as did the r.IeCaILllO occupation. Other 
campaigns have used lobbYing, strike threats. demonstrations 
and marches, rather than an occupation, as the basis of their 
tactics. The vast majority of closures and redundancies, 
however, are quietly accepted, receiving little attention 
from the media. 
The Management of Closure 
It would seem feasible to suggest that the reactions of 
elT\Ployees (and other groups) may be related to the "lJlay in 
which the closure is handled or managed. As \'lood (1980) has 
sueeested, it is possible to manage redundancies \,lithout 
anatagonising em.:."Jloyer-worker relations. The analysis of this 
issue requires a new approach focusing on the implementation 
of the closure. As Seglow (1971), \'Jood (1980) and \'lood &. Dey 
(tmpublished) point out, conventional analysis does little to 
explain why these different responses should arise. 
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This piLece of research marks an attert1pt to fill some of the 
gaps mentioned above. It provides a cOID..orehensive analysis of 
four proposed closures - "O'iO industrial and two hospital 
closures. It focuses on the at;terrpts to implement those 
closures in a bid to throw some light on how closures are 
managed and \-Ihat effect this has on the response of the 
employees. This in turn should help to anS\'ier such questions 
as: why' acceptance of such a traumatic event should occur; 
what leads to resistance; how does it arise; and what makes it 
successful. 
The outline of the remainder of the book is as fol10\'Is. 
Chapter -t\'iO emphasises the importance of looking beyond the 
organisation in explaining behaviour, and emphasises some of the 
theories which have led to and called for this link between 
organisation and environment. Chapter three outlines the 
political perspective which forms the basis of this analysis. 
Chapter four relates the theoretical framework prQPosed in the 
previous chaPters to the substantive area of closure. Chapter 
five describes the methodology used in the study. Chapters 
six to nine consist of descriptions of the four case-studies. 
Chapter ten focuses on the impact of the enviroru::ent, particu·· 
larly on how economic factors in recent years have changed 
attitudes to closure in both industrial and health sectors. 
Chapter eleven provides an analysis of three ex~~les of 
managerial success in i~olementing closure without resistance 
- 10 -
in terms of the theoretical frame\'1ork espoused in ch~"')ter three. 
Chapter twelve looks at a case of oanagerial failure in 
inlJlementing closure. Finally, chapter thirteen concludes 
\'li th a SUl11r!1ary of the findings of this research. 
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Chapter 1"°.:0 
ORG0NISATION ArID E:NIRONMENT 
This research is aimed at explaining why different responses to 
announcements should arise, and why some closure decisions are 
implemented "VIi thout oPPosition, \'lhereas others are confronted 
with resistance. The problem is where should one look for 
explanation? 
Inside or Outside the Organisation? 
There has, in the past, been a tendency to explain orgru~isational 
outcomes solely in terms of factors \~ithin the organisation 
itself 
"social science research on organisations 
has been concerned principally \'lith intra-
organisational phenomena •••• vIith relatively 
few exceptions, social scientists engaged in 
organisational research have not taken the 
organisation in its environment as a unit 
of observation and analysis" Evan (1966) P 175 
A perspective such as this is incomp~te because it ignores the 
fact that the internal workings of an organisation are as much a 
product of external forces as factors inside that organisation. 
See, for example, Dill (1958), Stinchcome (1965) and, Dore 
recently, Pfeffer & Salancik (1978), Aldrich (1979). 
There have been some attempts to incorporate the influence of 
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the environment into organisational analysis. Systems theorists , 
notably Parsons, also see Katz & Kahn (1966) have emphaSised 
the importance of inter-locking and open systems in which the 
organisation interacts with the environuent. This idea has been 
expanded on by such writers as Burns & Stalker (1961), Emery & 
Trist (1965), La~~ence & Lorsch (1967) and Terreberry (1968). 
These \'lri ters assert that turbulence and uncertainty' in the 
environment places additional demands on the organisation, 
which must respond, even if it requires adjusting and modifying 
internal structures, otherwise it will fail. 
Such work has, hovlever, been criticised becau.se of the 
functionalist and determinist nature of the relationship between 
organisation and environment. Changes in the environment are 
seen as automatically triggering off organisational ad~Dtation 
but, as Silverman points out, organisations do not adapt, people 
do (1970). Different people may have different perceptions of 
both the environment and of the necessary adaptations and so, 
an element of indeterminism creeps in (see Child, 1972). The 
relationship between organisation and environment thus becol"i1es 
more complex and tenuous. 
A further criticism of organisational analysis has been that 
the reco~nition of the impact of the environment has been 
c:> 
limited to a small number of studies. Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) 
comp lain that 
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"in recent years, it has become fashionable 
for those \'lri ting about management and 
organisation to acknoirTledge the importance 
of the environment, particularly in the first 
chapter or in a special section of the book. 
Except for some special terminology, hm.rever, 
the implications of the organisation's context 
remain undeveloped ll Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) 
p 6 
So \'Ie are left with either a human relations type of approach 
which treats organisations as if 
"they were self-centred entities operating in 
a socio-economic vacuum" Child (1969) p 11 
or the structural functional orientation 
"in which the environment (when it is 
considered) is seen simply as a means to 
the organisation's operation and survival, 
or at most a limiting factor" Child (1969) 
p 11 
Marxist \'lri ters have criticised organisational analysis for its 
handling of extra-organisational factors. They argue that the 
foundin8: fathers of sociology, industrial sociology and 
or,r;anisational analysis, Marx, Durlmeim, and We~er looked to 
the dialectic between types of work experience, organisation, 
and economic structure, societal stabilfty . 
and change (Esland ~~, 1975). However recent organisa-
tional theorists have failed to follow their exa~ple (Esland 
et aI, 
--
1975; Benson, 1977 (a) (b); Salaman, 1979, 1980; 
Hyman, forthcoming). 
"The analysis of organisational events 
rarely looks beyond the organisation to the 
society outside, and the reliance on such 
concepts as organisational structure, 
organisational roles, and rules, organisa-
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tional cultures, cliques and groups, inevitably 
predispose a loss of interest in extra-
organisational de-t;erminants of activity and e_ 
lack of concern for the relationship be-b..;een 
the orgal1isation and society" Esland 
et ~, (1975) p 26. 
These writers advocate the location of the organisation \'ri thin 
the wider society. 
The Marxists, hmlTever, have their own problems between the 
determinists and non-determinists. The former, such as 
Althusser and Bukharin, assume that actions and historical events 
are determined fundamentally by the social formations in which 
they are located, rej ecting the notion of creative free \'lill 
(see Burrell & Morgan, 1979). Other T-llarxist writers, such as 
Salaman (1979, 1980) attribute rather less weight to the 
O\"nership of the means of production, acknowledging that 
variations occur between and vlithin capitalist societies, regions 
and plants. 
The overall result is a lack of consensus among both l-Iarxist and 
non-1'1arxist perspectives regarding the extent and nature of 
environmental influences on organisational life. 
"From such perspectives derive varying 
conceptions of the business enterprise 
itself - (i) as a functionally integrated 
and normally harmonious system which is 
directed towards the attaininent of a set of 
goals that all its members hold in common; 
(ii) 2.S a some ... rhat uneasy coalition of 
economic convenience in which the pursuit 
of conflicting sectional interests is 
balanced against the mutual benefits of 
co-operation; or (iii) as a potentially 
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unstable arrangement 'lThereby the property-less 
and oppressed many are exploited for the 
private gain of a privileged controlling 
elite" Child (1969) p 12. 
This confusion and disagreement makes it difficult to see how 
soci.etal and intra-organisational processes are interrelated. 
Hyman (forthcoming) asks 
"is it possible to grasp theoretically the 
relationships between control and resistance; 
bebleen the deliberate strategies of the 
powerful and the impersonal constraints of 
economic forces; between subjective experiences 
and group relations and patterns of structural 
determinism? II p 21., 
This research is intended to make some progress towards answering 
that question - to illustrate how environmental and organisational 
factors interact. The aim is to provide a theoretical frame-
'<lork. for this relationship in general terms, which ~,ill then be 
applied to the specific area of organisational closure. The 
construction of this framework requires, first of all, a glance 
back over the previous research on organisation and environment. 
Structure: Organisation or Environment? 
One organisational outcome which has been relatively well 
researched in terms of both intra- and extra-organisational 
factors is structure. 
Sone writers have linked structure to environmental uncertainty. 
Burns & Stalker (1961) argue that an uncertain environment 
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requires an organic structure which is more flexible and less 
clearly defined than a mechanistic structure. The latter is 
suitable in times of stability but the former is necessary ~Ihen 
rapid adjustments have to be made in response to a changing 
environment. Lawrence & Lorsch (1967) demonstrate that 
environmental uncertainty requires more differentiation in an 
organisation, as specialised units deal with particular tasks 
and problems. This, however, requires integration as the 
diffuse units are brought together to pursue organisational 
goals. Structures must be geared up to provide both 
differentiation and integration if organisations are to survive 
and succeed in the face of environmental uncertainty. 
Others have looked to internal variables to explain structure. 
Woodward (1965) has argued that the type of technology 
determines the structure of successful firms. Perrow (1970) 
maintains that organisations can be classified on the basis of 
the nature of their technology. Pugh ~ al (1969) have 
contested the role of technology in determining structure, 
arguing that size is the most important factor. 
All these studies are deterministic in that a situational or 
contextual variable such as environment, technology, size, 
automatically determines structure because organisations strive 
for success 
"if organisational structure is not adapted 
to its context, then opportunities are lost, 
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costs rise, and the maintenance of the 
organisation is threatcned" Child (1972) 
p 8. 
Child (1972) has criticised this approach arguing that an 
element of choice exists in dec'iding on the nature of structure. 
This leevJaY exists for a number of reasons. Decision-makers 
have to perceive and interpret the environment. This process of 
"enactment" is open to individual differences in the recognition 
of and meaning assigned to environmental factors and events 
(see Duncan, 1972). Organisational members may be in a position 
to manipulate their environment, rather than being forced to 
change structure. Decision-makers may have some choice in 
defining exactly what constitutes a satisfactory performance. 
They may also have a degree of freedom in designLJg and 
choosing both technology and structure. Consequently, there is 
not a direct relationship between the organisational a~d 
environmental context and str~cture. The context may set outer 
limi ts on the structural form of the organisation but. \lJi thin 
these, some degree of choice exists for decision-makers. 
Child (1972) conceives of organisations as containing a variety 
of sectional interest groups. The dominant coalition of these 
_ the power-holders or decision-makers - are then able to 
utilise the lee\'lay provided by the degree of strategic choice 
in making their decisions to further their interests. In othp-r 
\'lords, they usc the available degree of freedom to en2..ct 
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environments, measure success and desi6n structure in such a 
'liTe::! that protects and furthers their pm'ler positions. 
\'lhat are the implications of Child's notion of strategic choice? 
He argues that it 
"provides a useful antidote to the sociologically 
unsatisfactory notion that a given organisational 
strUcture can be understood in relation to 
the functional imperative of 'system needs' 
which somehow transcend the objectives of any 
group of organisatione~ members. In this way 
the analytical contribution of a functional 
interpretation is supplemented by a political 
interpretation which does not regard such 
constraints as necessarily acu·te or immutable 
and which highlights the role of choice. In 
shifting attention towards the choice, we are 
able to account for organisational variation 
directly through reference to its sources, 
rather than indirectly through reference to its 
supposed consequences" Child (1972) P 14. 
In other words we must view structure as a product 
"of a set of interacting constraints both 
internal and external, which are subject to 
varying degrees of direct control by 
organisational members" Kimberley (1975) p 1. 
In this way structure is the result of both politicai 
processes and the characteristics of the organisation and the 
environment . as 
"economic and administrative exigencies are 
weighed by the actors concerned against the 
opportunities to operate a structure of their 
o'llm and/or other organisational ~embers' 
preferences" Child (1972) p 16. 
Structure is a political element not only because it is an 
outcome of power but also because it is a mechanism by which 
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power is created, protected, maintained and utilised to produce 
outcoJ:les and allocations of resources which serve the interests 
of the power-holders. 
Much of the literature on organisations is phrased in terms of 
organisational goals, organisational success and effectiveness 
but, as has already been mentioned, organisations do 
not have goals, people do. The phrase "organisational goals" 
usually refers to the goals of the power-holders, senior 
managers, decision-makers, dominant coalition. Other members, 
however, may have totally different goals. Even within senior 
management there may be significant differences of interest. 
Under these circumstances it is 
"more fruitful to analyse organisations in 
terms of the different ends of their members 
and of their capacity to impose these ends on 
others - it suggests an analysis in terms of 
pOVler and authority" Silverman (1970) p 39. 
Also see Child (1972) and Pettigrew (1973). 
A political perspective views organisations as comprising of 
different interest groups, each seeking to utilise pOVler 
sources to protect and promote their .. own interests. Orc-anisa-.~ 
tions thus become tools which are used by some groups to control 
others to achieve their ends. 
"Organisations must be seen as tools •••• a 
tool is something you can get something \,lith. 
It is a resource if you control it. It gives 
you power others do not have. Or2,anisations 
are multi-purpose tools for shaping the world 
as one ,·fishes it to be shaped" PerrO\1J (1972) p 14. 
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The structure of an organisation is one means by \'lhich senior 
Qembers are able to exert control over others 
"thus the structural framework is not some 
abstract chart but one of the crucial 
instruments by whi"ch some group s perpetuate 
their power and control in organisations: 
groups struggle to constitute structures 
in order that they may becone constituting" 
Ranson ~ al (1980) P 8. 
structures embody certain asstunptions t values, practices \'lhich 
are taken for granted by organisational members and which serve 
to ensure that certain behaviours and actions are carried out wi th-
'out question (Ranson et aI, 1980). Furthermore, structure 
can be used to control behaviour indirectly,through bureau-
cratisation which relies on procedures to limit discretion, or 
directly, by using centralisation to limit decision-making to 
the higher echelons (Child, 1973). 
Through such methods as these, behaviour throughout the 
organisation is directed towards serving the interests of senior 
menbers by a structure which, although presented as neutral, 
inevitable and functional, is inherently political (Salaman, 
1979) • The pO\'rerful have a vested interest in shap ing the 
mechanisr.1 which provides them "Ii th pm-leI'. Thus 
"the organisational structures \'li thin which 
individuals both contribute to organisational 
performance and pursue sectional interests are 
in part the outcome of their m·m initiatives" 
\'Jatson (1980) P 213 
It is important to point out, as Salaman (1979) does, that 
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al though the power-holders may be in an advantageous and 
strons~er position to use their influence to shape structure to 
protect their own pO'IJler positions, other members with their 
different priorities are never the "mere tools" of senior 
managers. As a result structure is the outcome of a process of 
political struggle and negotiation beb~een different interest 
groups. 
Technology is closely bound up with structure and Salaman (1979) 
argues that it is necessary to consider its political 
implications in much the same way. Technology can be used to 
control people, especially if managers have a degree of freedom 
in choosing the type of technology (Child, 1972; Davis & Taylor, 
1976; Salaman, 1979). 
"Technologies are chosen, not imposed by norms 
of efficiency; and the structure of an 
organisation may owe as much to managerial 
philosophies, conceptions of organisational 
purpose and views of the nature and capacities 
of organisational personnel as to any immutable 
loaic" Salaman (1980) p 93. 
<=> 
Structure and technology are usually conceptualised as the 
formal and official aspects of an organisation, including 
'I all the official arrangements made by those 
who control the organisation" \'Jatson (1980) P 192. 
It has been argued, however, that this approach excludes the 
.informal . arrangements and interaction which should be 
included 
"we need to reconceptualise what is often 
which 
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regarded as the total structure of the 
organisation as merely one part of i til 
\'Jatson (19.80) p 191 
"leads us tm'lards seeing the orr.ranisation' s t~ 
structure not in terms of the pregiven 
official arrangements into which individual 
actors are slotted but as the emergent 
pattern of relationships and behaviour of 
organisational actors" VJatson (1980) p 192. 
Culture and Ideology 
The informal aspects of organisational life are usually 
categorised under such terms as culture and ideology. Culture 
rests on norms, values and beliefs (Eldridge & Crombie, 1974). 
Ideologies are specific sets of beliefs 
"about the social world and hO\I[ it operates 
containing statements about the rightness of 
certain social arrangements and what action 
would be taken by the light of those 
statements" \lJilson (1973) p 91. See Pettigrew (1979). 
CuI ture can be broken down in1;o myths, rituals, symbols and 
language (Pettigrew, 1979). It is a system of 
"publicly and collectively subscribed-to 
meanings operating for a given group at a 
given time •••• which function to interpret 
a people's ovm situation to themselves" 
Pettigrew (1979) P 574. 
Organisations may. contain a variety of cultures and sub-cultures 
(Salaman, 1979) and this informal part of organisational life is 
as important as the official structure in determining the nature 
of organisations and what goes on inside theQ. 
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HoW are the attitudes, expectations, belie~s and values 
which mru<e up a specific culture or ideology formed? Some of 
the early ,,,ork in this area ,.,as concerned "lith alienation at 
work. and the factors which caused it. Some people. such as 
Sayles (1958), Blauner (1964) and Woodward (1965), have argued 
that it is related to technologY. This has an impact on the 
nature of social relationships, the quality of \'lork, the degree 
of control which, in turn, influence feelings of alienation. 
Such research argues that attitudes are essentially the result 
of characteristics of the work}) lace. 
These findings were questioned by Goldthorpe et al (1968). 
Goldthorpe found that despite assembly-line technology (which, 
according to Blauner. is associated with high levels of 
alienation) \'Torkers were not dissatisfied. This ,ar.gues 
Goldthorpe, "Tas because workers had an instrumental orientation 
to work which led them to choose these jobs for the monetary 
reward, rather than their intrinsic satisfaction. The sources 
of this orientation were traced back to the class, community and 
family backgrounds of the employee rather than the workplace. 
"Technology thus appears tOo be less important 
a variable than had been suggested. The motives, 
interests and extra-work backgrounds of the 
worker had to be taken into account, if not given 
central emphasis" \'latson (1980) P 114. 
Others, hO'VTever
t 
have argued that it is \lTrong to dismiss totally 
the influence of the \'Jork place. Beynon & Blackburn (1972) 
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claim that employees try to select '.-mrk in keepinz with their 
objectives but, nevertheless, make significant adjustments at 
".,ork in keeping \.'Ji th the '..'lork processes, pay structures and 
pO'.'ler systems. \'Iedderburn & Compton (1972) found that 
instrumental workers di~played different attitudes and 
behavioLw in response to the specific constraints imposed by 
the technology and control of a particular work setting (see 
Watson, 1980). Lupton (1963.) found individualistic, as 
opposed to collective, attitudes were related to both internal 
and external factors. Locb'lOOd (1958) has argued that the 
class consciousness of black coated \'lorkers is the result of 
the '\fork situation ( the conditions at \,lOrk) , the market 
situation (income, pro8otion, security), and the status 
situation (the position of the individual in the status 
heirarchy of the society at large). 
Studies such as these demonstrate that, in the same way as 
structure and technology, attitudes and values at \'lork are 
influenced by the characteristics of the workplace and factors 
external to the organisation. There appear' to be -o.'v'O levels 
of external influence. On the one hand, there is the 
influence of values in the wider society, on the other, there 
is the impact of the specific conte:<:t in which a particular 
organisation and its members are located. 
Sone writers have pointed out that the background and eX'~eriences 
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of the local communivJ are instrumental in forming attitudes 
and ideologies. Beynon (1973) has emphasised t.l-J.e part played 
by the experiences of the Liverpool working class and the 
development of the Labour movement on Merseyside in influencin1'7 
c.> 
the attitudes of the Ford workers at Halewood. Lane & Roberts 
(1971) argue that the isolation of st Helens and the 
dependence of the town on the Pilkington Glass Works led to an 
authoritarian management and a deferential but resentful 
workforce. Hartin & Fryer (1973) examined a similar situation 
at Casterton Mills. 
Other \'lri ters have investigated the link between the values and 
atti tudes of the 'Vlider society and those expressed at \'lOrk. 
Bendix (1954), for example, has explored the relationship 
bet\:leen the dominant political ideology and how the ~uthori ty of 
managers is legitimated at work. Crozier (1964) examined how 
certain characteristics of French society '.'Tere embedded in the 
French bureaucratic system. Marxist "rri ters have also 
examined the relationship between the ideologies of the wider 
society and those at work (see, for example, Salaman, 1979). 
It seem then, that the perspectives and attitudes of those at 
\'lork are related to the 1..IJ'ider society, the local community and 
the workplace itself 
"in seeking to unravel the origins of their 
socio-political perspective and the forces which 
sustain it, it is we \'1ill argue, necessary to 
consider their 'immediate' and 'less direct' 
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experience and the wider ideological structures 
- = 
of this society and their insti tu-tional 
supports. To fail to do this is to ignore 
that the organisation and the control of the 
total socie~7 - and not just the local 
communi ty and 'lJTOrkshop - bears upon the 
organisation of knowledge about societ-y i tselfll 
Nicols & Armstrong (1976) p 29. 
Culture and ideology, it has been argued, are products of both 
internal and external forces and, in a similar way to structure 
and technology, are both outcomes and sources of pO'Vler and 
politics. One factor which highlights this is the role of the 
entrepreneur in shaping culture. Beynon (1973) has demonstrated 
the impact of the philosophy of Henry Ford on managerial 
ideology which even outlived the man himself. Lane & Roberts 
(1971) have emphasised the role of the Pilkington family in 
shaping their firm in St Helens. Martin & Fryer (1973) 
stressed the influence of family philosophies on Casterton 
r,Iills. Entrepreneurs create ideologies and cultures to 
generate order, purpose and commitment among organisational 
members \,lhich, in t1..lI'n, facilitates the achievement of their 
goals (Pettigrew, 1977, 1979). Ideology and culture can also 
be used to legitimate the ''lay things are done in a particular 
organisation by asserting the rational, inevitable and 
functional nature of that organisation. 
"Both within organiaations and without, ideas 
and attitudes exist •••• that justifY the 
form of the organisation, the locations of 
people in their various positions \'lith their 
associated reuards and deprivations and that 
clain the inevi tab iIi ty and neu"crali ty of the 
organisation and the desisn of \'!orl:, and 
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Proclain the functional value of the 
organisation's goals" Salaman (1979) P 179. 
Organisational members may attempt to shape culture and ideology 
because of the political benefits to be gained 
"by their ability to exert power over others, 
individuals can change or maintain structures 
as well as the norms and expectations upon 
which these structures rest" Pettigrew (1973) p 31. 
Thus the very nature of the organisation, in terms of both 
its structural and cultural components, is used to insulate 
and enhance power positions (Ranson et aI, 1980) 
"power becomes institutionalised by a process 
which legitimates and perpetuates not only the 
social reality of the distribution of power 
but also the various structures, procedures 
and practices which reinforce the present 
power structure" Pfeffer (1981) p 
Organisation, Environment and Outcome. 
This chapter has demonstrated ho,,! the nature of organisations, 
in particular the structural and cultural arrangements, are 
influenced by both internal and external factors. It has not, 
hO\\Tever, been suggested that the environmental and organisational 
context dictates organisational behaviour and forms. Instead, 
the implication has been that the context places outer limits 
on managerial discretion \'11 thin which a certain amount of choic'2 
is exercised. 
The existence of a degree of choice enables actors to attempt 
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to produce the outcor:les which best suit them. Such political 
behaviour is not surprising considering that organisations 
consist of a variety of interdependent and interrelated sub-
groups, each with their own goals, interests and objectives 
(Child, 1972; Pettigrew, 1973). Political behaviour is most 
likely when groups perceive threats to their position or 
opportunities to enhance their status. Pettigre\'1 (1973) and 
Mumford & Pettigrew (1975) have found that decision processes 
which threaten the existing distribution of resources are often 
associated with political behaviour for these reasons. 
A political perspective looks for connections bebieen outcomes, 
particularly those associated \-rith changes in resouroe 
distribution, and political behaviour. The success or failure 
of groups to achieve their goals is related to their sources of 
pm'rer and their ability to use them. Furthermore. the very 
nature of the organisation is not viewed as necessarily 
functional or inevitable. Instead it is examined for its 
poli tical potential as a source of power. and as a possible 
outcome of political behaviour. 
This focus on power and politics, \lrhich is expanded in Chapter 
Three, is not meant to be at the cost of ignoring contextual 
factors. It has already been mentioned that the aim of this 
chapter "ras to discuss the relationship beu'leen organisation 
and environment. The problem is that, although the discussion 
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above has clearly demonstrated that external factors do impinge 
on organisational life, it has not shed any light on the exact 
nature of the relationship, about which there is some 
considerable confusion in the literature. 
Ranson et al (1980) argue that the environment can act as a 
constraint and that we must not place too much emphasis on the 
perceptual element and the role of choice. The environment 
can and does act as an objective constraint regardless of 
peoples' perceptions of it. 
Aldrich has minimised the role of choice still fUrther 
"while there are some occasions on which 
'strategic choice' may be exercised, there 
are usually severe limits to decision-
maker autonomy" Aldrich (1979) P 28. 
"Various external constraints have been 
identified as sharply limiting the role 
that participants play in selecting 
organisations' structure and activities" 
Aldrich (1979) P 136. 
Another perspective on the impact of the environment is the 
resource-dependency approach (see, for example, Yuchtman & 
Seashore, 1967; Aiken & Hage, 1968; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
This conceives of the environment as providing various resources 
on which organisations depend - survival depends on the ability 
to aquire these resources. Patterns of interdependency exist 
between ot'ganisations, in the neblfork of institutions with. 
which a particular organisation must interact and it is this 
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net'lork \'lhich provides the resources. An organisation is 
vulnerable if it depends upon another for cX'iti:cal resources 
and so, a successful organisation is one which is able to reduce 
its dependency by acquiring access to or ownership of its 
resources, or by being able to control the use of the resources. 
Because the environment, and the patterns of interdependency, 
are constantly changing, organisational decision-makers have to 
be prepared to control or circumvent-dependency on others. 
Strategies to do this might include mergers, diversification, 
inter-locking directorships, co-optation (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978) • 
The idea of organisations responding to their environments is 
reminiscent of the arguments of Burns & Stalker (1961), Emery & 
Trist (1965), Lawrence & Lorsch (1967) and Terreberry (1968). 
Aldrich & Mindlin (1978), however, distinguish between the two 
approaches. The resource-dependency perspective views the 
environrr.ent as a source of scarce resources which are sought 
after by organisations who compete for and share them. 
Structure and actions are designed to facilitate the acquisition 
of these resources. The other writers mentioned above vie\A/ 
the environment as a source of information which is used as a 
basis for maintaining or modifying structures and processes. 
Both approaches are, however, concerned primarily with a reactive 
response to the environment. This is also true of the views 
put fOI"',."ard above by Ranson et al cmd Aldrich. The resourCe- dependency 
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theorists, hO\qever, direct Ii10re attention tm'lards the process 
"Thereby adaptations are made. This, in turn, sheds light on ''1hy 
adjustments are made and on the choices open to decision-nakers, 
suggesting that there is some room for manoeuvre. 
So far, we have considered the environment in terms of the 
varying degrees of its constraining influence and the extent to 
'''hich an organisation must react to it. Pfeffer & Salancik 
(1978), hm1lever, have suggested that a proactive stance can be 
adopted by organisational members towards the environment. 
The Environment as a Source of Power 
"\'le argue not only that organisations are 
constrained by the economic, social, political 
and legal environment but that in fact, law, 
social norms, values and political outcomes 
reflect, in part, actions taken by organisa-
tions in their interests of survival, growth 
and enhancement. 'Environment' is not only 
a given to be absorbed, avoided or accepted. 
It is itself the dynamic outcome of the 
actions of many formal organisations seeking 
their ovm interests" Pfeffer & Salancik 
(1978) p 190. 
Pfeffer & Salancik argue that organisations strive to achieve 
legitimacy for their goals, operations and activities in the 
eyes of the outside 1trorld because it ensures then social 
support for their continued activities. In this 'I:lay the 
environment provides a direct povier resource - legitimacy - to 
- t- 1 b Soc~al leQitimacy m~" be created and organ~sa ~ona mem ers. • ~ ~ 
manipulated by decision-makers, rather than simply bestowed on 
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their organisation. 
"An iTilportaY'J.t part of the management of the 
organisation's environment is the Tilw~agement 
of social legitimacy. \'nlile legitimacy is 
ultimately conferred froTil outside the 
organisation, the organisation itself may 
tru(e a number of steps to ~ssociate itself 
wi th valued social norms" Pfeffer & Salancik 
(1978) p 195 
In this \'lay , legitimacy is a resource available from the 
environment, which organisa-tional members may take active steps 
to secure by, for example, changing their activities so that 
they seem compatible with societal norms, by identifying 
themselves "lith symbols, values, institutions \'ihich do have 
a strong base of social legitimacy, or by redefining legitimacy 
(Dowling & Pfeffer t 1975). 
I.!eyer & RovJan (1977-8) argue that organisational structures are 
more likely to reflect the myths of their institutional 
environment, thus gaining legitimacy, than they are the demands 
of their work act;ivi ties. In this "Iay, organisations may 
survive as a result of being socially accepted and valued 
rather than by being efficient (Hirsch, 1975). Legitimacy can 
also help to buffer organisations against environmental 
uncertainty which threatens their effectiveness. 
Organisational members "/ho try to redefine legitimacy are 
seeking to change the environment rather than the organisation, 
making the environment fit the organisation rather than the 
th d Other \'lri ters have emphasised the importance o .er way roun • 
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of ch~~2in6 the environment and proactively managing the 
poli tical-econouy and institutional environment of the 
organisation in order to secure economic and poli-t:;ical resources. 
See, for example, Zald (1970), \'Jarmsley & Zald (1973), 
Benson (1975), Pfeffer & Salancik (1978). These writers 
demonstrate the importance of viewing the environrnent not only 
as a constraint, but also as a potential source of power 
which is manipulated by organisations in their attempts to 
secure that power. 
"Legitimacy provides a linkage between the 
organisational and societal levels of analysis. 
Legitimacy ~d social norms w~d values 
constrain the actions taken by individual 
organisations. At the same time actions 
tru(en by organisations for the purpose of 
legit~ation can actually alter the values 
and norms" Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) p 131. 
The discussion above has been couched in terms of legitimacy 
and resources for the organisation. Of course, as has been 
stressed before, this refers to the dominant members' attempts 
to acquire legitimacy and resources in order to fulfil their 
goals. Such members may be in a strong position to acquire the 
resources they need but other groups .. may also seek to use the 
environment for their ovm ends. 
Summary and Conclusions. 
This chapter has attempted to examine the nature of the 
relationship beb. ... een organisation and envirol1T::ent. It has 
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highlizhted the re "tationship be~JJeen political processes and 
outcor~es, especially when those outcones are connected v.'i th 
cha.'1.ges in the distribution of resources. It acknm'Tledges the 
role of the environQent, both in terms of its constraininc. 
c..> 
influence on organisational activities and in terms of its 
provision of power sources and attempts by organisational 
r.tembers to modify it. 'Any theoretical franework which is 
successful in combining these features 
"must "work out from, but beyond, both the 
'structural' perspective of specifying abstract 
dimensions and contextual constraints, and the 
'interactionist' perspective of symbolic media 
mediation and negotiated processes. These 
procedures and perspectives which, until nm'1, 
have tended to be regarded as incompatible, 
must be incorporated in a more unified 
methodological and theoretical frallework" 
Ranson ~"~ (1980) p 1. 
The actual impact of the environment on the organisation \'Iill 
depend upon the individual case: sometimes it will act as a 
total constraint; in some cases there will be some lee"'Tay for 
organisational members; in others, members. will be in a position 
to manipulate the environ.'TIent. This dra\>1S attention to the 
need to incorporate external influences into organisational 
analysis and to be aware of the different forms this relation-
ship can ta.1ze. 
To make any pro,p:ress tovJards an understanding of organi":":'3.tional 
life , it is necessary to incorpora-t;e several levels of 
analysis. Firstly there is a need to investigate the 
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or~anisational level, in particular the political p~ocesse3. 
There is also a need to incorporate the context. This includes 
organisational characteristics such as size, technology, structure 
and culture, and the envirop~ent of the organisation in question, 
for example, the community in which it is located, the 
insti tutional net\llOrks 1I-li th which it interacts, the industrial 
sector of which it is a part. Finally there is the impact or 
the \'lider society which will have a general effect on all 
organisations in that society, at that time. Contextual and 
societal influences must be examined not only in terms of their 
direct constraining influences, but also for their provision 
of power sources for the various interest groups. 
Pettigrew & Bumstead (1981) and Pettigrew (forthcoming) have 
also adopted different levels of analysis (in this case: 
outer environment; context; group; individual) in an attempt 
to reformulate organisational analysis and bring in the 
socio-econo~ic c~ntext as part of the analysis of organisational 
process. 
These recommendations guide my OVln research into closure. 
The focus \Ifill be on the political processes in the mana,?;ement 
of closure but, at the same time, due recognition \lIill be 
given to the socio-economic fabric of contemporary Britain 
wi th \'lhich current closures are inevitably and inextricably 
linlced. 
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Chapter Three 
POWER AND POLITICS 
The previous chapter has demonstrated the need to adopt a 
political view of organisations. It has long been argued that 
organisational outcomes, particularly those which threaten 
interest groups or which provide a vehicle for serving their 
interests, are not the result of rational decision-making but 
political activity (see, for example, Pettigrew, 1973). This 
chapter is intended to examine the issues of power and politics 
in more detail. 
PO'lller: A\'lav' from a definition. 
Power is a comp lex concept to grasp and has always evoked a 
considerable amount of controversy around the definition and 
use of the term (see, for example, Partridge, 1970; Nagel, 1975; 
Lukes, 1977). 
"The question of how to define the concept 
of power is a notoriously unsettled oneil 
Lukes (1977) p 4. 
This has resulted in a proliferation of different definitions 
being used by writers "'lith little, if any, agreement between 
them, and a confusion between power and similar terms such as 
authority and influence (Nagel, 1975). 
- 37 -
The problem, according to Allison (1974), results from a 
failure to see the limitations of the concept \'lhich is too 
general and which should, perhaps, be replaced by a more specific 
and \'lell-defined term. Bachrach & Lawler (1980) argue that 
pO\lJ'er is inherently a primitive term and, as such, is bound to 
be vague. Rather than attempting to pin it down to a precise 
definition, we should be using it to reveal the complexity and 
multi-dimensionality of the phenomenon, to integrate ideas and, 
perhaps, to develop more specific concepts. 
"Extant work on pm'ler usually attempts to 
impose on the concept a level of precision 
beyond that appropriate for a primitive 
term. Thus, we must ask not what i!! power 
but to what does the notion of pm'ler 
sensitise us" Bachrach & Lawler (1980) P 14. 
This is sound advice - attention should be directed towards 
asking what power comprises and how it produces results, rather 
that what it is. 
There have been a number of different ways of approaching the 
question of power and recent discussions of these (for example, 
Gavents, 1980; Saunders, 1980) have tended to follow Lukes's 
pattern of dividing the literature i~to three categories. 
The One-Dimensional Approach. 
One vie".l of power is that of the pluralists (Dahl, 1957, 1961; 
Polsby, 1963; Parsons, 1963; Wolfinger, 1971). The focus here 
is on the decision-making process. The pm'rerful are those \'lho 
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are able to influence the process in order to.obtain the 
decisions they want. Pm'Ter, according to the pluralists, is 
only exercised in key issues and decisions \·rhen conflict is 
clearly observable. Other than this, consensus prevails. 
The narro'llmess of this approach has been severely criticised 
(Giddens, 1968; Lukes, 1974; Gavents, 1980; Saunders, 1980) 
for its failure to recognise that interests and grievances might 
remain inarticulated and outside the decision-~aking arena. 
Consequently, conflict might well exist even though it is not 
directly qbservable. The focus on decision-making has been 
criticised because of its assumption that the use of pm'Ter ~s 
confined to this arena and that access to it is equally 
available to all organisational members. 
The ~~o-Dimensional Approach. 
Bachrach & Baratz (1962, 1963, 1970) \~ere among the first to 
take issue with the pluralists' approach. They developed the 
notion of a second face of power in which power, rather than 
simply being exercised within decision-making processes, is 
used to exclude certain issues and individuals from that very 
process. The pm'lerful are able to use mechanisms such as 
* the mobilisation of bias and nondecision-making to squeeze 
For a more detail,~d discussion of these ter:-:1S see below P 3.17. 
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people out, confining decision-making to safe issues. In this 
way outcomes are the result of decision-making and nondecision-
making. This approach, however, fails to deal with the other 
defect inherent in the one-dimensional vie\'l of power. Bachrach 
& Baratz continue to confine themselves to observable conflict 
whj.ch may be overt or covert but, nevertheless, still exists 
"in order for a power relationship to exist 
there must be a conflict of interests or 
values" Bachrach & Baratz (1970) p 633. 
In other \'fords , although they consider the use of power to 
suppress issues and prevent them froD coming up for decision-
making, they do not consider its use to prevent issues from 
being articulated and observable-conflict from arising. By 
doing this, they assume that the absence of grievances and 
manifest conflict means consensus but 
"to assume genuine consensus in a situation 
where there is no apparent conflict (that is, 
to give the system - and the powerful - the 
benefit of the doubt) appears to be no more 
justifiable on theoretical grounds than to 
assume that such a situation necessarily 
indicates the existence of a widespread 
false consciousness" Saunders (1980) p 33. 
The Third Dimension of Power. 
This is Lukes's'(1974) attempt to correct the deficiencies of 
the one- and two-dimensional views. He argues that pO\,ler is 
mobilised not only to prevent issues and conflict from 
entering the decision-making arena but also to prevent issues 
and conflict from arising at all. PO\,ler can be used to prevent 
people 
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"from having grievances by shaping their 
~erceptionst cognitions, and preferences in 
such a \'fay that they accept their role in 
the existing order of things, either because 
they can see or imagine no alternative to it, 
or because they see it as natural and 
unchangeable, or because they value it as 
divinely ordained and beneficial" Lukes 
(1974) p 24. 
In other words, "'e can not confine our study of power to 
observable conflict, the outcomes of decisions, or even 
suppressed issues. We must also consider the question of 
political inactivity and quiescence: why grievances are not 
formulated; why demands are not made; why conflict does not 
arise, as this may be the result of the exercise of power 
(Lukes, 1974; Gavents, 1980; Saunders, 1980). 
"\lIe may, in other words, be duped, hoodwinked, 
coerced, cajoled or manipulated into political 
inactivity" Saunders (1980) p 22. 
Power: From Three Dimensions to Two. 
Lukes's three-dimensional classification has become the 
traditional \'lay of discussing power (see, for example, 
Gavents, 1980; Saunders, 1980). Despite this three-fold 
division, it seems to me that pO\,ler, or the use of power, 
falls more naturally into one of U'lO camps. The first U'lO 
dimensions are concerned with power being exercised in the 
face of competition, conflict or opposition. This is plainly 
clear in the work of the pluralists, but also in the work of 
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of Bachrach -&- Baratz where 
"even here, however, the focus was very much 
upon 'issues' about which 'decisions' have to 
be made, albeit 'nondecisions'. Power in 
this view' stands close to action, using the 
bases of power to ensure compliance' 
Ranson ~ al (1980) p 8. 
but, as Ranson et al continue, 
"power is most effective and insidious in 
its consequences when issues do not arise 
at all, when actors remain Una\'Tare of their 
sectional claims, that is, power is mo~t 
effective when it is unnecessaryll .'p 8. 
This is \'rhere Lukes's discussion of power comes in - the ability 
to shape values, preferences, cognitions, perceptions so that 
grievances and issues do not arise or, if they do, they are 
never articulated or transformed into demands and challenges. 
Other writers have drawn attention to the more subtle aspects of 
power. Fox (1973) has pointed out that the powerful do not 
need to make their power visible because their position is 
rarely challenged. Hyman & Fryer- (1975), in their discussion 
of trade union power, have distinguished between objective 
power based on material sources of pO'l.'1er, and subjective power 
which rests on the awareness of workers that they are in a 
disadvantaged position and that political issues exist. 
Pettigre\'/ has dra\'rn attention to the cultural and unobtrus i ve 
aspects of control in his 1977 and 1979 papers. 
If this two-level analysis of power is extended it becomes 
clear that it affords a degree of flexibility that the three-
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dimensional model does not, without losing sight of the 
inportant insights of Lukes's 'Work. PO','fer can be used in two 
ways - one use of power is to prevail in the face of conflict, 
the other is to prevent that conflict from arising in the first 
place. 
Overt Pm-Fer. 
Overt power refers to the ability to produce preferred outcomes 
in the face of competition and conflict. The decision-making 
arena is one mechanism ,...rhich can be used to achieve these 
outcomes. PO\,ler is exercised to produce favourable decisions 
(the pluralist approach) or to keep dangerous issues out of the 
arena (nondecison-making). Either way, the decision-making 
process produces, positively or negatively, the desired result. 
Outcomes can be influenced outside of this arena, for exa~ple, 
the implementation of decisions may become a political process 
as groups attempt to impose or block decisions already made. 
The sources of overt power are grounded in the differential 
access to material and structural resources (Ranson et aI, 
1980). Because resources are differentially distributed 
some actors are dependent upon others for access to them. 
Dependency relations confer power onto those providing the 
reSOt~ces to others (Emerson, 1962). The successful control 
and management of these scarce resources allows political 
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actors to influence decisions, agendas, resource allocations 
and the implementation of decisions. 
Pm'ler involves the possession of strategic resources on which 
others depend. Pettigrew (1973), for example, argues that 
power sources include access to information, expertise, assessed 
stature, political access and sensitivi~y. Mechanic (196~ 
has suggested that lower participants are able tp acquire 
pOVler through their access to information, people and 
instrumentalities (equipment and machinery) which makes others 
dependent on them. Hickson ~ al (1971) argue that the power of 
a sub-unit is related to its ability to cope with uncertainty, 
to the extent to which it can be substituted, and to hm'/ 
central it is to the workflow. Hickson places the sources of 
power in the technology and diviSion of labour within an 
organisation. Other sources, such as access to ~nformation, are 
8lsogrounded in the organisational context. Other power 
sources may have their roots in the ~ernal context. Expertise, 
for example, is derived from training, education and previous 
experience. The country's legislation m~ provide some with 
a source of pOVler. 
The sourceS of overt power lie in the access to scarce resources 
which, in turn, is derived from the organisational and 
environmental setting in \·rhich the actors are located. 
Pettigrew (1973) has argued that it is not enough to possess 
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these sources, political ac'i.;ors must also be aVJare of them, and 
able to control and tactically use them, if they are to be 
successful. Thus political success depends not only on the 
possession of strategic resources, but also on the ability to 
mobij.ise them: dependency relations have to be managed. In 
this way we move a\-ray from a static vie\'1 of pm-rer to a vie ... 'r 
of a political process. 
Unobtrusive Power. 
There is a need to go beyond the notion of overt power and 
examine the whole question of power in more depth. Power, as 
Lukes has stressed, can be utilised to prevent issues and 
conflicts from arising - to secure acceptance and quiescence. 
An understanding of the unob-crusi ve side of pm'rer should help 
us to understand quiescence as a possible result of power 
relationships. It should also help us to understand under 
what conditions rebellion might arise, and what form it might 
take. 
"Power \'lorks to develop and maintain the 
quiescence of the powerless. Rebellion, as 
a corollary, may emerge as pm'ler relation-
ships are altered. Together power and 
pm'rer lessness can keep issues from arising, 
grievences from being voiced and interests 
from being recognised" Gavents (1980) P ,,{ii. 
Political actors may define success, not so much in terms of 
\';inning in the face of confrontation (where there must always 
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be a risk of losing), but in terQS of the ability to section 
off spheres of influence where domination is perceived as 
legi timate and thus unchallenged. The unobtrusive side of po\'ler 
revolves around attempts to create legitimacy and justification 
for certain arrangements, actions and outcoQes so that they are 
never questioned. Tn this way, power is not only mobilised to 
achieve physical outcomes but also to give these outcomes 
certain neanings; to legitimise and justifY them. 
"Political analysis must then proceed on bJO 
levels simultaneously. It must examine how 
political actions get some groups the tangible 
things they want from government and at the 
same time it must explore what -these same 
actions mean to the mass public and hO't'J it is 
placated or aroused by them. In Himmelstrand's 
terms, political actions are both instrumental 
and expressive" Edelman (1964) p 12 
Pfeffer (1981) has distinguished betvleen substantive and 
sentiment outcomes of pml]er. The former are physical outcomes 
and depend largely on resource-dependency considerations. The 
latter refer to the way people feel about the physical outcomes. 
These are mainly influenced by the symbolic aspects of power -
the use of political language t symbols and rituals. My use of 
the term overt power corresponds to P.feffer's resource-
dependency considerations and their effect on substantive 
outcomes t and my discussion of unobtrusive pO\'ler is closely 
linked with the symbolic aspects of power expounded by Pfeffer. 
Below is a diagram \"hich explains in nore detail the "t\'lO aspects 
of pm!er and their effect on outcomes. 
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DiMram 3.1 
; 
The Overt and Unobtrusive Aspects of Power 
Resource-Dependency 
Considerations: 
OVERT PO\'JER 
SUBSTANTIVE 
. OUTCOMES 
Symbolic Aspects 
of . power: 
UNOBTRUSIVE POVIER 
SENTIMENT 
OUTCOl-'IES 
The mobilisation of the sources of power based on resource-
dependency patterns enables actors to produce the physical or 
substantive outcomes they desire. The use of unobtrusive power, 
by manipulating symbols and language enables power-holders to 
produce certain sentiments among other groups. Pfeffer argues 
that there is only a vreak relationship beu:leen the symbolic 
aspect of power and substantive outcomes. I would argue, 
however, that there is a strong relationship. By engineering 
sentiments among the power-less, the po" .. Terf'ul are able to 
endO\'/ their actions or proposed actions with legitimacy in the 
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eyes of ether individuals. Actiens and decisiens which are 
perceived to' be legitimate are unlikely to' questiened er 
epp esed. As a result the p ewerhelders ~chieve theoutce:nes 
they want because nebedy attempts to' prevent them frem 
deing So'. Unebtrusive power-is used to' achieve substantive 
eutcemes by influencing sentiments such that eutcemes are 
. deemed legitimate, inevitable er acceptable (in the manner 
described by Lukes). Anether relatienshiep emitted by Pfeffer 
is that beuITeen evert pO\'Jer and sentiments - the use ef evert 
pewer, especially if it is perceived as excessively ceercive, 
may preduce hestile sentiments tewards its use and the eutcemes 
it is intended to preduce - the means :renders the end unjustifiable. 
The essence of the unebtrusi ve aspect ef pm'ler is the ability 
to' give meaning to' events and actiens, and to' influence the 
perceptiens ef ethers So' they they either remain unaware ef the 
implicatiens ef pelitical eutcemes er view them in a faveurable 
way. Unebtrusive pewer is thus feunded in the ability:-te define 
reality, net enly fer eneself, but fer ethers. 
Varieus epistemelegical and theeretical stances allO\'r individuals 
a ~egree ef freedem in defining reality. Secial actien theery, 
fer example, suggests that secial reality is secially 
censtructed but that meanings are given to' us by society: 
seciety defines us and we define seciety in a brQ-\aJ'ay precess 
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(Silverman, 1970). Solipsism asserts that the \'lhole world is 
the creation of the mind and has no existence beyond the 
perceived sensations of the: mind al"ld body (see Burrell & 
Morgan, 1979). Some\'lhere between these two perspectives lies 
phenomenology (see, for example, Schutz, 1972). This argues 
that meaning is still subjective but reality lies in the inter-
subjective set of classifications which are used by people as 
they attempt to make sense of what they see and feel. In 
other words, reality is perceived individually but, because 
ne".'l experiences are classified on the basis of past experiences 
and stocks of knO\'lledge t they are contextually and culturally 
grounded. Consequently, there is likely to be a high degree 
of inter-subjectivity between people in sLrnilar social 
situations (Burrell & Morgan, 1979). 
If we accept that reality, at least to a degree, is socially 
constructed, then there is rOom for individuals to define 
reality. It has been suggested by some that this ability 
is not equally distributed throughout society. Although the 
broad paradigm may be similar for particular groups and 
societies there are, in fact, mUltiple realities or perceptions 
of reality. The definitions which are most likely to be 
adopted are those of the more powerful 
"he \'Jho has the bigger stick has the better 
chance of imposing his definition of 
reality" Berger & Luckmann (1960) P 126-7. 
Consequently, there are some groups who are able to define 
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reality for others as \,le1l as themselves. Such groups "'Till 
tend to be those , .. ,ho control the mechanisms 'which "teach" us 
our values, beliefs, attitudes and \'lhich help us to form our 
perceptions of life, for example, the media, education and 
other information channels. It has long been argued, 
par'ticularly by Marxist vrriters, tha-t those who possess 
ideological power of this nature are those \'Tho are also privy 
to material domination. See Burrell & Horgan (1979). 
This is the dominant theme of Gramsci's work (see Boggs, 1976) 
who coined the phrase "ideological hegemony". This refers to 
situations in which 
"a s-tructu.re of power relations is fully 
legitimised by an integrated system of 
cultural and normative assumptions" 
Hyman & Brough (1975) P 199. 
In this case, the ability to define reality is restricted 
solely to dominant classes who use it ,to support and justify 
their material domination, thus preventing challenges to their 
position. 
Other \'rri ters, hQi.'lever, disagree wi tb the view that this source 
of power is the exclusive ability of the elite. 
"All social actors, no matter hO\'l lO'l'dy, 
have some degree of penetration of the 
social forms that oppress" Giddens (1979) 
p 72. 
\~e should not assume that dominant groups alor:e have recourse 
to unobtrusive po\·rer and the ability to define reality. Instead, 
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we should vie"l the ideological bases of power as being 
differentially distributed throughout societ-y, in much the same 
W2.y as the sources of overt pO'Jler. Some groups may be more 
likely to possess these sources but that does not render other 
groups totally defenceless - im most circumstances there will 
be some sources of power they can seek out and employ. This 
enables us to move a1.'lay from the conception of ideological 
pm'ler purely in class terms, and we can start to examine its 
use in other arenas. such as organisations. 
The politics of unobtrusive, power_is associated with attempts 
by interest groups to legitir:lise their demands and "delegitimise" 
the demands of others, which, Pettigrew,{1977b; 1979) refers to 
as the management of meaning. Dominant groups engage in it to 
prevent people from becoming a'ware of grievances, to prevent 
grievances from being transformed into challenges, to 
depoliticise issues, to legitimise existing power positions. 
Subordinate and potential OPPOSition groups, on the other hand, 
will attempt to make people aware of grievances, poli ticise 
issues, and delegitimise the status quo. Both groups \'rill, 
by attempting to manage meaning, be using the symbolic and 
unobtrusive aspects of pO\'ler. 
"Politics concerns the creation of legitimacy 
for certain ideas, values and demands - not 
just action performed as a result of 
previously acquired legitimacy. The manage-
ment of meaning refers to a process of symbol 
construction and value use designed both to 
create legitimacy for one's own demands and 
to 'delegitimise' the demands of others" 
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Pettigre\I, (1977 b) p. 85. 
The Eechanisms and Sources of Unobtrusive Po·wer. 
One obvious source of unobtrusive povrer for some groups is the 
ideological hegemony of the wider society. Solaman (1980) 
argues that there are a variety of societal mechanisms which 
help prevent the formation of full class consciousness and 
political organisation, thereby gaining quiescence to the 
s·tatus quo. Salaman acknowledges t however, 
"that desp i te the 'success' of such societal 
mechanisms, the extent of quiescence, 
resignation or class consciousness varies 
from plant to plant, industry to industry, 
region to region" Salaman (1980) p 29 
which must mean that there are other, local sources of 
unobtrusive pov/er. 
One local source of unobtrusive power for dominant organisational 
members is their ability to institutionalise their existing 
power in structures and cultures to protect it from change. As 
has been discussed in the previous chapter, structure, culture 
and technology are important vrays of .... enabling some groups to 
protect their interests. 
"The ideoloaical nature of organisational 
= decisions and events or structure and processes 
is mystified, disguised and denied by the very 
structures \'lhich advance and perpetuate the 
oppression of organisational members. For it 
is often argued that nembers of organisations 
are constrained and frustrated not by human 
acrencv or sectional interests, but by 
L) '" , 
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neutral technology, inevitable market pressures, 
unavoidable sc~.entific-technical advances, the 
need to 'rationalise'" Salaman (1979) 0 181. 
So, the very nature of the organisation acts as a source of 
pm'rer for some groups, and as a mechanism by \-'hich some groups 
are controlled, unknowingly, and directed towards the objectives 
of others. 
Structure and culture can also be used by senior organisational 
members to acquire legitimacy in the eyes of individuals 
outside the organisation (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978) by reflecting the myths and demands of the 
institutional environ~ent rather than norms of efficiency 
(r.1eyer & Rowan, 1977-8). 
"By designing a formal struc'bure·that 
adheres to the prescription of ~rths in 
the institutional environment an organisa-
tion demonstrates that it is acting on 
collectively valued purposes in a proper 
and adequate manner. The incorporation of 
institutionalised elements provides an 
account of its activities that protects 
the organisation from having its conduct 
questioned" Meyer & Rowan (1977-8) P 349. 
Another mechanism which can aid dominant organisational groups 
is the mobilisation of bias. Bachrach & Baratz (1970) use the 
term to refer to 
"a set of oredominant values, beliefs, rituals 
and instit~tional procedures ('rules of the 
game') that operate systematically and 
consistently to the benefit of certain 
persons and groupS at the expense of others" 
Bachrach & Baratz (1970) p 43. 
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Bachrach & Baratz use the term - the mobilisation of bias - in 
an overt sense 'where actors consciously and actively use the 
bias of the systen to exclude certain issues from the decision-
making arena. It implies a planned effort to squash specific 
demands by using the available opportunities. It entails 
"more or less direct manipulation. It does 
not cover the situation of 'ltlhich the essential 
feature is common acceptance of certain 
basic premises, \vhich nobody directly 
engaged in dispute, bargaining or advice 
considers it realistic to challenge" 
\',Jestergaard & Resler (1976) 0 148. 
More recent writers, including Lukes (1974) and Saunders (1980), 
have used the concept to refer to the situation described in 
the quote above. As such, the concept refers to the use of 
unobtrusive power; to the exertion, by dominant interests, of 
such a degree of control over value and political systems that 
certain demands are never e:h""P.ressed. It seems to me that the 
current usage of the term evokes more of an idea of unobtrusive 
power, despite its original association with Bachrach & Baratz. 
The behaviours noted by these authors \I/ould seem better 
accomodated by the concept of nondecision-making where force, 
sanctions, threats, procedures, precedents, rules and symbols 
are used to thwart challenges by l-<eeping them out of the 
decision-making arena. For these reasons I intend to use 
the mobilisation of bias as a mechanism of unobtrusive pm'rer, 
in the same \'lay as Saunders (1980) and confine the use of 
negative or nondecision-making to the overt side of pO\'/er. 
Another mechansin \I/hich might favour dOfilinant groups goes under 
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the heading of anticipated reactions. Actors are aware of 
grieva."'1ces but challenges are not made either for fear of the 
consequences, or because it is not considered vTorth\'lhile. The 
enpirical problem here is to distinguish beu1een those 
anticipated reactions which are "genuine" and those vlhich are 
the result of another group's intervention. The latter might 
\'Tell represent a power ploy to "persuade" groups not to. make 
certain demands. 
The institutionalisation of power VIi thin struc1;ural and 
cuI tural arrangements, the ideological hegemony of the \'dder 
society, the mobilisation of bias and the manipulation of 
anticipated reactions undoubtedly exist to the benefit of 
dominant groups in society. It is more difficult, however, to 
trace their existence to specific groups. These advantages 
have evolved over long periods of time and \'Ie cannot hold a 
particular group causally responsible for them, even. thoueh 
it may benefit from them. 
"This is not to deny that the pO\'lerful may 
succeed in imposing their definitions of 
reality on others, but the definitions they 
impose are necessarily confined \'li thin the 
context of the dominant form of life or 
hegemonic principle" Saunders (1980) p 36. 
Furtherr.1ore, the workings of these "bJpes of mechanisms are 
likely to be so subtle and unobtrusive as to be unnoticeable. 
They achieve outcomes almost by def2ult, because demands and 
challenges to the status quo are si:-:'ply not made. As a result 
. , 
the impact of these nechanisms is hard to detect: political 
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inactivity due to mechanisms such as these may be difficult to 
distinguish from political inactivity which is the result of 
people being genuL"'1ely happy with the state of their affairs. 
H\'!e need, that is, to distinguish between an 
authoritative relationshcLp in \'Thich 
legi tinacy is voluntarily ceded from belm'l. 
and various forms of manipulative 
relationships in \I!hich legitimacy is in 
some way imposed from above. The problem 
is that empirically t both types of power 
relationship are likely to appear the 
same" Saunders (1980) p 28. 
There are difficulties then, in establishing the existence of 
these types of unobtrusive power relationship. Lukes's (1974) 
solution to this problem is to measure "true" or "real" 
interests and, if these are not being met for any reason, he 
concludes that power is at 'tJork. This approach has been 
heavily criticised because of the difficulties in measuring 
true interests (Martin, 1977; Gavents, 1980). Saunders (1980) 
purports to have overcome this by arguing that, although 
true interests can not be directly ascertained, the overall 
pattern of costs and benefits associated with a decision can 
be evaluated and, through this, true interests assessed. This 
may be possible ",!i th straight forlJ.Jare decisions, for example t 
no pollution is better than pollution. It is not, however, so 
feasible \'li th more comp lex decisions. If, for example, no 
pollution is only available at the expense of increased costs 
then the price of goods Bight rise and/or eoployment night fall;" 
How does one measure the benefits of reduced pollution against 
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t:'1e costs of hir;her prices or reduced job opportu..n.ities? 
Benton (1981) has a~so drawn attention to the problems of 
usine real interests to determine the use of pmlJer because of 
the evaluative nature of their measuremen-t. Benton claims to 
have solved this with his use of the concep-t of "objectives". 
This solution is. hO\·Iever. too arbitrary and confusing to 
advance the argument. 
The difficulties in measuring true interests have not, in 
my opinion, been satisfactorily overcome to allow its use on an 
emp irical basis. The use of such subtle processes as those 
mentioned above cannot, as yet, be eDpirically ascertained and 
verified even though they doubtless exist. It is not the 
essence of Lul':es' s concept of pm'fer "lhich is at issue, but his 
use of real interests to verify .' it. 
"It is clearly the concept of 'real' or 
'objective' interests rather than the 
concept of power "Ihich is the precise 
site of the difficulty, since it is the 
politically evaluative character of 
attributions of interest ~!Jhich renders the 
vie\\[ of pol,,IJer on ,.;hich they depend 'essentially 
contested'" Benton (1981) P 164. 
This problem can, h01.'Tever, be partially overcome by the use of 
the terr.1 powerlessness. This ackno\lTledges the fact that some 
groups are politically disadvantaged through no fault of their 
o\'m, and allo\,ls speculation and documentation of the processes 
which r.lay' have produced_this, 'IIli thout attributing the cause to 
the use of pm'!er by specific groups or individuals. 
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Unobtrusive power can, hO\,lever, be used to influence sentiments 
in a more open was-, to secure the acceptance of desired 
substantive outcomes by other groups. In this case, its use 
can be empirically ascertained without the need to resort to 
real interests. In a situation, such as closure, where there 
is a potential conflict of interest, groups and individuals 
may be prepared to admit that they have taken steps to 
influence perceptions in order to secure the acceptance of 
preferred outcomes. If admissions can be connected \,li th actions 
which, in turn, can be traced to outcomes, it is fair to assume 
that unobtrusive power has been at \\lork, especially if there are 
no other persuasive explanations. In this way, the use of 
unobtrusive power can be ascertained, even if those people 
being influenced and manipulated are unaware of it. 
Various mechanisms will be utilised in attempts to manage 
meaning and influence sentiments in this way. Some of these 
are discussed below. 
Symbols 
This term is often used as an all-embracing concept to include 
language, rituals and myths. Essentially, the important aspect 
of symbols is that they stand for something other than themselves 
_ the meanina is in society, not in the symbol (Edelman, 1964). 
-=> 
Furthermore they have a multiplicity of meanings which can 
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be useful in politics (Abner Cohen. 1975). 
LaTlguage 
Language is an important aspect of political activity 
(Pettigrew, 1977, 1979; Pfeffer, 1981). It can work as a 
catalyst to mobilise support, or as a device to cloud issues 
and quiet opposition (Edelman, 1964). Mueller (1973) points 
9ut how the obfuscation of political reality can be achieved 
with the use of a highly evocative language. On the other 
hand, language and political consciousness are -closely linked. -It 
typifies and stabilises experiences, integrating them into a 
meaningful whole (Pettigrew, 1977, 1979). Martin (1977) 
points out that groups who can perceive their situation 
experientially but \'Tho are unable to translate these specific 
experiences into general terms will be unable to adequately 
define their own position. This, in turn, \\fill inhibit 
political consciousness and activity. Language, therefore, is 
likely to be an important device in both restricting 
opposition and rallying support. 
Hyths 
This phenemenon is probably the most empirically explcred 
aspect of symbolism in political activity. Myths have been 
defined as fictional narratives and, more explicitly, as 
- 59 -
narratives of events which explore issues of origin and 
transformation (see, for exc~plet Abner Cohen, 1975; Pettigrew, 
1977, 1979). Nyths can be used to legitimate existing power 
positions (Abner Cohen, 1975; Anthony Cohen, 1975; Pettigrew, 
1977, 1979; Gavents, 1980), by emphasising the inportance of the 
past and of tradition. They can also be used to question the 
legitimacy of the status quo and emphasise the importance of 
change and modernisation (Anthony Cohen, 1975). So, myths can 
be used to both justify or challenge the sy~tem. 
Rituals, Ceremonies and Settings_ 
These are the more physical aspects of symbolis8. Ritual, rite 
and ceremony appear to be used interchangeably. They refer to 
procedures and ceremonies which convey certain messages a~d 
meanings. So, for example, the ceremony of dismissal and 
replacement might be used to s~g~al change, discredit past 
practices, warn others. Meetings may ta~e on a ritual 
character in order to convey messages to the participants. 
Settings, including the grandeur of rooms and the seating 
arrangements, can express the importance assigned to meetings 
and individuals (Peters, 1978). 
Summary and Conclusions. 
This chanter has attempted to examine the way in which pC'.'1er 
... 
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and political activity can be used to produce de~~~ed outco 
_JO...L Des. 
A tVlO-fold analysis of power has been suggested which is 
documented in more detail be 1m.., • This focus on intra-
organisational processes should not blind us to the fact that 
the political processes within organisations are contexually 
embedded in the wider society. 
"PO'I.'ler within organisations is related to 
the distribution of pOitler outside the 
or9-anisation. The various features of 
processes of organisational control 
sanctions, control mechfuLisms, 
legitimating ideologies, resources, 
justificatory assumptions about the 
qualities and intelligence of 'types' of 
personnel etc - derive from, and only 
make sense (or could succeed) in terms 
of their surrounding society. The 
inequalities of organisations reflect 
the inequalities of the host societ:r" 
Salaman (1979) p 2. 
The diagram belm\]' illustrates the relationships involved in the' 
unobtrusive and overt aspects of po'wer: 
(i) Overt po\'rer is based on the_ control of scarce resources 
and resource interdependencies. Success depends upon more 
than the mere ownership of these power bases J they also have 
to be brought into action through a process of pow'er 
mobilisation. 
(ii) The mobilisation of overt power sources enables actors 
to achieve the substantive outcomes they desire, for example, 
in the form of budget and resource allocations, decision 
outcome and implementation. Overt power is mobilised by actors 
in their atteopts to secure these outcomes in spite of 
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Diagram 3.2 
The Overt and Unobtrusive Aspects of Pmler 
OVERT POl.'lER ( Dc) UNOBTRUSIVE PO\VER 
derived from resource derived from the 
interdependence and ~~-------------->~ symbolic and hege-
control monic aspects of 
power 
(i) 
via POWER 
MOBILISATION 
(ii) (x) 
SUBSTANTIVE 
OUTCOMES 
(v) 
/ 
4: 
opposition and conflict. 
(vi) 
(vii) 
(viii) 
via the MANAGE-
I:IENT OF MEANING 
(x) 
~ 
. SENTU1ENT 
) OUT C01.IE S 
(iii) 
(bJ) 
(iii) Unobtrusive power is derived from hegemonic and symbolic 
Sources which are brought into play through a process called 
the management of meaning. 
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(iv) Unobtrusive power can be used to influence sentiments. It 
mi~ht, for example, be used in conjtIDction \'rith overt uO\'ler 
one producing the desired outcomes, the other producing 
favourable feelings towards those outcomes. 
(v) Unobtrusive power can produce substantive outcomes 
directly. Factors such as the institutionalisation of pm'ler 
and the bias of the system ensure that certain demands and 
challenges are never made because actors are unaware that the 
issues are political, that there is any alternative or that 
grievances exist. In this case, because of the prevailing 
ideological hegemony, substantive outcomes are achieved by 
default. This relationship corresponds closely to Lukes's 
third dimension of power. 
(vi) Unobtrusive power can produce substantive outcomes in 
a less direct w~. In this case, unobtrusive mechanisms are 
used to produce favourable sentiments towards certain outcomes. 
So, steps are taken to "persuade" other groups to 
desired outcomes. 
accept 
(vii) There may be relationship between substantive outcomes 
and sentiments - some outcomes may be so unpalatable that 
they automatically produce hostile sentiments. 
(viii) The excessive use of overt power may, for example, 
produce hostile sentiments. 
(ix) 
power 
other. 
There may be a relationship bev,lTeen the bIO types of 
the successful use of one may preclude the use of the 
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(x) There '-'Till be feedback from the outcomes into the po\'ler 
systems. The existence of certain physical outcomes and 
sentiments may, for example, increase or reduce the power 
sources of the groups involved. 
To sum up, the analysis of political activity requires an exam-
ination of both the overt and unobtrusive aspects of power. 
"It is through competition and conflict that 
occurs at once on both a symbolic level as 
well as \'1i th respect to interdependencies 
and power relationships that the outcomes 
of organisational power and politics get 
determined" Pfeffer (1981) P 229. 
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Chapter Four 
A Frarne\'lork for Closure 
The previous tvTO chapters have been designed to provide a 
comprehensive framework which accounts for the interrelation-
ships between organisation and environment and which explains 
the role of power and politics. It is now time to see whether 
this framework has any relevance for the area of organisational 
closure. This chapter revie\'1s the previous two and relates 
the frame,,,ork to closure on the basis of secondary data from 
the existing research on closure and redundancy. 
The ~~o major principles which have emerged from the preceding 
discussion are (i) the environment must be examined as well as 
the organisation if we are to understand what goes on within 
organisations. and (ii) a political vie'-' of organisations 
is likelv to be most fruitful in explaining actions and decisions 
... 
in organisations, particularly those that threaten or benefit 
interest groups by changing the existing distribution of 
resources. 
The environment has been broken down into two areas. The wider 
environment refers to trends, values and practices which affect 
all organisations in a given society, at a given time. The 
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environment of a specific organisation is referred to as its 
external context. It includes the local community in which 
the organisation is situated, the netvrork of institutions \.,i th 
which it interacts, and the industrial or public sector of 
which it is a part. The context also includes the internal 
characteristics of the organisation such as its size, structure, 
technology, culture, ideology and Workforce. 
Organisational outcomes are a product of environmental 
influences in a number of 'lirays. The environment can act as an 
objective constraint on actions and decisions taken by 
organisational members. The organisation may respond to the 
environment in a reactive \'lay, operating wi thin limits 
defined by environmental pressures , although , .. lith some degree 
of leeway. The environment can represent a source of pm'ler 
to organisational members who take steps to proactively 
mana~e it in order to secure control over these resources • 
. .. ? 
Within the organisation, political processes are an important 
component. The use of power can be overt and/or unobtrusive 
as actors seek to influence substantive outcomes and sentiments. 
Both the material and symbolic sources of these aspects of 
pO\oJer are to be found in the organisational and environmental 
context of the organisation in question. A political analysis 
must examine the actions of individuals and groups as they 
seek to mobilise these pm'1er sources to further their interests. 
- 66 -
The term pO','1erlessness has been incorporated to explain the 
posi tion of grou:;:Js and individuals \'lho are politically 
disadvantaged by values, biases and institutions in organisations 
and society which have evolved over a number of years, rather 
than as the result of the direct actions of other actors. 
In order to explain the nature of the response to closure fu~d 
the outcomes of closure decisions, we need to consider three 
levels of analysis: 
(i) The impact of the wider environment in terms of its 
general influence on all closures. 
(ii) The impact of the specific context of a particular 
closure, including both the external setting and the 
characteristics of the organisation. 
(iii) The impact of the strategies, both overt and unobtrusive, 
by groups in their attempts to impose or oppose the closure 
decision. 
If this frame\'lork is to be applicable to closure there are a 
number of questions which need to be answered. 
(i) Is there justification for areuing that closures are 
poli tical and that a political analysis should be adopted? 
It seems to me that closure is likely to be a political issue 
and there are strong theoretical reasons for this. Closure 
decisions are innovative, they have repercussions 
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which affect the existing distribution of rosources (usually 
by removing resources)~ thus heightening people's 
perceptions of resources and power, and releasing politic~l 
energy. See Pettigrew (1973), Mumford & Pettigre1.·[ (1975) and 
Pettigrew (forthcoming). 
There are many reasons why people may wish to prevent the 
closure of a hospital, school or factory. The closure will 
deny them future jobs, hospital care or education facilities. 
People may stand to lose the jobs they already have and may 
not welcome the prospect of changing to a new one. In the 
current economic climate of this country, it may not be 
possible to find another job. In Great Britain in 1977, a 
quarter of those unemployed had been out of \I]'ork for a year 
or more (IVIC, 1978). Even if redundant workers are able to 
find ne\'l work, they may become redundancy-prone because of the 
"Last In First Out" (LIFO) policy which is often used to 
select redundancies. 
There may be benefits to be derived from closure, such as the 
golden handshake, but these, at the v~ry least, will be 
accompanied by change and uncertainty. Consequently, unions 
and employees may find the costs of closure very high and will 
have reason to resist. it. If this is the case, closure 
becomes a political issue with some groups trying to impose it, 
others trying to prevent it. Even without actual resistance, 
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the realisation by employers that closure is an unsavoury 
prospect in the eyes of many maybe. enough for them to view 
its implementation as a political process. 
(ii) \,lho are the opposing or potentially opposing interest 
groups? 
It has been stated above that there are those \'1ho wish to 
prevent closure and those who \llish to secure it. Management, 
or senior management, and employers are likely to be "pro-
closure" in that they "Till have taken the decision to close 
and/or will be responsible for implementing it. More junior 
managment may, if threatened with redundancy, be inclined to 
resist although there are few examples of this (\'Jood, 1980). 
Employees are probably most likely to oppose closure because it 
is they who stand to lose their jobs. For some employees, 
however, such as those nearing retirement or those who can 
easily find another job, the prospect of leaving with 
redundancy compensation may seem an attractive proposition. 
Unions may be opposed to closure, given their remit to protect 
employment and serve the interests of their members. It is not 
ah'rays the case, however, that they work in accordance with the 
"fishes of their members (see Pizzorno, 1978). The lack of 
support from the union hierarchy for strikes at Fords has been 
noted by a number of Nriters (r.latthe\'ls, 1972; Beynon, 1973; 
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Red Notes, 1978). Beynon & \'Jainwrisht (1979) have demonstrated 
the hostility of union officials to shop ste\llard initiatives 
in setting up combines. Ursell (1976) has noted the failure 
of unions in the steel industry to support shop steward action 
committees in the fight against redundancy. Bryer et al 
(forthcoming) points to the failure of steel unions to use 
the available accounting evidence to contest the closure of 
Corby Steelworks. Bradley (1978) found reluctance on the part 
of the unions to support the founding of the Scottish Daily 
NeVls (SDN) worker co-operative. A study by Parker (1971) found 
that only 6% of uhion officials felt that redundancies could be 
entirely avoided in the long term. Clarke (1979) argues· that 
a fight against redundancy at Stracha~'s van bodies plant in 
Hampshire VIas ended by union officials \'lho forced employees 
back to 'vlork (also see Peers, 1974). 
Unions Qay oppose closure, but it is presumptious to assume 
that they are automatically a~ti-closure. 
HTrade union officers, themselves, have 
frequently failed to oppose redundancy 
seriously, and •••• seem largely to have 
accepted managerial explanations of the 
problem" Clarke (1979) p "'83. 
Outside groups, such as governments, MPs, councillors, members 
of the local community, may also be involved in.the closure. 
Whether they are in favour of it or opposed to it will depend 
on the particular closure. 
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There are then, in any closure, a number of potentially 
opposing interest groups.. Exactly who is pro-- or anti-closure 
\'iill depend on the particular closure and it is up to the 
researcher to identify these groups and their interests .. 
(iii) Do these groups try to influence substantive outcomes 
and sentiments? 
In some circumstances, those wishing to effect closure, for 
example senior managers, may wish only to influence the 
substantive outcome ie ensure that the closure goes ahead. 
Hmol it is achieved and how people feel about it may not be 
important. A company with only one plant might be unconcerned 
about sentiments because they have no other factcries to suffer 
from any repercussions. 
In other cases, hm·lever. managers may be more concerned with 
sentiments. It may be far more preferable to these managers 
that. rather than risk confrontation over ~ closure, they 
secure acceptance of it from employees and unions. Firms 
might adopt this view because they have other closures planned 
and do not wish to jeopardise them.. They may not wish to 
antaoonise industrial relations in surviving plants. They may 
<:;> 
be anxious to maintain a responsible and caring reputation. 
They may not "rish to risk a strike or an occupation. Desires 
for a peaceful closure may direct managers towards the use of 
unobtrusive strategies in order to prevent conflict over the 
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closure from arising. 
Opposi tion gronps may have to choose between unobtrusive and 
overt strategies - between reformisn and revolution (Saunders, 
1980). The former might involve creating an image of 
respectability and credibility by limiting tactics to lobbying 
and discussion. This might win support but it runs the risk of 
putting minimal pressure on employers, who might not be 
prepared to listen. The latter involves more extreme measures, 
such as an occupation or strike, designed to force employers 
to stop the closure. This strategy runs the risk of attracting 
oPPosition from those \\fho view such tactics as irresponsible. 
(iv) \'lhat overt and unobtrusive strategies are available to 
interest groups, and onvlhat sources of power are they based? 
The overt sources of pov/er to those group s wishing to effect 
closure are based on the legal systen in this country. 
Employers usually have the legal right to close a place down. 
There is an obligation to inform the Departnent of Employment 
(DoE) and employees in advance (60 days in advance if 10 - 100 
redundancies are involved, 90 days if more than 100 are involved). 
Firms have to give redundancy compensation. Employees who have 
been employed for more than two years are entitled to ~ \'Ieek' s 
pay per year of service \'1hile aged 18 - 21 years, 1 week's pay 
while aged 22 - 40, and 1Yz \'Teek' s pay while 41 - 65, up to a 
maximum of 20 years service. The State reimburses the 
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1 "/ 1/ 1 k' . emp oyer i:., 12, \'Tee s pay per year of serVl.ce respectively. 
Apart from these restrictions, an employer has the legal risht 
to close a factory. 
The situation with hospitals is rather more complicated. It 
appears that, usually, local management recommends closure. If 
this is approved by the Area Health Authority (AHA), consultations 
must take place \,lith employees, unions and Community Health 
Councils (CHCs) among others. Should the CHC object to the 
closure it has the power to refer it to the Secretary of State 
for Health and Social Securi ty \lTho can confirm or revoke the 
closure. (For more details on the process in the National 
Health Service (NHS) see Cg.apter 8.) 
Pov;er is thus conferred by the legal machinery of the society. 
In British indust:cy it favours the employers - there is no 
legal mechanism Whereby employees can contest closure. The 
situation is different in NHS where the CHC, representing 
patients' interests can appeal to the Secretary of State. 
Employers make take further measures to ensure that the closure 
goes ahead, especially if they anticipate or face resistance. 
One strategy might be to fragment \'lorkforces either \,Jithin one 
factory or between two or more factories. This happened at 
Imperial Typewriters when Litton Industries (the employers) 
ca~:>italised on the divisiveness between the v!orkforces at Hull 
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and Leicester. This prevented the Hull workers from enlistina 
o 
the sup:?ort of the Leicester workers \I}'hen Litton Industries 
closed their facto~J (Clarke, 1979). Beynon (1978) has 
pointed out hmT the \'TOrkers at the Speke (Liverpool) plant in 
British Leyland (BL) were isolated and divided by management. 
The closing of the plant meant that the work would be transferred 
to the Canley factory in Coventry and so, the Canley workers 
had a lot to gain from the closure. This, coupled.with the 
geographical distance beu'leen the two plants, effectively boxed 
the Speke workers off from support from the Midlands car plants. 
Beynon also argues that a strike was provoked by management, 
"d th the closure being announced in the 17th week of that strike. 
This, argues Beynon, meant that wor!-:ers \'lere not in regular 
contact with each other and were, consequently, in a difficult 
position to organise immediate resistance. 
Such straterries as those described above are overt - they are 
~::> 
designed to deal with, or prevent opposition. Unobtrusive 
strategies will involve legitimising the closure in the eyes of 
the employees and the world outside. Thismight.involve 
stressing hm'! rational, necessary or inevitable the clos'Ltre is. 
It might include casting doubt on the credibility of any 
opposition movement by arguing that it is irresponsible. 
Mana[;ement may take steps to promote their O\'m credibj.lity by 
consulting employees and unions, by stressing their concern, 
by offerin~ generous compensation. The ability of managers to 
- 74 -
justify their decision and demonstrate their concern will 
depend upon such factors as the history of industrial relations, 
the reputation of the firm, the culture of the organisation and 
attitudes of employees, the economic climate a~d the visibility 
of the reasons for closure. Managers may use symbols, myths 
language and ribJals in their attempts to secure legitimacy and 
credibility. 
Opposition groups may have recourse to overt sources of power. 
The most common means of preventing closure has ~een the use 
of the occupation both in factories and hospitals. These 
prevent owners from dismantling the factory and selling off 
assets (Hemming\'lay & Keyser, 1975; Greenwood, 1977). Bet\'leen 
1971 and 1975, there "[ere over 200 factory occupations in the 
UK. Some led t.o the founding of the new worker co-operatives 
such as Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (UCS), Meriden, Scottish 
Daily News (SDN) and Kirkby. See Clarke (DIC 42), Eaton et &_ 
(IWC 25), Buchan (1972), Thompson & Hart (1972) t Coates (1976). 
Greenwood (1977) t Bradley (1978) • Hospital occupations have 
included those of Elisabeth Garrett Anderson, Bethnall Green, 
Plaistow and Hounslow hospitals, among others. 
It has been argued that strikes and stoppages are ineffective 
in closures because the market pO\'ler of the. workers is non-
existent (Pizzorno, 1978). Hmiever multi-plant organisations 
miGht be transferring production from the closing plant to 
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another factory. If so, the company 'Vlill be vulnerable to 
disruptions before production is transferred. Company-wide 
strikes. including the surviving plants, \·rill have a considerable 
impact on the company. It has been argued that this is the onlY 
type of action to prevent closure 
"there is no 'Vlay that it is possible to 
resist a closure on the basis of one 
plant" Lane (1981) p 26. 
Unobtrusive strategies will revolve around delegitimising the 
decision to close', often arguing that it is morally or 
economically vTrong. 
When considering the strategies used by opposition groups, it 
is also important to examine hov1 and ;1I1hy that opposition 
arose (Gavents, 1980; Saunders, 1980). 
(v) \lJhat leads to pO\l.rerlessness? 
Some groups mqy be disadvantaged vis-a-vis closure as a result 
of systems which have evolved over many generations but for 
which specific groups cannot be held responsible. One example 
of this concerns the public policy on redundancy. Fryer (1973) 
argues that it promotes the idea that redundancy is the 
prerogative of mangement and, as such, it is justified. 
"In Britain, hm'rever, the implicit assumption 
in manpower policy has continued to be that 
redundancies are necessary and desirable as 
and when management should decide" Greenwood 
(1977) p 1. 
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Another exanple mi,Eht be the culture of the firm. Martin & 
Fryer (1973) studied redundancy in a firm with a culture of 
paternalisw. The resulting deference among employees meant 
that resistance to the redundancies \'las never really 
contemplated. 
The characteristics of the workforce might make them more or 
less predisposed to opposition. It has, for example, been 
argued that women workers are less likely to contest redundancy 
because they are not attached to work as a career (Barron & 
Norris, 1976). \'Iood & Dey (unpublished) have argued that 
although women value their jobs, they do not appear to 
value specific employments and so may accept redundancy if they 
can go to al'lother job. On the othel"' hand, Hardman (1975) 
presents a case-study where women, obviously strongly attached 
to their jobs, fought closure by forming a co-operative. 
(vi) Does the environment act as a constraint? 
In some cases the environment can act as a total constraint, for 
example, in the case of a small firm going bankrupt, the "vlhole 
closure 'will be dictated by economic criteria. 
(vii) \'Ihat effect does the vrider environment have? 
Societal characteristics may have a general effect on the ,'IJola;j 
closure decisions are received. Gallie (1978) has pointed out 
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that wor1:ers tend to be more radical and revolutionary in 
France due to differences in the process of industrialisation. 
Lane (1931) notes that, in Italy, unemployment has al\11ays been 
a trade union concern, \'lhereas the focus in Britain has tended 
to be on wages and condi-tions. Consequently, Italian unions 
are far Dore sensitive to and prepared for threats of 
redundancy. 
Societal values may be another source of influence. Inglehart 
(1977) has documented the content of ·and changes in societal 
values in the post war era and has posited a theory for 
explaining these changes. Pettigrew &. Bumstead (1981) and 
Pettigre\'J (forthcoming) are able to link changes in societal 
values and the economic context to strateeies of legitimation 
used to justify organisational changes in a large UK chemical 
company between 1965 and 1981. 
It may be possible to demonstrate that general attitudes to 
closure have changed since the early seventies when there ·were 
a large number of factory occupations in protest against 
closure decisions, and when the worker co-operatives v:ere 
founded. Today, a superficial glance indicates that, despite 
a significant increase in the number of closures and 
redundancies, they are more readily accepted. It has been 
su£gested in the press that increasing unemployment has put 
unions in a far \'leaJ-cer position to fi.sht closure. This 
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hypothesis - that unemployment reduces the bargainin~ position 
of unions - does have a theoretical base in the \'lork of 
economists Eagley (1965), Sci tovs}:y (1978), Routhorne (1980). 
There has been relatively little research into the impact of 
the wider environment on attitudes to closure and this issue 
will be discussed in more detail in cha..Dter 10. 
:rt is a central postulate of this work that the framework 
and three-fold level of analysis, suggested in this and the 
previous blO chapters, has some relevance for the question of 
closure. This has been indicated by the brief examination 
nade in this chapter. A more detailed investi,sation will be 
made on the basis of the empirical data from the four case-
studies. 
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Chapter Five 
THE HETHODOLQGY 
The choice of methodology in the social sciences generally and 
in organisational behaviour in particular has become problematic. 
"The hope which originally inspired 
methodology was the hope of finding a 
method of enquiry which would be both 
necessary and sufficient to guide the 
scientist unerringly to the truth. This 
hope has died a natural death" Watkins 
(1959) p 503. 
There is no such perfect methodology. Those that exist tend to 
produce different kinds of data and perform differ~nt functions 
(Mintzb erg, 1979). This has led to a deb ate over which 
methodology is appropriat~ to a particular piece of research. 
Confusion over this has been compounded by the different 
opinions concerning the role of social science. Some see it as 
a branch of pure science, resting on methodologies which allow 
a high degree of scientific rigour in testing hypotheses and 
theories. Others emphasise the idiosyncracies of the social 
world, arguing that if social science' is to understand them, it 
has to rely on the "soft" methodologies which allow researchers 
to gain insights and understanding. As a result of these 
conflicting tensions, social scientists are in the position of 
having to justifY and vindicate their particular choice. 
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The Debate bet':leen "Hard II a."1d "Soft" Pethodologies 
In the past, social scientists have often emphasised the place 
of social science alongside the pure sciences and, for this 
reason, the goal has been to establish increased scientiflc 
rigour. Since the late 19308 particularly in America, sociolo-
gists have been developing more ',' systematic and sophisticated 
methodological procedures to test, prove and verify hypotheses 
with this aim in mind (see Glaser & Strauss, 1967 for a 
discussion of this). The result has been that such social 
scientists have tended to concentrate on those aspects of social 
life which are most amenable to quantitative methodologies. 
Consequently, the tendencY has been to focus on structural 
matters rather than the more complex issues of process (see 
Pe"ctigrew, 1973; Van Maanen, 1979). 
This approach has met with increasing criticism. It has, for 
example, been suggested that for these social scientists, 
methods have become ends in themselves (Filstead, 1970). They 
have also been accused of over-simplifYing and abstracting 
their subject matter, leaving their theories and hypotheses of 
dubious ontological status (Burns, 1967). They have been 
condemned for failing to address the complex issues and processes 
of the real \'10rld (I.lintzberg, 1979). 
It has been suggested that these complex issu5s require a 
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more qualitative approach. Methodologies which provide 
investigators with meaningful insights by delving more deeply 
into social and organisational life are necessary to examine 
the intangible aspects of process (Loffland, 1971; Pettigrew, 
1973; r.1intzberg, 1979 ; Van Maanen, 1979) _ Such methodologies 
are more commonly associated with the generation rather than 
the verification of theory, particUlarly in relation to new 
areas of research where pre-defined concepts and 
operationalisations are not available: 
"I was not driven into the field with a 
neatly labelled and rigidly constructed 
set of hypotheses and operational 
definitions. Such an approach would have 
been unsuitable, given the little that is 
known" Pettigrew (1973) P 55. 
On this basis the choice of a qualitative methodGllogy was 
essential: the research was in a new theoretical field 
(unobtrusive power) and.in a relatively unstudied substantive 
area (closure). Pre-existing and clearly defined concepts 
were not always available. A quantitative approach would have 
suffered from not knowing exactly What to measure. In addition 
to this \llas the fact that the research was concerned with the 
intangible and partially hidden aspects of a political process \'lhich 
a quantitative approach would have been unable to uncover-
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The Hethodolog:y 
As has already been indicated, l1\Y choice of methodology has 
been qualitative, by which I mean that an unstructured 
t 
investigative approach has been adopted to provide in-depth 
data in the unfolding of political processes. The corner-stone 
of the approach has been the use of informal interviews. This 
was supplemented with evidence from written and documentary 
sources and the use of various unobtrusive measures. 
Unstructured intervie\l}'s provided an invaluable opportunity to 
strike a balance beu'leen pattern and flexibility. A checklist 
of questions and issues formed the basis of the intervie\'ls t 
providing regularity and patterning. 'This allo\'led theoretical 
themes to be pursued and comparisons to be drawn. At the same 
time, however, new issues and concepts which arose out of 
previous interviews and the literature, could easily be 
followed uP. This flexibility proved indispensable in 
allo\l}'ing the final theoretical frarnevrork to emerge out of the 
data. 
A second step in the formation of the theoretical frame\'iork 
was the final analysis which occurred after the data haG. been 
collected. All the data had been retained and \lIas re-processed 
at this stage. (The retention of the data was made possible 
by using a . cassette recorder to tape all the intervie·~'ls.) 
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Analysis \'1 as , in effect, undertal:en twice - during and after 
intervie\'Ting. 
As a result of this approach, data collection and analysis 
were inextricably linked. Even at the stage of the final 
analysis, further data collection was undertaken to fill any 
gaps. It '!Jas through such a flexible process that the nuances 
of unobtrusive power came to light. The theory was grounded 
in the data - it has emerged out of it, rather than being 
imposed on it (see Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
This is an important issue in qualitative research, where 
social scientists may be charged \'lit~h forcing preconceived 
theories onto malleable data. This was not the case here 
because I entered the field with relatively little structure, 
the final frame\'IOrk genuinely arose out of the data. 
There is another problem \,li th qualitative research 
concerning the accuracy of the information received. asa 
resul t of such methods. It is often argued that intervie','lers 
are vulnerable to the deliberate falsification of information 
or, at least, subconscious bias on the part of their 
respondents. This can, to a great extent, be overcome \'1ith 
the use of multiple methods. Interview material can, for 
example, be checked against documents end records (\,leiss &. 
Davis, 1960). This was an inportant aspect of II\Y O\'m \'Iork -
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docUT!\ents t records and other written evidence were made 
available by a nUl.l.ber of different groups. At r,Iountside, 
Qanagement had compiled a diary of the closure, written while 
it was taking place. Divisional management allowed me to see 
some reports of other closures, and stewards and officials 
allo\'led me access to their own documentation. Andersons 
nanagers provided me with relevant memoranda, reports and 
letters from their files, as did stewards and union officials. 
One of the consultants showed me his own report on the closure. 
At the tvlO hospital closures I was able to examine management, 
AHA, CHe, and union files. 
Another source of data came from unobtrusive measures (see 
\'lebb et aI, 1966; \Jebb & \'Jeick, 1979). The examination of 
government statistics, local employment figures, personnel 
statistics, ne"'I]'spaper articles and Hansard \'lere used to both 
check and supplement interview material. 
The triangulation of these methods proved invaluable in a 
nUQber of ways. It provided opportunities to check the 
2.ccuracy of the interviews. It provided addtional data and 
it provided contemporary information, whereas the interviews 
", .... ere conducted retrospectively. 
A further im..Derative of intervie'ltJing is to ensure that ell the 
relevant interest groups are represented. This not only 
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provides the chance to check that the information received 
fro~ the various groups is consistent, but it also provides 
a wealth of different perceptions, opinions and ins~ghts 
that form an important data base in the analysis of a social 
process. 
I took steps to ensure that all key individuals (ie those 
individuals who played an active role in the closure) and a 
selection of passive individuals (ie those affected by closure) 
'IIlere interviewed. At Mountside, for eXatlple, I interviewed 
the works manager, the assistant ".Torles manager, persormel 
managers and other local managers, HoDs, and divisional 
managers. On the union side, senior stewards and officials 
from NUGIr1t\l, AUEVJ t EETPU, UCATT and the Boilermakers r union 
were seen. Ex-errp1oyees and redeployed employees from staff, 
general and craft groups were also interviewed. At Newlands 
I spoke to UK Directors, local managers, local and national 
officials and stewards from TASS, AUEW cul.d the Boilermakers r 
union. Staff and manual workers, both redundant and working 
at Merryvale were intervie\ved. In addition to this, one of 
the conSUltants, three of the university research team and the 
Chief Executive of the local council granted interviews. At 
the two hospitals I sa\1}' the -chairman and some members of the 
AHAs, members of the ATO and other local managers, CHC 
secretaries, doctors, and officials and stewards from IJUPE, 
COHSE and NALGO. At Northville I spoke to members of the 
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Action Committee and at Hidville, staff \'lho used to \·rork at 
\'Ji thybrook. 
The Nature of Historical Explanation 
: ( 
Historical, qualitative methods such as those described above 
have often been subjected to criticism concerning their 
internal and external validi~"'.. The former refers to the 
accuracy of the information acquired by such methods as 
interviewing. This issue has already been discussed above. 
~lhere it was aL~ued that by using other methods and inter-
viewing all the relevant groups, information could be 
satisfactorily checked. It was also pointed out that in 
research involving processes and politics, disparities in 
perceptions and opinions are often an important source of data 
in themselves. 
Another issue \'lhich has to be addressed concerns the question 
of external validity - whether the findings of one particular 
Piece of research can be generalised to other situations. 
This is, in terms of qualitative methodologies, a particularly 
pertinent matter because it attacks tile very nature of 
historical e.,."'<planation. Critics question \'ihether t.''1.e 
information derived as a result of such measures constitutes 
e}~lanation and analysis, . rather than mere description. 
This opinion stems froLl the view that "sciences" based on the 
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historical method are ontologicolly distinct from the pure 
sciences. There is, according to this view, no &cientific 
explanation events stem from the thoughts and desires of 
individuals \'Jhi~'1 can not be predicted with any certainty 
(see, for ex amp Ie, Colling\"ood, 1959, 1965; VI atkins, 1959). 
This vie'lll has, however, been contested by a number of 
individuals (see, for example, Gardiner, 1952; Hempel, 1959; 
Frankel, 1959). \-Tho argue tha-t causal explanations can be 
established in history and sociology, L~ addition to the 
description of individual actions. 
"Historical explanation, too aims at showing 
that the event in question was not I a matter 
of chance I, but was to be expected in view 
of certain antecedent or simultaneous 
conditions. The expectation referred to is 
not prophesy or divination but rational 
scientific anticipation" Hempel (1959) 
p 348-9. 
This describes explanation in history, the social .. sciences 
and the pure sciences the differences are a matter 'of degree 
not ontological status. 
The function of the social scientist, then, is to establish 
the nature of the conditions which give rise to the event or 
outcome in question and to ascertain the relationship bebleen 
them. The starting point of this procedure will be the 
description of the phenomena in question (as indeed it is :L""1 
the pure sciences). This is a necessary but not sufficient 
part of the process - following this the scientist is able 
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to abstract patterns and processes \'lhich enable the 
formulation of generalisations \'lhich stand on their O'l'in as 
theoretical statements, regardless of the substantive area 
which gave rise to them. Thus, the scientist is able to 
generalise from one situation to a."'1other. 
It would t perhaps, be foolish to thin.lc that the social 
sciences are governed by the neat precision of the 
deterministic relationships of the pure sciences (Berlin, 1959; 
Hempel" 1959). It is here that the differences be-b.'ieen the 
UIJO t,ypes of science lie - in the degree of precision which 
can be expected from an eA~lanation. 
"It is artificial and misleading to suggest 
that explanations in history represent sequences 
of events as instantiating cases of lavJs 
which can be exhib ited tid ily and 
comprehensively and for \I/hich there exist 
precise rules of application" Gardiner 
(1952) p 96. 
Hempel (1959) calls the type of explanation found in the social 
sciences explanation sketches because of the gaps which exist. 
HO\lJever, the sketch, in addition to providing an explanation, 
also states the gaps and the nature of futUre research 
necessary to fill them. 
"A scientifically acceptable explanation 
sketch needs to be filled out by more 
specific statements; but it points to the 
direction where these statements are to be 
found; and concrete research m~ tend to 
confirm or to infirm these indications ie 
it may show th at the l(ind of initial 
conditions suggested are actually relevant, 
or it may reveal that factors of a quite 
dif:erent nature have to be taken into 
account" Hempel (1959) P 351. 
Such a philosophy charact;er-ised this research. Explanation 
for the events in the case-studies has been given in terms of 
unobtrusive power. This theoretical framework can be 
generalised to other situations. The task of future research 
lies in establishing \'lhich types of situation are conducive 
to this framm'lOrk and how approPriate or useful it \IIill be. 
Thus, the eA1Jlanations offered provide aTl. acceptable 
explanation sketch, notviithstanding the gaps \·vhich exist. 
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PREFACE TO THE CASE-STL~IES 
The following four chapters comprise the Ll'ldividual case-
studies. They are intended to be descriptive rather than 
analytical (although some analysis inevitably takes place) in 
order that readers may familiarise themselves with the events 
and actors involved before they are confronted with the 
analytical chapters. In this sense, the information provided 
here constitutes the evidence for the the conclusions dra~rn 
in subsequent chapters. 
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Chapter Six 
! 
CAMERONS 
The first case-study concerns the closure of a factory in the 
North-\,lest. The factory, knmm as r.Iountside VJorks, is a 
production site in one of the divisions of a large British-
based multi-national, knmm here as Camerons. r.lOtmtside \\] orks 
is situated in a large city in the North-VJest, on a site 
adjoining divisional headquarters. The works manufactured a 
large number of chemical products, most of which were inter-
mediaries and sold to other sites in the division and outside 
the Company. There has been a long history of chemical 
production at l1Iountside - chemicals have been manufactured 
there in one form or another for 100 years and the Company has 
been involved for over 50 years. 
In 1975, the divisional Chairman announced that Mountside \'lorks 
would close in five to ten years time. This decision can be 
traced to a number of events. Firstly, the last piece of major 
investment on-site had been in 1952 and, although maintenance 
"'1ork had been undertaken, the works and the equipment were old. 
Secondly, in 1971, the divisions had been reorganised and the 
nylon business, previously a big moneyspinner for this division, 
had been moved elsevlhere. The removal of this piece of 
business highlighted the difficulties being experienced in the 
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remainder of the division as profits had begun to fall. 
\tJith the inception.of a new divisional c..l-J.airman in 1971, 
studies had been undertaken to improve profitability by 
eradicating and rationalising the products 'Illhich \'lare losing 
money. A further problem \'las that the division was comnetinc:r 
• = 
with European .chemical manufacturers working from a small 
number of highly complex integrated sites. This division, on 
the other hand, had ten production sites and so, the rationalisa-
tion of these sites became a priority. ~ountside was not a good 
candidate for survival. It was wedged in between divisional 
headquarters and a hospital, with little room for expansion. 
It was situated in a built-up area, and with its ageing plant, 
costs of modernisation would have been high. These problems 
become even more app arent when it is realised that there \'lere 
large integrated sites elsewhere in the division which, in the 
eyes of one divisional manager, were the "obvious places to 
concentrate prodUction". 
In 1975, then, the divisional chairman gave a somewhat vague 
statement that Mountside and two other sites had a life 
expectancy of five to ten years. Follo\,/ing this announcement 
the assistant works manager (AVJM) embarked on :t;he construction 
of a closure plan. This detailed how the numerous products 
and businesses should be run dm'ln. Alongside the business plan 
was a "people plan" which stated how many people would be 
needed, of what skill, for how long. The plan was to take five 
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years to marry both business and people needs. Business needs 
required a gradual rundOliffi because some products \'rere being 
transferred to other sites where new equipment and facilities had 
to be buil t. In the meantime, Mountside had to keep on 
producing. Peop Ie I s needs also dictated a gradual rundown so 
that the release of 1,000 employees could be dispersed over 
a number of years. In addition to the rundovffi plan, . 
\'forking parties were set up to establish individual needs, 
key personnel, communication and retraining requirements 
during the rundovm. 
A year after the first announcement, in March 1976, a second 
anl'1.ouncement was made stating that Mountside T:Jorks \lJ'ould close 
by the end of 1980. The \I[orks manager J olm Oppen, made a 
presentation of the reasons for closure and details of the rQ~dm1n to 
man~csers, supervisors, shop stewards and elected representatives 
who, in turn, passed the information on to the.workforce. 
Union officials were informed by letter. 
The initial announcement in 1975 does not appear to have 
aroused much consternation. This is" probably because five to 
ten years is a long time anyway and, secondly, the Company had 
a reputation for announcing the closure of sheds \·rhich had 
then taken many years to close. 
"The lack of an emotive reaction to the 
1975 announcement was not surprisin~. 
Staff had be~ome accustomed in recent 
years to hearing bad news about some part 
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or other of the ~~rks business and had 
already suffered the closure of four 
manufacturing sheds as part of divisional 
rationalisation - and 5-10 years \'laS still 
something vague and indefinite in the 
future. There \,las always the possibility 
of a change of heart~" (managerial report 
on the closure). 
The reaction to the 1976 announcement was somewhat more definite 
- employees were confronted with a detailed closure plan which 
undoubtedly brought the news horne to most people. 
"The availablility of the closure action 
plan in early 1976 provided the means of 
driving horne the message of \'lOrks closure 
in unmistakable terms" (managerial report). 
The shop stewards immediately began to think of fighting the 
closure. They contacted their local officials and the local 
MP. In June 1976. Oppen gave a presentation to the local union 
officials. This explained the reasons behind the closure, 
showed how the rundO\'In would be effected and described \.;hat 
provision was to be made for employees in terms of redundancy 
compensation and redeployment opportunities. 
After the meeting, the local officials passed the matter up to 
*" their national officials to see if anything could be ,done to 
prevent the closure. This is the normal procedure in th:!.s Company 
* The main unions involved here were NUGJ.1U and AUE\'J. follm'led 
by EETPU • VeATT and the Boilermakers' union. 
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- if "failUre to agree" occurs at a particular level, the matter 
is passed up. In November 1976, the local officials had 
another meeting \'lith Oppen in which it \lIaS said that the 
national officials were satisfied with the Company's reasons 
for the closure and that nothing could be done to prevent it. 
The local officials then said that they intended to play no 
part in local negotiations which would be left to the shop 
stewards "to get the best deal they could for their members". 
The ste'wards could, of course, call them back in if they could 
not agree with management on any p articular issue. This 
effectively marked the end of any talk of resistance on the 
part of the stewards. 
Meanwhile the work went on \·lith the rlli"1down process. The process 
had, in reality, started many years before. Oppen had been 
appointed as works manager in 1971. His predecessor had been 
a particularly authoritarian type of manager \I/ho had run a 
tight ship. The Company had, hO"'lever, introduced a ne\'l \<[age 
scheme in1969-70 which, effectively, gave the \llorkers more 
responsibility for their jobs (a type of job-enrichment). This 
"'las accompanied by a move towards extended joint consultation 
and a more progressive and democratic style of management. 
As a result, chan~e had occurred throughout the Company. Not 
so at 1.1ountside where the authoritarian atmosphere persisted 
under the "'lorks manager. According to the managerial report 
of the closure the new \vap:e scheme and j oint consultation 
, <..:> 
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had led to a certain amount of shock and trauma, particularly 
among junior managers \'lho had not undergone the behavioural 
science training which underlined these schemes. The existing 
",orks manager , with his more traditional disl' os it ion , had 
proved unable to introduce the necess~J changes at r~ountside. 
After a three month period with an interim manager, Oppen took 
up his appointment as \'lorks manager. He immediately began to 
to effect change at all levels in the culture of the \,lorks. 
This involved getting the heads of department (HoDs) to work 
together, bringing supervisors, who were particularly demoralised 
as a result of the ne'tJ' "'lorking responsibilities, and Ti1anagers 
toge.ther and eventually involving shop stewards as well. To 
help to achieve this residential courses were arranged for 
manaRers and supervisors in 1974, bringing in stewards in 1975. 
Oppen maintains that he would have introduced these changes 
in any circumstances in order to improve \"orking relations 
and to bring the works into line with the rest of the division. 
Furthermore, the interim manager had already initiated some 
changes before he took over. Nevertheless, when Oppen was 
appointed, he was aware that 
Ifin all probability IPS job was going to be 
to close those works". 
and so, the culture change became a necessary foundation for 
the closure. 
- 97 -
In 1976, having established the groundwork enabling stm'lards, 
supervisors and managers to '1l1ork together, Oppen began to 
focus more explicitly on the closure. In December 1975, a 
HoD had been appointed as redeployment t:anager - to deal with 
the problems facing those "'Tho wished to be redeployed. By 
mid-1976 a Redeployment Steering Group (RSG) had been set up 
"'Tith the r€dep19yment mmager, persormel manager, assistant 
persoID1el- manager, three craft stewards and three general 
worker ste\>Jards. This VIas a problem-solving group, not a 
negotiating body, whose aim was to indentify problems and make 
recommendations to the works m:mager ""ho would then take the 
final decision. 
The RSG had been set up to include the ste\lJards in the rundm·m, 
as an extension to the normal j oint consultation process, and 
to deal \-lith the particular problems of redeployment. In 1975 
questionnaires had been sent out to employees and these 
indicated that 83% of employees wanted to remain with the 
Company, while only 17% wanted to take severance. As it 
turned out, however, only 37% of manual \iTorkers and 44% of 
staff actually opted for redeployment. The problem of the 
RSG consequently became one of how to effect redundancy rather 
than how to achieve redeployment. It turned_out that many 
people wanted to leave-and take severance terms before their 
uni t or job had finished and the RSG was often concerned ''lith 
findin~' alternative arrangements so that people could leave 
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\dth terr:1s but \'rithout jeopardising the business plan. The 
reason for this chmlge of heart among so many employees was, 
undoubtedly, the severance terms. Uhen asked in the question-
naire, employees had no notion of hovl much money they \I[ould 
be entitled to. By 1976, however, they could find out exactly 
how much they \\fould qualify for, and the vast maj ori ty 'ltlere 
tempted by terms 'ltlhich were around three times the legal 
minimum. Furthermore, those over 53 years found that they 
could truce early retirement if they so wished, and in 1978, a 
payment in lieu of notice was introduced which, in the case of 
some \\forkers, added a tax-free sum of £1,000 to their 
redundancy compensation. 
The peop Ie I spoke to do not appeaJ:' to have been unduly worried 
about the closure, at least after Some initial uncertainty. 
They pinned a lot of faith in the Company's statement in 
January 1975 'ltlhich had promised that enforced redundancies 
would occur only as a last resort. 1Tost were satisfied that 
they \'lould not be "thrown out on the streets". Virtually all 
were happy with the redundancy terms, especially the older 
meobers who would also qualify for their pension. Many 
harboured ideas of getting a part-time job which, in addition 
to their pension, Vlould bring in as much money as they had 
been earning. The Company also provided help for people 
trying to find nevI jobs. Retraining schemes ,,,ere available free 
ei ther \·ri thin the C Or.1p any , or outside courses such as heaV"J 
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roods vehicle driving courses. A "job shop" \'las set up 
wi th vaca,'1cies posted up and ne\V's of successful redeploYr.1ents. 
Help was also given to those goinp, for interviews for-which 
time-off was al1m·red with no loss of pay. 
Another aspect of the closure was the extent of communication. 
Everyone I spoke to felt that they knew exactly what VIas 
going on. Oppen believed that up-to-date information was 
crucial and had devised a \'Ieekly bulletin which \lTas available 
in news sheet form and by dialling a number on the internal 
phone. The news \'las updated weekly, which vIas considered 
important if people were to use it regularly. Cascade 
co~munication was reserved for important announcements. 
The RSG involving the manual unions seems to have been quite 
a success. The stewards concerned felt that they played an 
important role by being a member of it. Oppen felt that it 
enabled management and workers to identi~J problem areas and 
offer constructive solutions. Individual \'Torkers knew they 
had a mechanism whereby they could air any personal grievances. 
The staff situation was some-~lhat different. On the whole, 
members of staff were dealt \'1i th on a more individual basis 
and representatives were only involved if specifically asked 
for. A staff RSG \'las set up but it was not very successful. 
It was not established until 1978 and the staff representatives 
expressed dissatisfaction with the choice of redeployment 
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Ti1ana~er (\'1ho found firm favour \'li th the manual RSG represent-
atives and individual members of staff). In visw of these 
problems, the staff RSG had disbanded by the end of 1978. 
The staff position \'las also significantly different to that 
of the manual workers in terms of union power and recognition. 
By the start of the closU!'e only ASTNS had gained official 
recognition. 
"At the time of the closure we'd only just 
really started to get properly unionised" 
( ASTr.rs representative). 
Furthermore, staff employees \ITere less militant "th~'1 their 
manual counterparts. 
"You couldn't ask union members to do 
anything - they'd run a mile" (ASTgS 
representative). 
Due to the inexperience of the representatives and the ambivalent 
attitudes of their members, many of whom preferred the personalised 
approach,' attempts to deal \lrith staff collectively \'V"ere doomed. 
"The relative inactivity of staff unions 
in the closure process compared with the 
activity of the manual unions was affected 
by the timing of the closure relative to 
growth in staff unionisation and the pro-
gressive involvement in negotiating rights 
• • •• There was a lack of supp ort from the 
staff themselves for their union to be 
involved at the late stage of 1978 \'lhen it 
\'ras clear that redep loyment and other 
probler;:s were being handled by managers, 
including the redeployment manager, in a 
'lJFa:l that satisfied most staff (report). 
This position was compounded by the fact that management 
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-Has less convinced of the desirability of dealing \llith the 
staff unions in the same \,1C\)r as they did the manual uJlions 
"VJorks management's vie',-j is that the need 
for the establishment of a similar steerin~ 
group for monthly staff was doubtful" 
(manaSerial report). 
\'lhy WaS there no resistance? 
Mountside represents an example of where a company has 
successfully engineered a peacefUl closure. The complicated 
closure plan \'las carried out almost to the letter and the 
works was closed in 1980. There was no industrial action against 
the closure and initial discontent \'las limited to calling in the 
local officials. Furthermore, no-one I spoke to was really 
bitter about the Company or the closure. r-lany expressed regret 
at seeing the place close, some Vlere having to adjust to new 
jobs although most 'Vlere quite happy \'lith their ne\l, positions 
One man, 'IIiai ting to take terms and early retirement t said he 
would be upset if he now heard that the factory was not going 
to close. So, how was all this achieved? 
Key People 
One of the most sionificant factors vIas the appointment of John 
<.:> 
Oppen to manage the closure. He was selected "lith a possiblc 
closure in mind, and for his ability to introduce chan~e 
!,;cnerally. He \'las a "progressive" manager himself and "las 
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anxious to introduce a change in culture for its O\'m sake. 
Eve~Jone I spoke to greatly respected Oppen and credited him 
i'Ii th a lot of the success. All the ste1.'la:;r::'ds I intervie\':ed 
thought he had been very helpful. He 
"bent over bach'Wards to see things were 
going right" (steward) • 
"He did a great job" (ste'l,,'lard). 
EVen a steward '\JTho was very upset about the closure and the 
lack of opposition to it, respected the part played by Oppen. 
A manager who personally disliked Oppen still Sai'l that he "Tas 
the ideal choice for the job. 
"He "'las a pretty hard guy but came over as 
very compassionate. That i.,ras an ideal 
combination" (manager). 
One steward pointed out his ability to get people to agree to 
things they did not like. Others stressed that, had the closure 
been conducted by the previous works manager, it would have 
been a disaster with a distinct possibility of resistance. 
Oppen 
"was by far the most significant person in 
the closure. He decided the philosophy 
based on a background of behavioural science 
interest and training over many years. This 
\'las even more important in I.Iountside \']orks 
because this has tended to be a fairly 
autocratic outfit; ve~J efficient, very cost 
conscious but the \'rrong sort of attitude for 
a closure" 
This ''laS the comment of a senior manager. renowned in the 
\'lorks and admitted by himself to be a member of the autocratic 
school. 
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Oppen himself had to select key personnel, the raost important 
of \Ilhich \lIas the redeployment man~a,er - a \llell-res:;Jected 
HoD who had spent 30 years at M:ountside. He \',,-as 'Oo':')ular \·rith 
... . 
the ste\'lards and vTith individual members, although the staff 
representatives I spoke to thought he \lTaS a bad choice. The 
appointment of this post is also interesting because it had 
been in the mind of Oppen for some time 'I.'lhen it \':as mentioned 
by the stewards. As a result, Oppen appeared to appoint a 
redeployment manager in direct response to the stewards' 
demand. 
The Culture Change 
Oppen's first actions were to initiate the culture change in 
general terms, which later became more focussed around the 
specific issue of the closure. Mountside was one of the first 
closures undertaken by the division and, as such, experience 
was limited. The Company did, hO'l.'leVer, have a great deal of 
experience in change programmes follo'l.'ling the introduction 
of j oint consultation and the new \'Jage scheme. The closure 
and the preceding culture change \-Jere treated very much as 
any other change programme and so Oppen \'las able to drm'! on 
his own experiences and those of the Company. Furthermore, a 
little had been learnt from the closure of a site in another 
division and from the previous shed closures at I.Iountside. 
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All the steuaru.:.; I spoke to \'lere a\'1are of changes in management 
style, although this had not alwa;ys permeated do\'ffi to t-he 
ordinary r.tembers of the shopfloor. Ste'.'lards, however, fHl t 
that management -.. ras the type that did not go L"'l for 
confrontation, but which VIas \\Tilling to spend time tal~dng. 
Members of staff perceived managers as "friendly", "willing to 
talk", "willing to listen" and as· b0ing the type of people whom 
Q~e could approach directly with any problemo 
Managers were also aware of the culture change - of the 
autocratic nature of the previous regine (many pointed to its 
efficient nature) and the more relruced atmosphere under 
Oppen \\Thich, ma.-,y conceded, was necessary to the handling of 
a sensitive issue like closure. The managers I spoke to felt 
that if the old culture had persisted, resistance would have 
been far more likely. They felt that the changes had been 
. worth\'lhile and that industrial relations had impI'oved. 
"I jus t can I t see how we would have 
tackled the closure successfully in 
the old culture" (Oppen). 
The new culture had the effect of setting the right climate 
for the closure. It enabled maYlagers, supervisors and 
stewards to \'lork together before they were confronted vlitb 
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the particular difficulties of clostrre. It established 
"the right environment from the bec-inninO', {~ 0 b 
or even before the beginning, \lThich is 
extremely important" (redeployment 
manager) • 
This meant that trust between the different groups existed and 
could be built on, so the stev.rards could be brought into the 
discussions and consultation to play a constructive role. 
One manager argued that the stewards were extremely flattered 
by this invitation, having been ignored for so long under the 
previous 'works manager , they \\fere overvlhelmed with their chance 
to enter into discuss ions \>Ti th management. 
This foundation building was important in practical terms. In 
the early days of joint consultation, ste\'lards were inexperienced 
and managers "'lere suspicious. A period of "practice" was 
necessary if consultation was ever to be productive. 
Ironically, as well as consultation helping the closure', the 
closure helped consultation: 
"in the early da,jl's we didn I t know what VIe 
had to do •••• we had all sorts of minor 
issues but nothing to get your teeth into. 
When \'1e had a closure there was sor.!ething 
to go at and I believe the "Thole thing 
developed because \lle had a very real 
problem" (Oppen) • 
This development and improvement in industrial relations was 
perceived by managerial and stevlard groups as they began to 
\'lork together and not against each other. 
The culture change and the improvement in vJorking relations 
laid the basis for the (manua~ vrorkers I) RSG "/hich played a 
significant part in the closure. The terms of reference meant 
that it functioned as a problem-solving, rather than a 
negotiating, body and virtually all issues and disagreements 
were resolved through its recommendations to Oppen, without 
recourse to formal negotiation. Oppen's credibility meant 
that stewards respected his right to say "No". The fact that 
he sometimes said "Yes" meant that they felt they were playing 
a meaningful part in the proceedings by \'Tinning some 
concessions. 
The stewards on the RSG appear to have '.'lorked together \·Jell. 
There had al,;laJrs been a traditional divide beb .. reen general 
and craft ste:·.rards but the closure saw them working together. 
Certainly nana~enent sa\'1 them as a united front t although the 
stewards themselves were more aware of their differences in 
interest. Their unity is quite an achievement as the rundovm 
often had very different implications for the "b.'10 grcups. For 
example, general workers were often tied to a particular unit 
and could not, therefore, be released until that unit \'las 
closed dOi/Tn. Craft 'Horkers usually provided a service for 
the site as a v/hole and, as it contracted, those who \r.[anted to 
could leave one electrician or carpenter can cover for another 
\']hereas a security man could not cover for a process iI.'orker 
and often process \I[orl:ers fron different sheds VJere not inter-
, t 
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changeable. 
From the stm'lards' point of view the RSG \'la.s a complete 
succ.-:'::::s. They felt they had won concessions \'lhich they otherwise 
would not have got. 
"I know we changed things" (ste'\.ITard) 
l;lany managers felt the same. 
"VJe gave the shop ste'wards a certain amount 
of power, and it was a pOl.'ler, no doubt 
about it. Some of the HoDs thought '\1-Ie gave 
them too much pO ... 'ler at times" (redeployment 
manager) • 
Oppen agrees \·lith this. He refers to the u\'Jorks I,Tanager's 
Concessions" which he made. One year, for example, he allowed 
those workers \'Tho wanted to 'leave early to go to another 
job, to gO early \'Ii th terms. The next year he discontinued 
this practice but the stewards, in return, won payment in lieu 
of notice which, in Some cases, meant an extra ta....,,<-free lump 
sum of £1,000. As Oppen admits 
"I \>/as certainly being much more liberal 
with the Company's money than a manager in 
a normal situation. But I recl-wried that 
it was my job to get it closed without 
any upset" 
., 
The RSG represented the forum in which the stewards '\1-1ere able 
to press for these concessions, mru:ing them feel that they 
had played a significant role in serving the interests of their 
members. It also was the mechanisf.1 uhereby management \<Jere 
made a\'rare of the demands of the \'lor1cforce and, in some cases, 
were able to satisfy them. 
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The PO':ler of the stec""-ards 
The s-'ce\'lards felt that they had a certain amOlult of power 
within the context of the RSG, to win a better deal for their 
members. They did not, hO'I,\rever, feel that they could have 
prevented the closure, or that industrial action \llOuld have 
afforded them any benefit. 
"They would have laughed at us if \tTe' d gone 
outside the gates. They wanted to close it 
and you're doing it for them" (steward). 
The stewards felt that they were limited in the action they 
could take. They had seen the local MP who did raise the 
closure in a question in the House of Commons, but only in terms 
of the general employment situation in the North-Uest and not 
with much specific attention to Mountside. The stewards 
contacted the local press but only three short articles 
appeared in local papers, nothing in the nationals. The 
stewards e:...-pressed a certain amount of resentment a-t (in their 
opinion) the Company' s ability to keep things out of the papers. 
A sit-in was not seriously considered a.",d, in any case, "las not 
feasible in a chemical works without technical supervision. A 
national strike might, according to the stewards, have 
prevented the closure but support from other sites was considered 
unlikely. Some stewards were even dubious about support from 
their own members 
"People don't want to go outside the gates. 
They don't even want to lose overti~e" 
(steward) • 
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"There was no real desire to fight it from 
the outset" (steward) 
There "las a definite lack of motivation a1'1d support from the 
shopfloor for action against the closure. There are a number 
of reasons for this. The original arnouncement was greeted 
"lith disbelief because they had "heard it all before" and 
because the timescale was so vague. By the tine the employees 
were confronted with the second announcement, the details of 
the rundo"Jm process \'.fere already worked out and it was probably 
too late to do anything. A second reason revolves around the 
statement on no enforced redundancy (exce!)t as a last resort) 
made earlier. Workers pinned a lot of faith in this and were 
not worried about suddenly losing their jobs. They knew that 
they had plenty of time to look for nE:\'! jobs if they waTlted 
them 
"\'1e knew we \lJouldn' t be turned out onto 
the streets" (general worker). 
The Compa~ had a good reputation for dealing with its workers, 
who felt that they ''lere being well looked after. They considered 
that they were well-informed· and that the Company .... '1as doing 
its utmost to accomodate their wishes": They probably felt as 
secure as they could in an essentially uncertain situation. 
The generous redundancy terms were another reason why many 
employees \'Jere loathe to resist the closure. The money Vias an 
attraction many could not refuse. 
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liThe existence of those terr::s \,las probably 
the biggest; single factor in preventing 
real trouble. I·lost people, I guess, have 
decided to take their money and go" 
(HoD) 
For older employees this \'las probably a wise move - they 
':/ould collect a lump sum, qualify for their l;ension and get 
out of the chemical industry. 
"I reckon that with the money I get plus 
my pension I'll be able to take a part-
time job - four hours a day - and I'll 
still have as much income. So, instead 
of beating my brains out '~orking eight 
hours a day , five days a week and 
sometimes more, I might live a lot 
longer and have a reasonable sta."1.dard of 
living" (employee) 
I.Iany employees, once they had the details of the severa.'1.ce 
terms for vlhich they qualified, were not averse to the closure. 
For many the money was a strong attraction. This was all the 
more so for a \'lorkforce which had a high number of older, 
long serving employees Who qualified for higher rates of 
compensation. 
Another factor vlhich mitigated against resistance was the 
reasoning behind the closure, which appears to have been 
accepted by employees and union officials alike. The reason 
that everyone latched on to "'las the environment - the worl<s 
"ias situated in a built-up area, beside a hospital - not only 
lJias there no room for expansion but it was 'I,:lroI1g to think of 
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making chemicals with so T.1any peo,l:11e aroll.Tld and \'!ith ~he 
possibility of an acc·ident. 
"Every thine was explained and it \ITa8 
found to be sensible, such as the 
hospita1r~ht on the perimeter of the 
works. When it was explained about the 
environmental problems, to even think 
about putting chemical products here 
','lasn't common-sense" (ste-~'lard) 
This reason, although by no means the most importfult in 
determining the closure, \,las the one senior management tended 
to use. This W'as not true of Oppen who insisted on trying to 
explain the whole gamut of reasons behind the closure of 
Vrountside. 
"I think most people tended to latch on 
to the envirolliuent hit of the argument 
-but it \'las only part of it and 
secondary" (manager) • 
Another reason that was connected -,'lith the environment and 
easily accepted VIas the age of the plant. It was clear to 
anyone who sa\\[ the factory that the works was old and much of 
the equipment out-dated. Many stei:Tards felt that the cost of 
modernisation was prohibitative and that they should have 
-, 
realised earlier that th~~ eventual result of no investment 
is rundOi:ln and closure. This line of thought probably ster:ulled 
from the fact that the Company had recently introduced a 
Business COfilmi ttee . foro, the ste\'lards where they .had becC'me 
aware of investment policies and their implications. (This has 
some interestine ramifications - if this committee is 
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successful, stewards may anticipate future closures and so be 
in a better posi.lcion to fight them.) 
The result of this reasoning on the p art of the stewards and 
the employees justified the closure. Management supplemented 
this by explaining the difficulties and problems underlying 
the decision. The real reasons, revolving around the 
rationalisation of the division, appear' to have been too complex 
in most cases for employees to comprehend fully. Nevertheless, 
the closure, decision was accepted mainly on the basis of the 
environment. This not only justified the decision but 
delegitirnised action taken to prevent it - it \'las 'wrong to build 
a chemical \V'orks in a built-up area, so close to a hospital. 
The Company's mind was made uP. justifiably so, and nothing 
could or should be done to change it. 
The feelings of the workforce, the lack of available courses of 
action and the acceptance of the closure decision resulted 
in stewards perceiving that there "las very little they could 
do to prevent the closure. In effect they perceived themselves 
as powerless. Their only hope lay with the local union 
officials. The officials, however, did nothing and accepted 
the closure, telling their stewards to handle it as best they 
could. 
"It \'las told to us in no uncertain terms 
by the union oflicers that due to 
envirorunental problems and the age of 
the plant that it had to close. VIe were 
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told then that there was nothinrr more VIe 
b 
could do except Bet the best possible 
terms for the employees" (ste".'lard). 
The stewards were all too a"lare of ''J'hat this abdication meant. 
"If the union officials were like that 
what chance did \'J'e stand" (ste ... "ard) • 
"I was very disappointed in their attitude. 
It was more or less an attitude of' 'Oh well, 
there's nothing we can do about it lads so 
get on \,Ii th it and get the best terms you 
can for them that have to go~' I thought 
it was very irresponsible f'or a union 
official to say that. Perhap s we wouldn't 
have won anything if we I d fought it but vie 
might have done better than \Ire' ve done 
today" ( steward) • 
The actions of the union off'icials left the stewards on their 
own, incapable of preventing closure and possibly even too 
inexperienced to take advantage of any opportunities for 
improving the closure terms that existed. The concessions that 
the stewards did win were probably due as much to Oppen' s 
frame of mind about spending money to ensure a peaceful 
closure. as to their own negotiating and bargaining skills. 
Union involvement might have led to a be-t;ter overall redundancy 
package. 
The ste\'rards perceived themselves as powerless, divisional 
management, hm'/ever, was rather more aporehensive. They were 
anxious that the closure went ahead quietly. 
"The Company takes the view that it really 
isn't in our interests to handle anyone 
situation in a way that gives serious 
offence to the rest of our population. 
The total Company population needs to 
feel that although the Company ''1ill not 
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jib at going in for change \'ihen it is 
necessaxy, it \-rill handle it in a 
reasonable \,lay" (divisional manager). 
Oppen \-ras left in no doubt about his responsibilities: 
"Throughout the \·Thole thins it \'las made 
very clear to me that my job \'laS to 
contain it because if anything \'lent \'Trortg 
with the closure - whether it VIas a strike, 
or a big hold-up, or a disruption of any 
sort - it could very readily spread ~o the 
rest of the division with economic 
disaster". 
Divisional management was vTorried about the possibility of 
trouble at Mountside and, more importantly, the prospect of 
this spreading to other sites in a division which \'las already 
experiencing economic problems. Furthernore 
"there \AlaS concern that it shouldr~' t (10 
.:'> 
Wrong because there \'lOuld be others that 
would have to be closed" (Oppen). 
The fact that products were being transferred to other sites 
meant that management was anxious not to lose production 
before the transfers were completed. In other \'lords, Camerons 
was vulnerable in a number of areas. Firstly, a strike at 
Mountside could disrupt the production of surviving businesses 
and hence lose customers. Secondly, the spread of action 'lJ10uld 
be very damaging to the division as a whole. Thirdly, it was 
important that this closure \':ent quietly because of the prospect 
of other closures in the future. 
It is difficult to say "1hether, had the steuards realised 
the vulnerability of the Company, they could have exerted 
enough pressure to prevent the closure. It is clear, h01J/ever, 
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that, i:lith union support, they would have been in a far more 
povlcrful position. 
IIT~'lhat the stewards and orficia_ls \,'lOuldn' t 
have appreciated is ho\! \'iorried the 
Co~pany was that the closure shoulcln' t 
go wrong. Because the Company was 'VlOrried 
if the officials had made a bie- thiner of 
b <~ 
it and said 'Fine,' yOU close a "lorks down 
but "Vle're going to negotiate something 
special for that' the Company \'1ould have 
neGotiated so as to prevent trouble and 
the possibility of it spreading a.1'ld 
affecting 01..1I' business" (senior manager). 
Oppen was particularly worried about the local officials. 
because they \'!ould be the ones to instigate action. Oppen 
was verry anxious about one of the local AUEW officials who 
had been viewed as being on his way to the top ranks of the 
union hierarchy II Fortunately for Oppen, he VIas ill and played 
no part in either of the meetings. Another thincr "lhieh ~ 
\'lorried Oppen was his failure to actively involve the unions 
in the second announcement, instead, he had left it to the 
stewards to call them in. l'Jith hindsight Oppen felt that, had 
the unions been spoiling for a fight, they would have taken 
exception to this. 
As has already been discussed, the unions took no action -
with the absence of the AUE\'J official, the initiative was 
taken b~' I'nJCr.Il'l. The local official checked \'Ii"tJ.'-l his national 
officers and decided that, because of the gradual rundown, 
the o-enerous terms and the reputation of the Company , it \'laS 
, > 
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poi.ntless taking any action. The other unions such as the 
EETPU and the Boilermakers' Union only had a fe',,, nembers to 
look after \'Tho, as they were skilled, v.'ould have no problems 
in finding alternative Hork. The of'ficials felt that it was 
a ','Tasta of time taking on Came!'ons \':ith all their provisions, 
'.'lhen there were plen-bJ of other comp anies giving only 90 days 
notice and the minimum redundancy compensation. 
The situation is one of perceptions of powerlessness on the 
part of the stC'.'lards and, to a certain extent, local officials, 
"I;:'!ereas na"1agement \'las much more apprehensive of the poten.tia~ 
pO'~rer of these groups. The fact that they took steps to 
prevent it from being used, meant that stewards remained 
unaware of any strength they mis ht have had. 
Contextual Factors 
Tl:.e managers in this case-study took a lot of trouble to 
manage this closure in such a way that success was ensured. 
They Here, however, lucky in the respect that the ' contextual 
background 01 this closure afforded them many advantages 
;'r11ich complemented their attempts to secure a peaceful 
closure. 
The \'Jorkforce ':las relatively old with a tradition of loyalty 
to the Company - they were not predisposed towards taking 
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militant action. Furthermore, they \'Jere in a position to 
benefit from hi,zh redundancy compensation and early retirement. 
Neither the \'lorkforce or the stewards 1.l{ere particularly 
militant. 
Ita bloke who wants to go on strike is an 
idiotll ( steward) • 
People could remember only one strike in the last twenty years. 
The ti'lO senior stewards were of the same mould. The AUEtJ 
convenor wa$ probably the most likely to organise resistance 
but he left the Company in 1978. The general worker steward 
was described by management as "moderate" and "responsible". 
He represented the largest membership and cow~anded a lot of 
respec-l: fron'! both manaeers and workers. Neither steward 
really represented much of a threat to management. 
"I think to some extent we must be thankful 
that we had the shop stewards VIe did have. 
Al though they '.'Tere pretty difficult 
characters in many ways I think they could 
be convinced of the logic of the situation" 
(manager) • 
The Company \'Ias lucky in terms of the amount. of redeployment 
opportunities that were available locally - at divisiona~._. 
headquarters on-site and at another factory in the city. r·Iore 
opportunities ''lere available in the division at factories 
wi thin commutinrr distance. This meant that emp loyees \'Tho (::> 
\'lanted to stay "lith the Company but \'Tho did not "Tant to move 
could be accomodated relatively easily. Coupled with this was 
the fact that, at the time. workers perceived alternative 
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jobs as being available. All the skilled workers I SlJoke 
to were confident of finding new jobs if they \',ranted them. 
The general \'iorkers ~,:lere more apprehensive by.t, on the \',hole, 
they were confident of finding some sort of alternative 
employment although it was likely tobe less '1el1 paid. 
Finally, there are a fev! other points to mention. It seems 
that a plan for alternative industry was talked about by 
stewards but C8l1le to nothing, probably with the abdication 
of the union officials. A.11.other interestincr feature was 
.::> 
the occurence of managerial resistance. The A1.'lIil made a thorough 
investigation of the proposed closure, before the 1975 
anIlouncement, because he was not satisfied it!i th the grounds 
for the decision. It took some time to convince him of the 
desirability of closure but, by the time he \'!as, all the 
reasons had been properly worked through and management 'I.'!ere, 
maybe regretfully, committed to the decision to close. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The key factors in this case-study are the appointment of 
Oppen and his management of the closure, includin~ the initial 
culture chanr:re Hhich set a firm foundation for a consultative 
= 
approach to the closure. This was then follo\,led by an open, 
co:nlilunicati ve atmosphere in "lhich both managers and ste\'lards 
v.'ere able to contribute to the rundovTn process. The impact of 
the closure was softened by generous severance ter;ns, early 
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retire8ent and other aid. IIanagement \'las undoubtedly hell1ed 
in their ain for a peaceful closure particu18.rly by the 
perceptions of pm'!er1essness by the ste''I'rards and the abdication 
of the officials i:Thich left the stewards in a hopeless position. 
"There \'laS clearly not much \'1e could do 
about it, only what we did" (steward). 
Both of these groups found the decision to close Mountside 
\'lorks acceptable, mainly for environmental reasons. !,!anagement 
\I}'as also helped by the e:.dstence of a non-militant lonu-
c..> 
serving \"lorkforce whi~'1. was loathe to ta1;:.e action against the 
closure and '.'lhich\'1ou1d benefit from the severance terms and 
early retirement plans. Abund~~t redeployment opportunities 
helpedmana~ement find alternative jobs inside the Company for 
those \'Iho did not wish to. ;leave. 
This chapter has concerned itself with merely describing 
the situation at Hountside \'Jorks, so that the reader can 
familiarise herself or himself with the actors and events 
involved. The data are analysed and the evidence presented, 
in terms of the framework given earlier in the book, in 
chapter eleven. 
A Comparison 
A limited anount of data, in the form of a report a"1d a fe'!;[ 
intervie'Js, are available on another closure in the division. 
This hir:hlights a number of interestin;: factors vlhen it is 
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compared l.-d-th the information from !·Iountside. 
I::. 1975-6, the division closed an operating plant in a 'works in 
the \'Jest of Scotland, lmovmas Brookside. Although the closure 
\'lent ahead 
"the unions put up a lot of resistance 
before accepting the decision at a final 
conference at headquarters level. In the 
process they involved the press as well 
as political leaders in an effort to 
muster support" (report) • 
This constituted, in the eyes of Camerons, a significant amount 
of resistance. A number of factors can be found to account for 
tbe differences in outcome at Brookside and 1.1ountside. 
This particular di~ision (A-division) had only arrived on this 
site durinfT 1971. 
<-" 
Since the 1940s vlhen the Company first 
became involved in this site, the \1Jorks had enjoyed a peaceful 
existence, apart from one clos'llI'e in 1958. l'Jith the arrival of 
A-division a nlli~ber of unc~~fortable chanGes occurred: 
.::., 
a) The transfer of a plant to another division in 1973 
which led to accusations from manual 'Horkers of inadequate 
consultation. 
b) The provision of site services "'las traJ.1.sferred to the 
other division on-site (B-division). No redundancies uere 
involved but 100 people were transferred to B-division. 
c) An operating plant \\Tas closed in 1974 and 12 people 
\','ere redeployed. 
Since the arrival of A-division in 1971 
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"nn accumt.ilation of fc2.r and suspicion 
since the division ha.d taken over the 
business" (report). 
Bumbers had reduced from 300 in 1971 to 200 in 1974 on d .. y..o.> -cne 
number of operating plants had been reduced to 0Q..!O from four. 
As a result, traditional '\:lorking arrangements and longstanding 
relationships had been eroded. 
The announce~ent of the closure of this particular plant came 
very much as a shock to employees. It ',las announced in 
f.1arch 1975, on the same day as the chairman. announced the 
complete withdra'l,'lal of A-division from the site. This double 
blo\\}' vIas all the harder because it had recently been preceded 
by three highly optimistic state8ents about the future of 
the \'lorks in December 1974, January 1975 and February 1975. 
Furthermore, as a statement in April 1975 announced, the 
closure was to be effected quickly - part of the plant would 
close by June 1975, the rest in early 1976 , the one remaining 
plant would continue to operate but "lould be managed by B-
division. The result 'Jas that the closure came as a complete 
shock to the employees and it was to be carried out as a crash 
prozramme that would take less than a year to effect. 
The handling of the closure met with a lot of criticism from the 
stewards \-/ho obj ected to the lack of consultation and cornmunica-
tion. Ste\'le.rds felt that they should have been involved much 
earlier in the decision-mru<ing process and told of the business 
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uncertainties ';:hich existed. This a~J'Jears to have been due to 
the fact that the traditional and authoritarian attituces 
~d!'ich existed before the arrival of A-divis:Lon had not yet 
been changed. Consequently the closure and the changes '~'lhich 
preceded it had all been handled in a highly autocratic manner. 
This situation \"as exacerbated by the illness of the "''lorks 
manager and his successor which led to three people having 
responsibility for the itTOrks from the crucial period from 1974. 
\'Jorking relationships also proved to be ineffective as they 
pivoted around the relationship be"b.'ieen the original works 
manager end the senior ste'\.\lard, who \'las extremely powerful. 
As one manager put it 
"you managed through him". 
tlhen the 'lJlorks manager "'las taken ill t and the stei'lard was 
promoted to a staff position, the entire basis of industrial 
relations at the 'lllOrks was removed. This tvlO-person relationship 
had robbed manaeement of opportunities to develop relationships 
at Imler levels. Furthermore, the new steward \'Jas less 
"middle of the road" than his predecessor and presented 
menagementwith problems because he had inherited a pO\llerful 
position. 
Brookside closure represents a ver~y different picture from the 
closure at I.1ountside. Althouryh there had been shed closures t~ 
at I:ountside, they do not ap:Jear to have had an adverse effect 
on enployees. The ne\'IS of the closure at I·~ountside did not 
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come as a shock - al tbou.zh employees said that they initially 
did not believe it, they could all trace the causes back to 
the 1950s and 1960s t and all mentioned rUTaours of closure 
which had started many years before. They had .more time 
to adj ust to the closure with the nlO announcements and a five 
year rundo\'m period. 
The closure at Brookside ~las handled very differently - there 
was no consultation or communication and there certainly had 
been no culture change prior to the closure. Consequently 
there was a climate of suspicion and distrust already existing 
which was not helped by the handling of the closure. 
An additional problem facing managers at Brookside \las the 
difficulties surrourtding redeploJment. Although transfers to 
plants operated by B-division were available on-site, the 
employees had developed their Oi.'m culture to such an extent 
that anti-B-division feelin2s were rife. This has been 
attibuted to the gradual srmvth in dominance of B-division 
to 1400 employees (as against 200 in A-division) despite its 
later arrival in 1959. So, although~opportunities for 
redeployment ,'rere available on paper, er:1ployees were apprehensive 
about the prospects of being transferred. Added to this "'Jas 
the lack of alternative jobs outside the Company in a tm'ln 
,..,here unemployment 'lJras double the national average wi.d in 'Vlhich 
7~~ of the \'1orkinS popUlation \vor1<:ed for Canerons. 
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A comparison bet .... reen r,10untside and Brookside shm'jS ho".! 
• L.1.. th -an .t.. fl·· h·· ~r.ipOrl.anv e I.. agemenl" 0 c osure 18 J..n ac ~evlng a peaceful 
closure, particularly in the form of setting the rizht tj~e 
of clirr.ate in preparation for the closure. A climate of 
trust and co-operation 'l.'lOuld appear to make matters a lot 
easier for managers. It also demonstrates how significant 
the context of a particular closure can be - it can help or 
hinder managers. A benevolent context is a bonus for managers 
but a hostile environment can present problems. It has 
to be assessed fu"1.d counteracted. This was not done at Brookside 
and, consequently. the difficulties 'l:lhich already existed 
were compounded by mismanagement leadjng to resistance. 
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Chapter Seven 
MIDERSONS 
The second case-study concerns another industrial closure - of 
a factory in the West of Scotland. The factory, known here as 
Newlands, was part of a non-British based multi-national, knO\I/l1 
here as Andersons. The factory was opened in 1949, employed 
around 1500 people, and covered the general areas of nechanical 
engineering. 
In September 1978, it was announced, following the Company's 
world-wide loss of ~145.5 million for the nine months ending 
July 31st 1978, that a study \lias to be conducted into the 
European manufacture of a particular product (product A). The 
terms of reference of the study, announced slightly later, Were: 
given that the Company had exceSs manufacturing capacity at its 
two European plants (at Newlands and St Bertin in France), 
what would be the most efficient manufacturing arrangement for 
the Company, and \'lhat would be the best utilisation of any 
manufacturing capacity which was released. The study was, in 
effect, to assess the feasibility of reducing the existing 
dual sourcing arrangements to a single source, in a bid to save 
money. The Company had recently undergone massive losses, for 
eXample, $256 million in the 1978 fiscal year and in the summer 
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of 1978, a ne\'l president had been appointed to restore the 
Company's viability. 
It had been announced that the feasibility study \'lould report 
in three months time. The recommendations \'lere, in fact, 
presented in November 1978. These proposed the complete 
transfer of product A to St Bertin, saving i10 million on 
annual overheads. It was also suggested that a second product 
(product B) should be transferred from St Bertin to Newlands 
which, at a cost of i2 million, \'lOuld provide work for 500 
people. This latter recommendation was, according to the 
Company, in recognition of its social obligation to its workforce 
and the area. 
These recommendations were presented to employees and union 
officials in November 1978. These groups responded quickly 
to the news of probable job losses. Local ste"'lards formed a 
joint union co-ordinating committee (JUCC) which consisted of 
nine representatives of both manual anq staff unions (AUEW, 
TASS and APEX). They commissioned, through the Scottish TUC 
(STUC), studies of the commercial basis of Anderson's 
decision, and of the social implications of the implementation 
of the recommendations. They lobbied politicians and other 
unions. They organised a demonstration in London, and arranged 
a visit to the French factory to see if they could learn anything 
there. 
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In January 1979, the unions presented their case to the Company. 
The report they had commissioned, from members of a local 
university, argued that product A should continue to be based 
at newlands and product B in France. They also pointed, on the 
basis of another study, to the severe effect the Company's 
decision \vould have on the local economy. The unions based 
their decision, which "''las in direct opposition to the findings 
of the feasibility study, on various assumptions because they 
did not have access to all the figures used as a basis for the 
Company I s study. A series of meetings evolved around the two 
studies but because, the Company \-lould not allow the release 
of key figures, on the grounds of confidentiality, the "truth" 
could not be demonstrated, so the discussions led to a stale-mate 
eventually petering out, having effectively achieved nothing. 
In July 1979, the Company announced that the study was to be 
re-opened and the deadline for the final decision was extended. 
This was fol101.ved by another series of raeetings be-o'leen the 
president, the STUC, the unions, the local stewards and the 
district council, and also between the m<managing director, 
local MPs, the under-Secretary of State for Scottish Industry, 
and the Secretary of State for Industry. These meetings revolved 
around the future of the factory and the possibilities of 
saving jobs. In November 1979, however, fol101.'ling the collapse 
of the market for product B t it was announced that there \'lOuld 
be a complete closure of Newlands with the loss of 1500 jobs in 
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February 1980. 
In the meantime, however , consultants had been brought in to 
work out ne"'l payment and production systems in anticipation 
of the arrival of product B. These consultants had been 
liasing with both managers and emp loyees, as a result of which 
an idea had emerged for bringing alternative work into the 
factory. An international work-search had been designed to 
find a buyer for the complete factory and a local work-search 
had been established to assess if any demand existed for their 
skills. The international search failed to produce a buyer 
but the local search proved more fruitful, establishing a 
market for a sub-contracting engineering firm. Both management 
and employees had been involved· in this search for new work, 
as a result of which a new company - Merryvale Ltd - was 
formed. 
In February 1980, Andersons withdre\'l from the Newlands site, 
leaving Merryvale Ltd, which nO\" employs about 170 people. 
Andersons is still responsible for the project but wishes to 
hold no more than a 20% share in the long term. 
Resistance: Its Likelihood and Conseauences 
The closure of Newlands eventually went ahead, as far as the 
Company \'las concerned, successfully. There was certainly a 
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great deal of activity designed to prevent the closure but it 
''las confined to lobbies, meeting, reports and did not escalate 
into a strike or occupation. 
f-Tanagement was ' apprehensive about the reSponse of the workforce 
to the news of the loss of jobs. There were, in fact, -b,'lO 
crucial stages - the announcement of the feasibility study, and 
the announcement of the complete closure. Management 
anticipated action. 
"\lJe '''ere never confident that it was going 
to go our '''8:3. VIe were never certain 
whether or not it was going to turn into 
an occupation; it was always on the cards" 
(UK director). 
Other managers expected industrial action, on the basis of the 
attitudes of the shop stewards who appear to have been an 
active and influential force at Ne\lflands. One manager, on 
being transferred to Scotland, was warned that they were "a 
pretty lively bunch". 
What were the consequences of industrial action? One UK 
Director admitted that the Company was vulnerable while 
production was being transferred to the French factory, because 
it would take time for it to "tool up" and acquire the 
necessary expertise. The stewards ,\Tere in a position to apply 
pressure but this, according to management, "lould not have 
prevented the closure , it ~lould have been more likely to have 
had the reverse effect. Andersons was in such a difficult 
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financial position that the cost of closure \flas unimportant 
in relation to shedding $10 million in annual overheads. 
"The Company "las in such a desperate state 
that the prospect of what they might do 
had ceased to be relevant" (UK director). 
Furthermore, if· act4.on -\'Tere to escalate to. the -other British 
factories, there were fears for the safety of the entire UK 
operation. 
"vJe've done what we have in the last tV10 
years because we've been so desperate as 
a Company. If we hadn't succeeded we 
might have gone out of business anywayll 
(UK director). 
Uanagement \,18S anxious to avoid precipitating industrial 
action, not because it might force them to rethink the closure, 
but because it '!.'Tould exacerbate an already difficult situation. 
UK management had other reasons for preferring a quiet life. 
From September 1978 until November 1979, no decision had been 
taken by the Company - the UK was still competing \'lith France 
for product A or, if not, product B. A peaceful scene at 
Newlands was the only chance of retaining either of these 
products and UK management naturally preferred to have one 
or other of these products based in Britain rather than France, 
if it was at all possible. Another reason for UK management 
to prefer peace stems from the previous history of unrest in 
British industrial relations ,..rhich had adversely affected 
this multi-national. 
"There \lIas pressure on us to close Newlands 
Quietly to demonstrate that the UK 
... 
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environment "-'las a 'can do' environment. 
It \'ras quite important for the fu.ture 
of Andersons in the UK that \'le could 
handle the problem without industrial 
action" (UK director). 
Management \·ranted to close the Ne'vrlands factory. or as in the 
original plan reduce the numbers employed there, but it \lIas 
infinitely preferable to UK management at least that this 
should be effected ~lithout any form of industrial action. 
As has been mentioned before, action of some sort was expected. 
The local ste\'J'ards had a reputation for being "militant" and 
"lively". They had been very influential in the running of 
Ne\l/lands and had overseen a number of previous disputes. Their 
response to the annoUJ."1cement of the feasibility study \lfas 
extremely professional. Under the leadership of the AUE\'} 
convenor - Charlie MacDonald - they had formed the JUCC. They 
had commissioned their own studies of the causes and effects 
of closure and they had contacted politicians, ministers 
and councillors in their attempts to prevent job losses and 
closure. In their o\'m words 
"everything that could be done was done". 
They arranged meetings with stewards'from other factories 
and obtained pledges of support from them. 
"This joint staff/manual delegate conference 
pledges total support for industrial action 
necessary to prevent the transfer of work 
out of Newlands and further undertake to win 
full commitment for this pledge from each 
factory location" 
The stewards were also conscious of their ability to hinder the 
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transfer of production to France. 
"Everyone recognised that to stop work 
\,lould hurt Andersons, since they needed 
production here until the French 
fact;or''J. \,las tooled up" ( consultant) • 
The stewards \'lere well-organised, had \,lidespread contacts, :had 
potential support from the STUC, their union and other 
Andersons factories and were conscious of their power so, 
\'Ihy did they not take some form of industrial action? 
Environmental Pressures 
The reason for there being no immediate industrial action 
in response to the announce~ent and report of the feasibility 
study was due, largely, to the leadership of Charlie r.lacDonald 
and the JUCC. Some ste\'rards, referred to as the 5th Column, 
wanted to take action but !;IacDonald decided against it and 
convinced the JUCC and the \'lorkforce of his re as onine • The 
basis of his argument was that previous attempts at work-ins 
and sit-ins had been unsuccessful in preventing closure. 
"\'}e've seen sit-ins, \,lork-ins, pickets and 
demonstrations, but in the end firms have 
still closed dO\vn. t'1e are trying another 
tack. I suppose \'Ie could have got ourselves 
into a political argument, but where 'lJlould 
that have got us?" (MacDonald). 
Another problem facing r.facDonald, had he "rished to take SOfi1e 
forr.1 of industrial action, was a lack of commitment from the 
shopfloor. MacDonald felt that workers would not support a 
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strike or occupation because of the threat to their redundancy 
payments, \·rithout guaranteeing the prevention of closure. 
"The membership wasn't prepared to go into 
a long struggle \'lhich they srulJ' J at the end 
of the day, ... ·lOuld produce the sarae outcome" 
(member of JUCC). 
The \'lOrkforce tended to be older, long-service employees who 
'Would benefit from relatively high compensation, qualifying for 
three weeks pay per year of service plus payment in lieu of 
notice of up to u'lelve "leeks pay. lilembers of the JUCC \'lere 
also dubious of , support from other factories if it came to 
industrial action. 
gacDonald and the JUCC could appreciate the difficult position 
the Company was in. 
"These things had to be done or the Company 
itself would collapse. Nobody wants the 
CompFlny to collap se because there are a lot 
of people employed there" (I.IacDonald). 
The union officials I talked to also seemed sympathetic to the 
plight of the Company. 
It appears that both stm'lards and union officials were convinced 
of the negative aspects of ta~ing anY form of industrial 
action. This attitude, argues more than one union official, 
is the result of the current economic climate. 
"Its difficult in the present economic climate 
to get support because everyone's looking 
over their shoulder about his O ..... ln job. In 
industry generally the demoralisation of 
workers is quite dramatic" (union official). 
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It certainly seer::.s that gacDonald and his collegues took a 
look at the \'lOrld around them and decided that industrial 
action '\llOuld be difficult to sustain and, even if it '\Here, 
it "lould be unlikely to produce the results they wanted. 
Hanagerial strategies 
If the stewards discovered the negative aspects of taking 
industrial action, management provided them with some positive 
reasons for remaining co-operative. Despite the initial 
decision of MacDonald no-c to take action against the job losses, 
the future was by no means settled for management. Their 
strategy was to provide some hope, some reward for peace. 
"Our aim '\las to perpetually convince people 
that "lar would have a bad effect and they 
would lose out; that peace gave them hope 
and a chance" (UK director). 
The first part of this strategy involved eA-plaining exactly how 
difficult a position the Company was in and hm'1 necessary the 
job losses at Ne~'''J'lands were. They also tried to explain the 
reasons why it ,\las better to concentrate production in France. 
T,Ianagement appear to have been successful in convincing their 
employees of the precarious position of Andersons. Everybody 
I spoke to was aVlare of this and anxious that the ne\'T President 
should undo the mista1~es of past managers . Attitudes to the 
choice of St Bertin were More ~l1bivalent. On the one hand, 
they conceded that the French factory produced other products 
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and so, would be difficult to close dmm, that it had its 
mm foundry, that .Andersons O\l[ned the freehold whereas the 
Newlands site "las leased from the Scottish Development Agency, 
but they could not reconcile themselves to the decision to 
locate production in France. They would point to th~ quality of 
their product, to their previous achievements in meetina 
b 
production schedules, to the skills that ",ould be lost and to 
\ 
the effect the closure \'J'Ould have on the community. Most 
people effectively pinned the blame on to the French government. 
There \'las a \I]idespread rumour that the French government had 
told Andersons that, if it had any intention of ceasing the 
production of product A in France, it could cease manufacturing 
and selling in France completely. There was no evidence for 
this rumour - both managers and the academics hired by the 
Lmions had failed to find any proof of this. Nevertheless, 
virtually everyone I spoke to, both inside and outside the 
Company, quoted this as the real reason for the closure. It 
was as if this was the only reason that would justify, in 
many people's eyes, a needless closure. 
The second part of management I s stra~egy revolved around 
providing hope for the employees. 
"People perpetually had hope that something 
would come out of it that would leave them 
with jobs" (UK director). 
First, there was the (faint) possibility of retaining product 
A, or at least saving product B. Then there Vlere the international 
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and local· \'!ork--searches. These ':lere follOi:.red by f.1erryvale 
Ltd. All these· repr'esented chances to save sone jobs. They 
were also used by management to steer the men away from 
industrial action. 
"The one thing we couldn't afford was bad 
publicity because if you're trying to 
entice a company in and the company Sees 
there's trouble, they're not going to 
come" (member of JUCC). 
A second thrust to this strategy was the series of meetings 
which developed around the feasibility study and the unions' 
critique. Stewards and unions believed that the Company 
could be persuaded that the move to France was wrong on economic 
and financial grounds. 
"\I.[e thought that we could prove that this 
Was a viable plant" (member of JUCC). 
The general strategy of talkins and listening to the unions 
was part of the normal approach adopted by Andersons. 
"Anderson's relationship with the unions 
has al\,lays been a friendly one. They 
alvTays give us a considered reply" 
(union official). 
The academics involved in the union critique of the feasibility 
study maintain that the meetings which developed around the 
UoIO studies were part of 
"a deliberate managerial strategy to \'Tear 
dO\ffi the opposition". 
r:anagement, on the other hand, ru:'gues that their \,lillingness to 
particinate in meetings was to ensure that they did not make a 
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procedural error, 
"to make sure that in no .... lay could we be 
criticised for not; having given the trade 
unions every opportunity to be consulted" 
(UK Director ). 
The stewards and unions entered in'co the dialogue because of 
their belief that this was the way to prevent the closure from 
taking place. At times they. fel·c they were winning as the 
COiilpany \I[ent off to consider specific points which they had made. 
On the "Thole, hovlever, management was unimpressed with the 
study, and was always able to find an answer to the unions' 
criticisms, although management insists that. had the critique 
come up with a feasible way of saving Ne\,llands, they would 
have entertained it. In fact. the strategy adopted by the 
unions 
"played into their hands because the factory 
Closed without any trouble" (union official). 
As one mana£er exp lains 
"the STUC had an almost impossible task. 
They \-lere trying to refute our figures 
wi thou·c having the base to do it and they 
had to make assumptions. As soon as they 
made an assumption. we could shoot it 
dmm. In all cases we were beiP.g truthful 
but VTe couldn't demonstrate that VIe were 
being truthful" 
The academics ''Tho comp iled the reprt agree 
"the lJlay in "Jhj.ch the Company treated the 
critique. which obviously \'ie think is 
completely valid, suggests that the facts 
of the case were not really \'1hat \-laS at 
issue. At the end, it \'las whether 
manauement could or could not operate 
<:.> 
successfully, tactically, Skilfully 
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enough to get that plant closed". 
The academics the:nselves argue that there 'I:Tere drawbacks in 
using this stratc2S. It may have left o-eher avenues of action 
unexplored, it may have led to an over-reliance on experts, and 
they 'were using a method of argument that they could never \lfin. 
If this stra-tegy Vias started by a belief that this was a valid 
'1J.lay of reversing' the Company's decision, it ended in a sterile 
and sometimes acrimonious debate around the points of contention. 
For example J Andersons contested the assumptions made in the 
critique but refused to release the figures. The academics 
argued that the decision to reduce jobs 'VIas nothing to do 'VIi th 
operating costs, markets or excess capacity, but was the result 
of earlier expansion which had been financed by the banks who 
now. at a tine of uncertainty, \llan-ted their money back. The 
closure \lIas meant to be a sign to them that Andersons was 
making the right moves. UK management admitted previous mis-
management and the motives of the financiers but argued that 
the decision \'las still justified, and necessary for the well-
being of the Company. The academics argued that the real 
reason for closing the IIe\lTlands factory was the attitude of the 
French eovernment. Management replied by arguing that, to save 
money by ceasing the production of product A in France. you 
\-lould have to close the entire factory and then what would yOU 
do \'lith the foundry and the other products made there? 
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There \'/ere other points of disagreenent be-G\1Teen unions and 
management. The unions argued that mano.e;ement knew \,rell in 
advance of the feasibility study that the days of the factory 
were numbered. UK managemen-t; replied that they only kne\" v,'lO 
or three \'leeks beforehand, although preliminary work would 
have been undertaken at a higher level to See if an in-depth 
study was justified. The unions feel that they should have 
been involved in the study. Man8.Eement argued that to release 
the· figures on vihich the feasibility study \I]'as based "lould have 
been damaging to the Company. The unions also believe that 
the study was not conducted properly because it reported back 
in less than the intended three months. Management says that 
they put more man/hours in in order to end the uncertainty as 
soon as possible. 
The prevailing opinion of the study among unions and employees 
(at the time of the interviews ie after the closure) is that 
it was a means to an end. 
"Management, in their typical style, was 
prepared to listen •••• but, at the end 
of the day, they \'Jere still intending to 
carry on .with their propo;;als (ste"Tard). 
Despite its unsatisfactory ending, the dialogue \'Thich developed 
around the feasibilivJ study and its critique presented 
man~;enent with some useful advantages. It provided employees 
\'lith the belief that this - peaceful - strategy \'ras the way 
to save the factory, and while the employees and stevlards were 
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engaged in talking, they were not striking or occupying. 
The Company has also received criticism regarding its initial 
armouncement to transfer product B to Newlarlds. It has been 
suggested that this was a deliberate ploy to reduce the possibility 
of resistance, and they had no real intention of siting the 
product in Scotla..."1.d. Management's reply to this is 
"It certainly \,lasn' t a con game by those 
of us in the UK and on the study group or, 
to my knowledge, of other people. I do 
not believe they were clever enough. \,Ie 
are not in control, to that degree, of 
our environment" (UK director). 
Management maintains that the offer of product B \I/as genuine 
and \'Tas withdrm'm only because of uncontrollable market factors. 
The work-searches and I\Terryvale Ltd have come in for similar 
criticism. The academics, for example, believe that the 
consultants, ostensibly brought in to devise new payment systems, 
were, in reality, hired to "suggest" the idea of alternative 
products to the workforce in attempt to reduce the likelil~ood 
of industrial action as the news of the comple-te closure \'!as 
made public. 
"I thinl-:: they came up with this plan as 
part of an effort to close the factory 
without any industrial hassle" (union 
official) • 
There is no doubt that the idea of a work-search emerged at 
a convenient time for management but they insist that it \'Tas 
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not part of a preconceived strategY, that the idea genuinely 
arose out of dialogue between unions and manager:1ent, with the 
consul·tants acting as middle-I:len. This \'las a crucial role 
because management was ' um'lilling to introduce the idea of 
alternative work for fear that the unions \'Iould see it as a 
sign that closure \\fas inevitable (which, at the time it \'las not), 
and the stewards were reluctant to broach the idea in case it 
indicated to management that they accepted the job losses. 
It was left to the consultants to liase bet\l}'een the two groups. 
The ste~lards see themselves as playing a not insignificant role 
in initiating the role of alternative work. They had argued 
for alternative products to be brought in at the beginning of 
the exercise and they had compiled their own list of the skills 
and facilities the factory had to offer. 
It seems unlikely that management introduced the idea of 
alternative work as part of a premeditated strategy, it seems 
more likely that the offer of product B \'las genuine and that 
the work-searches evolved from management/union/consultant 
discussions. Nevertheless, management was quick to realise 
that these opportunities could be used to demonstrate to the 
workforce that a' peaceful closure was likely to prove more 
advantaryeous for them than the taking of industrial action. 
co. ... 
It was a case, in the \'lords of one manager, of "tactical 
opportunism" _ as the opportunities arose, management was 
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quick to realise tl)eir potential and make use of them. 
The Afterr:lath 
f 
I1anagement succeeded in closing Ne\lllands without industrial 
action, but what feelings have they left behind? The ste;'\lards 
and officials are ambivalent in their feelings. They new feel 
that the feasibility study was a foregene conclusien and the 
Company had already taken its decision. using the study to' 
obtain union agreement. They also feel, in retrospect, that 
their own attempts to' prevent closure "'ith their O'Hn study were 
doomed to' failure from the start. On the ather hand, they 
argue, "lhat else cauld they do - at least they saved sel7le jobs 
in the fcrm cf Merryvale. They remain adamant that a strike 
or sit-in \IIculd have achieved ncthing except, perhaps, an 
earlier clcsure. There is nO' real bitterness at the Company 
- they are able to appreciate the financial difficulties and 
feel that, cn the t1lhele. Andersons ha..'1.dled the closure \';ell. 
The feelings of the crdinary enplcyees are mere pessimistic 
and bitter. Many have remained unemployed since their 
redundancy and have little hope ef finding a new job in the 
future - unemplcyment has always been ''1ell abcve the naticnal 
average. Such peeple are reluctant to' meve to' England to' find 
wQrk, kncwing that, with the effect Qf the recess ian hitting 
Enelish firms, they ''1Quld be the first to' gO' in any redundancies. 
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J:Iarw of the people I spoke to \"Jere very bitter touards the 
Cor.cpany, feeling that they I.lad been treated badl~T and still 
unable to understand why EevTlands had been closed. 
A Comparison 
In February 1980, Andersons announced another study to be conducted 
into the transfer of production from a Merseyside factory to 
another plant in the North. The results here were rather 
different - the workforce had occup ied the factory within b'lO 
\'leeks. The sit-in lasted seven weeks during which time they 
picketed the other factory in an effort to stop the transfer. 
They ~ .. lere eventually forced back to ','lork by the threat of with-
drawn redundancy payments, and subsequently accepted the 
closure in I,lay. The factory VIas closed in July. 
The difference here, according to management, was that the 
ste\'lards "brol:e the rules" by taking action before procedure 
had been eXhausted, while talks and negotiations "-,,ere still 
going on. Hanagement then felt free to appeal to \'lorkers in 
the other factories, particularly at "Nortown, where production 
was to be transferred, on the grounds that the Compa.ny- had 
done its best, that the Merseyside stewards had tal<:en precipitate 
action '.:Thich threatened their m'ln jobs. The tIortown \'lorkcrs 
accepted the work from the Merseyside factory ano. the employees 
there found therllselves \·Iithout support. Having removed the 
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po::sibili vJ of s:/opathy action from other fq.ctories and ensured 
that the Norto· ... n l'iorkers \IJould not refuse to take t~,:e \'lork 
from their Merseyside collegues t management "'las able to 
force their employees to end their occufation. by threate~ing 
to \'Ii thdra\,l reduIldancy terms. Union officials 1;lere in no 
position to put up any obj ections because the employees had 
broken their contract of employment by taking action before the 
grievance procedure had been exhausted. 
This closure indicates that industrial action at Newlands would 
probably have brought the closure forward and that the stance 
adopted by the Scottish stewards at least saved the jobs for 
bvelve months. It also demonstrates the abili~J of the 
management to split the workforce. The union officials felt 
that Merseyside \'ias one that they 'VlOuld ".'lin. 
"They'll never be able to close it because 
they'll have to send the \'lOrk to Norto."m 
and all we do is tell our members 'You 
don't take it' but our members said 'You 
keep out of it, we want the "\,,ork'" 
(union official). 
r,1anagement maintains that they would have dealt with resistance 
at Newlands in the same way - isolating the workforce to avoid 
sympathy action and then threatening to withdrm': or reduce 
redundancy payments. The cost of industrial action would have 
been offset against the saving in redundancy terms, probably 
of £5-6 million. 
The "revolution" of r,1erseyside met -,':ith no success at all, the 
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I reforr'1ism" of Newlands only saved jobs temporarily apSl-·t 
from around 200 in r.ierryvale. Does this mean that employees 
and unions are totally pouerless? In this case, because of 
the Company's desperate position, there rl1ay have been little 
or no chance of saving the factories but, given management's 
concern for peaceful closure, they might well have been 
prepared to pay a higher price to achieve it. The key is, 
according to one manager, 'to play it by the book all the 
way through and then, when the Company still decides to go 
ahead with the closure, calIon help from other factories. 
This would make management appear as the aggressors. In an 
area of high unemployment, 'like Nerseyside and the \']est Coast 
of Scotland, if the plants could be saved, other concessions 
might be made 
"who knOVls what VIe would have been \,lilling 
to gO along with, put the right way" 
(UK director) 
because the refusal of such legitimate demands in an area of 
social need might be enough to ensure action from the other 
British factories, something Anderson's management was keen to 
avoid. 
Summary and Conclustons 
This\case-study illustrates two important processes. The first 
concerns the initial decision of the stevlards not to take 
industrial action. This, it seems, is the result of the 
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prevailing economic climate - the inevitability of closlTe 
al1.d the failure of previous att~mpts to prevent it by cc.ercive 
means. 
The second factor, which assured managerial success "'as their 
ability to recognise opportunities which enabled them to 
comTince employees and unions that peace was best way of saving 
jobs. If the ste,'lards discovered the negative aspects of 
aggression for themselves, maL1agement ':;as quick to provide them 
with some positive benefits to be derived from co-operation. 
The outcome "Tas a result of the combination of these two 
factors: 
"the general economic climate t.'at' s got 
people half-defeated before you go into 
the struggle and, secondly, the sophisticated 
way the Company did it" (union official). 
The strategy of tactical opportunism, althouRh successful, 
VlaS very different to the tactics adopted by the managers 
at Camerons. Theirs was based primarily on climate-setting in 
which a climate, conducive to co-operation and trust is 
constructed prior to closure. In the case of the Andersons 
closure, this \'las not possible as UK management, with the 
responsibility for managing the exercise, only knew about the 
feasibility study al1.d its possible implications a fe,'l "'leeks 
before it was ani1.ounced to employees. There \,las no time to 
eng aRe in climate-setting and they were forced to rely on a 
policy of recognising and seizing opportunities as they arose. 
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Cha,.Dter EiRht 
MIDVILLE 
Introduction to the NHS 
The next bro chapters deal with hospital closures. The 
NHS's administrative system and its procedures for dealing with 
closure are complicated and so, \'lill be briefly e~'Plained 
before the case-studies are examined. 
Since the 1974 Reorganisation of the health service, there are 
a number of distinct managerial levelE (see diagram 8.1). 
Diagram 8.1 
The Administrative Structure of the nI-rs 
Department of Health 8.c Social Securi"bJ (DHSS) 
Secretary of State for Health f< Social Security-
r.rinister of State for Health 
t 
Regional Health Authority (RHA) 
t 
Area_ Health Authority (AHA) 
/' \ 
Area Team of 
Officers 
(ATO) 
District i·:anagement 
_) Tean 
(DMT) 
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The DI-ISS and its Secretary of State hold lorJ1al responsibility 
for the E-IS. Irr.r,1ediately under the Secretary of State is a 
I.:inister of Health. Beloi.'l this level are 14 RHAs. These 
have between 18 and 24 members and a chairman \'lho are 2.11 
appointed by the Secretary of State. The PRA is responsible 
for a number of AHAs. These have bevNeen 18 and 33 members 
including one c onsul-t ant , one general practitioner (GP), one 
university nominee, one trade unionist, two health service 
employees, a number of lay members (all of these are appointed 
by the RHA) and local authority members (who must make up at 
least one third). The AHA is the decision-making body for the 
area - it responds to and votes on recommendations made by 
its managers. The ATO has responsibility for strategic policy 
and planning. It does not have direct control over, but is 
supposed to liase with, the Dr·ITs \\Thich have responsibility 
for the operational management and day-to-day running of the 
districts into which the area is divided. In some cases, 
there is only a single district and the U10 functions of the 
ATO and DUT are merged into one under the Area Management Team 
(AMT) • Consensus manaaement \'Tas also introduced in 1974. 
c> 
In the event of a proposed closure, it appears that the usual 
procedure is for the DMT to recommend to the ATO that a 
closure is necessary or justified on certain grounds. A 
proposal is then submitted to the AHA and, if they affirm the 
decision, a consultative document is produced. This 
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document should include the reasons for the closure, the disposal 
or al ternati ve uSe of the site, the relationship bet1'leen the 
closure and other developments in the area, and the implications 
for patients. This is then circulated to unions, Communit-J Health 
Councils (CHC)f local authorities, staff organisations and advisory 
committees. At the same time local MPs, the p~ and the DHSS 
are informed and a preb3 statement issued. Most of these 
groups are expected to make comments on the proposed closure, 
which the AHA has to take into account when making its decision. 
The vie":l of the CHC is particularly significant. There is one 
CEC to each district and they are responsible for promoting 
and protecting the interests of the patients. If they object 
to a closure and submit an alternative plan, the AHA must take 
it into account. If the f.B.A still \-fishes to go ahead with the 
closure, it must refer the decision to the RHA. If the RHA 
will not accept the CHC's proposals then it must seek the 
approval of the Secretary of State who mayor may not confirm 
the decision to close. Thus the CHC has a formal mechanism 
Whereby it can register its objections. If, on the other hand, 
the CHC agrees to the closure, then the AHA can go ahead with 
it., 
For more details on the ~lliS see, for example, Barnard (1974), 
The Royal Commission on the NHS (1976-9) and Hunter (1980). 
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:I.!idville - the Reasons for Closure 
This case-study concerns the closure of VIithybrook hospital 
by T,1idshire AH11. \'Jithybrook was a small hospital some ten miles 
from Midville - a rapidly expanding market tovm in the Midlands. 
l.Iidshire AHA comprises tt'lO districts, one of which covers 
Midville and its surrounding districts. The other covers the 
remaining tO\'lns in the county. 
\'Jithybrook 'II/as originally a TB hospital but, with the virtual 
eradication of the disease, had catered for chest patients 
and "cold surgery" (varicose veins, vasectomies etc). It 
had the appearance of a small cottage hospital \'lith attractive 
buildings in an idyllic setting in the countryside. According 
to one doctor, patients used to enjoy going there because it 
was small, friendly and picturesque, and because they \'lere not 
really ill - either undergoing minor surgery or convalescing. 
Its medical use, however, \lJas limited because of the lack of 
support facilities and its distance from the district general 
hospital (DGH) in town. 
The AHA's policy had been to concentrate services at the DGH, 
which had been greatly extended in recent years. A rationalisa-
tion process VIas underway and two geriatric units and a 
convalescent hospital had already been closed. This process 
was, hmlever, being accelerated due to the financial difficulties 
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the AHA was experiencing. The region had al\'Iays been one of 
the richer health service regions and hitherto had attracted 
funds. \'Ihen the Resource Allocation \'lorking ParvJ (RAUP) had 
devised a formula to distribute funds bev,.ieen the regions more 
fairly, it involved ta.kiri~ funds a't,:ray from the region. The 
problem, from Midshire AHA's point of view, \lIas that they had 
always been underfunded \'rithin the region by, management 
estinlate~, as much as £1 million per annum. With the loss of 
money through RAVlP and the gener.a1 economic stringency \trhich 
had resulted in the mid-seventies from government expenditure 
cuts, I:Iidshire' s small slice was coming from an even smaller 
cake. This situation was, in turn, exacerbated by r,fidshire's 
obligation to cater for 50% of the population of a nearby 
new town until its O'l!ffi hosp i tal \'las built. 
There was, then, a general principle of rationalisation 'which 
had been accelerated by the need to save money. The closure 
of '\lJithybrook would save over £300,000 a year. In April 1977, 
there was a recommendation by the m·IT to close the hosp i tal. 
They argued that the loss of beds would be met by the opening of 
a ne\'l phase at the DGH, although there would be a time lag of a 
couple of years. The AHA accepted the recommendation and 
proposed that a consultative document be prepared. In July 1977, 
the AHA accepted the document which then went out for consultation. 
In August, there \'las a formal notice of the proposed closure. 
The CHC called a public meeting in the November and, as a result 
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of the strength of feeling there, opposed the closure. They 
were supported by district and parish councils in the area 
but not by I.lidville tm·m or borough cotmcils. COHSE, the 
main union at Uithybrook, "deplored" the proposed closure. 
The CHC then made a formal objection to the DHSS. In December· 
1977, the AHA reaffirmed the decision to proceed with the 
closure, because of the CHC's action, this had to be passed up 
to the RHA, ""'ho gave their support to the closure and passed 
the matter up to the DHSS. In March 1979, the Secretary of 
State (David Ennals) eventually accepted the closure. The 
matter, hm'lever, \<las not finished, because of the change in 
government in May 1979, the new government reserved the right to 
reconsider the closure and it was not tmtil September that 
approval was finally given. 
Climate-Settinp" 
13 
The AHA had financial problems on a comparable scale to Northville 
(see next chapter), but it adopted a completely different 
approach, not only to the closure but to the general climate of 
industrial relations. Since Reorganisation, tmder the leader-
ship of the AHA Chairman, Alan Dale, they had sought to unify 
the trade union movement and bring it in to the consultation 
procedures which had been established. Consequently there 
\'1ere formal and informal meetings \'lith unions and the CHe in 
an attempt to exchange views and air problems and in which 
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managenent could fully explain its financial problems. 
These developments were taking place in a pea.ceful climate. 
I,Tidville had gro\ATn from a rural background and was not 
associated with high incidences of industrial activity Or 
labour militancy. The result \AlaS that, in the health service 
in Midville, industrial disputes were uncommon and relations 
between management and unions were good. Since Reorganisation 
there had been no local disputes, only national action during 
the Winter of Discontent (see chanter ten) and that 
had been minimal, confined to a work-to-rule by ambulance-
men and the "odd day off" (manager) by laundry workers. 
Furthermore, management had a high regard for the unions, 
describing them as tlreasonable", "responsible", "moderate" and 
"not militant". These feelings were mutual - union representa-
tives felt that relations with management were good because 
they were ah'rays willing to consult and discuss issues with 
them. 
"Relations are good here. We are told 
informally I Look out: in a month so and 
so is going to happell' II (troPE official). 
Having created a climate of good industrial relations and 
effective management, they were not going to jeopardise it 
by mishandlino the closure. Although managers felt secure in 
..,-, 
their relationships with the unions and the CHC, they \'lere also 
conscious of the fact that to ignore them or not consult them 
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fully could \'lell lead to trouble. Management \'las, therefore, 
~~ious to not only effect the closure but to handle it in 
such a way that feelings were not injured anong unions, staff 
or CHC members. 
H£magerial Strategies 
The main strategy was one of consultation with everyone 
involved in or affected by the closure. The key managerial 
figure in this was Alan Dale, Chairman of the AHA. He led 
many of the discussions. makin~ himself available for 
consultation ""ith any of the various interest groups. He \ITas 
able to draw on his moffi, considerable experience not only of 
the health service with which he had been involved for 25 years, 
but also of the local council. t'Ihen he took the 
AHA chairmanship in 1974, he was a member of the local council 
and so was able to capitalise on both his standing as a public 
figure and his political contacts. He was also in a position 
to apply to Withybrook. the lessons he had learnt from the 
previous three closures undertaken by the AHA. 
Dale'S strategy of consult~tion was supported by both the ATO 
and the m.IT. In particular. both the Area and District 
AcLllinistrators "Jere convinced of the need for consultative 
rnanag~rnent. Dale's doctrine was to 
"go and meet the people: people are 
compromised by the personal approach" 
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He attended the public meeting called to discuss the closure 
and was able, because of his background and expertise as a 
public speaker, to give a good account of the closure and the 
reasons behLTld it. He believed that it \'las imperative to 
explain the reasons behind a decision in such a way that people 
could understand. As a result, conscious efforts were . 
made to explain the financial position which had led to 
the need for the closure. 
A second part of Dale I s tactics was to test the ground and 
work oyt, in advance, the chances of success - with the unions, 
the CHC, the public, the,·AHA and,. '.in the~ event of an objecti(;)U 
from the CHC,the, Minister. His reasoning was that if you are 
prepared for opposition, you have a better chance of overwhelming 
it. It was also important for him to knm'! if there was 
absolutely no chance of winning, in which case plans could 
have been changed so as to avoid a management turn-around 
which results in a loss of confidence and creates more problems 
in the futl.tre. His aim \'Jas to (a) assess the extent and 
nature of opposition, (b) to assess whether it would spread 
further than the local resistance \A/hich was to be expected in a 
hospi tal closure and (c) if it was likely to spread, \'lhat 
were the imnlications and how powerful would the opponents be. 
In the case of \'Jithybrook, he anticipated some opposition 
but decided that, if handled in the correct wqy, it could be 
overcome. 
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The unions registered disapproval to the closure but they did 
not fornally object. Neither Dale, the ATO or the DMT 
anticipated any industrial action in response to t~e closure 
as long as they were fully consulted and handled in the correct 
\'lay. Nor was any action exp ected from the staff at the hosp i tal. 
As one AHA menber put it 
"they \sJ'ouldn't sit-in at their hospital". 
The news of the closure had not come as a shock to them. Rumours 
of closure, because of the eradication"of TB and the isolation 
of the hospital, had been rife since the 1960s. Staff at the 
hospital did not want a sit-in and, after the initial 
disappointment, \'Iere prepared to go alon~ with the closure, as 
\'Jere t.~e unions. Management had tried to ensure that all 
er..ployees had the choice of redundancy with terms or an 
al ternati ve job and most, if not all, \sJ'ere happy with this 
arrangement.:· They were, in their O'i.'ffi "lords "lucky" to have 
this arrangement, and this helped to counteract their 
disappoinment. 
The doctors involved at VJithybrook were neutral about the 
closure. Some objected to the long drive out to the hospital 
and the lack of support facilities and so were not averse to 
the idea of closure. The chest patients had already been 
moved to ne'" ''1C'..rds in the to\\Tn and their physicians had no qualms 
about the closure of \'Ii thybrool-:. Some obj ection carne from the 
sur~eons \·,ho had used \'Ii thybrook for minor surgery, thus avoiding 
.", 
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the queues at the theatres in the DOH. On the whole, hm'rever, 
the Eledics \'rere convinced of the suitability of the alternative 
facilities to Hithybrook hospital and none opposed the closure. 
Both Dale and management \<Jere confident that the AHA would not 
change its mind over the closure, except at the recommendation 
of its managers. Again the feelings~oL the members has been 
assessed in advance by Dale. The AHA vras haunted by the fear 
of overspending and was, therefore, happy to approve the 
closure. One member pointed out that they were often given 
little choice by the ATO and were obliged to go along ,·lith'their 
recommendations. 
The unions, staff, medics and AHA had not been expected to 
cause undue problems. It "'las, hOWever, expected that the CHC 
would register a formal protest. They had already opposed two 
of the previous three closures. 
"They had to take up c:;tuses and here was 
a cause that they could take up in a big 
way" (nanager). 
The forrilal objection of the CHC vlould, however, involve the 
minister. It would also have to pass through Region but they 
were unlikely to undermine a decisj_on of the AHA. Ministerial 
approval represented a probler.l. and Dale's policy "ras 
"you've got to knm-! the minister". 
By virtue of his position, Dale \'laS able to see, and put his 
argument across to the relevant ministers in both the Labour 
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and Conservative governments and, in so doing, was able to 
personally impress upon them the reasoning behind and im~ortance 
of the closure. 
This was probably the most uncertain stage of the entire episode. 
tIhereas it ,,'as possible for management to assess the likely 
responses of unions, employees, the CHC and AHA, it \'las far 
more difficult to predict the attitude of the government, 
particularly vlhen it changed half-way through. Furthermore, 
govern~cnt attitudes to financial economies had been tempered 
bjr the embarrassement caused by the hospital occupations of the 
mid-seventies. Personal contact ' with the ministers was 
probably one of the· best ways to enSllre a favourable decision 
but there was no guarantee. 
Management admit that they were lucky in their timing. The 
in-coming Conservative government had fought the election on 
the basis of a cost-conscious manifesto. One of the ministers 
involved in the NHS was a recent recruit from Labour and, 
al though an I,iF in the area, it is thought that he was anxious 
to be seen to be doing his duty - the affirmation of the 
closure of \'!i thybrook \lIas a chance to demonstrate that the 
ne',i ff'vernment meant business. 
Managment is adamant that they \liould have had difficulty in 
getting the closure appro'rco today. 
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"If that proposal had come for\'rard U'lO years 
later it vlould have had little chance of 
success" (Dale) • 
"If it happened today I dO'..lbt if \'lewd have 
got it through" (Area Administrator). 
"The closure business is getting more 
difficult" (manager). 
This is because the Conservatives have stated their preference 
for small communit-.f hospitals, like Withybrook. 
The Opposition' 
The opposition was not in a strong position. The unions had 
"deplored" the decision but were not obstructive in anv VIay. 
They were fragmented with COHSE having full responsibility 
for the staff at \~Ji thybrook and wanting no help from any of the 
other unions: 
"as a union we felt that \,le should be 
devoting our interests to looking after 
our-members if and \,lhen it was closed, 
rather than actually fishting the 
closure" (COHSE steward). 
If liason bebTeen the unions was limited, it "las non-existent 
between the unions and the CHC. The CHC did not See their 
role as involving union support. 
The CHC opposed the closure, but they were very much on their 
own. They did not \'/ant the support of the unions and they 
Were unable to calIon the medics, \,lho \'lere not opposed to the 
closure. The CHC believed that it could win but effectively 
- 160 -
lacked a strategy. Opposi -Cion was limited to a fe1JI members of 
staff cmd. local councils. It aroused press cover~e but the 
public's imagination was hardly set alight by a hospital that 
,':as situated in a small village ten miles out of to~m. The CHC 
"las unlikely to be able to change the AHA's mind Over the closure. 
Consequently. their only hope lay ''lith the Secret8.J:"':J of State. 
The Aftermath 
Hm.J do these groups feel, nm'] that VHthybrook hosy:lital has closed? 
There is almost a complete absence of bitterness - althouah 
= 
regretful, staff have adjusted to their new jobs and have no 
comp laints about the .... 'lay mana,Sef;1ent handled it. Some of the 
staff \'Jho took redt.mdancy t mainly -those who lived in the village 
and who were unable to travel to tOVln to take up other jobs, are 
upset about the closure which robbed them of happy. convenient 
jobs. On the \'ihole, however, employees, union officials and the 
CHC could see the reasonin~ behind the closure. 
-=> 
"The AHA hacL."'1 t t got enough money to service 
all these units" (CHC secretary). 
"The government didn't give management 
enough money to keep open their units. 
They had no alternative but to close" 
(union official). 
"The AHA were in such a state financially" 
(el71p loyee) • 
There \'las a tendency to latch on to the financial explanations, 
pinninr: the blame on the government rather than management, 
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even though, because of rationalisation, it would have gone 
ahead eventually any\'iay. In addition to absolving management 
of all blrune for causing the closure, the staff, unions and 
the CHC "lere all happy about the way ma.J.agement had handled it. 
"Nanagement handled it very \'lell" (NUPE 
official) • 
"\'!e've got no complaints at all about the 
manner in which management dealt with us" 
(CHC secretary). 
Summ~T and Conclusions 
, 
The key factors here revolve around the existence of a po\'rerful 
Chairman, who had the support of management at both area and 
district levels. He had initiated a climate-setting exercise, 
similar to that undertaken at Camerons, several ·years before 
the closure so that a constructive atmosphere existed before the 
closure became an issue. Once the closure was under"Jay, 
management relied on consultation, communication and explanation 
again, in much the same way as Carnerons. 
Another key factor was the ability tQ, assess and predict the 
extent, nature and implications of potential opposition. 
"I thought that there was a good chance of 
this closure being accepted by the r.Tinister -
the case 'was well-made out, the local 
opposition \·/as understandable and there \'Jas 
no real threat of the union behaving in such 
a \'Way that \'Jould embarrass the Government. 
In other \"ords, I couldn I t see it becomi~ 
a confla~ration. I could see it being a 
difficulty which someone had to grasp" (Dale). 
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l,:&"1agers have sup-.,£;ested that, had they expected any real 
trouble, they might have "erred on the side of caution", so as 
to avoid causing the government any further embarrassment and 
to avoid a turn-around by management. 
The fact that a formal objection was registered by the CRC should 
not detract from the success of management. The feelings of the 
unions and the CRG towards management is more indicative of 
their ability to handle problems such as closure. In fact, 
management \'ras even able to use the CHCs obj ection to their mom 
advantage. 
"\\Ie rather hoped the CHC would opp ose it as 
this would help us in our fight for more 
money" (mana.ger) • 
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Chapter Nine 
NORTHVILLE 
This case-study documents the progress of a proposal to close a 
maternity hospital known here as Maine Road Maternity Hospital 
by the Area Heal th Authority of a city in the North \lJest, known 
here as Northville AHA. 
Maine Road had been a candidate for closure since the 1960s, 
simply because it ''las an old hospital. Following the Reorganisa-
tion of the health service in 1974, it became clear that 
Northville had an over-provision of maternity beds. A fall in 
the birth rate coupled with a move of people out of the inner 
city area, "There Naine Road was situated, had resulted in 
falling bed occupancy. Apart from a prestige naternity unit 
in the city which enjoyed a very good reputation both inside and 
outside the city, the other three maternity units - r,Iaine Road, 
and t-lards at King Street and Sackville General Hosp i tals - "'ere 
all \lTorking at around 50% of their fu1..1 capacity. See table 
9.1. 
There was then, according to management, an overwhelming case 
for the rationalisation of obstetric and eynaecolo,,:~Jcal (O&G) 
services in Northville. This general co~~itment to the 
principle of rationalisation in 1974-5 had been turned into a 
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Table S.l 
The Relationship be"t\Jeen Obstetric Beds z Births, Lengths of Stay 
and Occupancy since 1959 
Year 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 
Eastern District 
Beds Available 222 222 217 185 192 185 195 
Births~"ear 5598 5125 4748 4169 3648 3239 2968 
Average Occupancy 163 146 126 112 100 93 77 
Average Stay 8.4 8.2 7.6 7.5 7.5 7.7 7.4 
Central District 
Beds Available 228 227 232 228 217 210 193 
Births/Year 6360 6433 6264 5882 5440 5113 4019 
Average Occupancy 176 169 163 151 139 130 126 
Average Stay 8.4 7.9 7.4 7.1 7.1 7.1 6.1 
Northville was divided into two dis"tricts - Central and Eastern 
- as a result of Reorganisation. 
Figures supplied by the AHA. 
specific plan to close Maine Road by 1976. Initial soundings 
of the p Ian met \'!i th the approval of the AHA and in September 
1976 a consultative document "las released. This proposed the 
closure of Maine Road over "bIlO years. during 1Jolhich time 
facilities at King street and Sackville DGHs \'!ere to be improved 
to enable them to cope with the extra demand. 
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Concern VIas ir.unediately expressed by many groups at this 
plan to close Haine Road. Staff at the hasp i tal set up an 
Action Comrni ttee to stop the closure. They \'Irote to GPs, 
lobbied MPs, appeared on the TV and radio, spoke at a local 
Trades Council meeting, contacted the press and presented 
the Chairman of the ArIA with a petition of 10,000 signatures 
opposing the closure. The Action Committee \'las closely linked 
with the two CHCs. The hospital was situated in the Eastern 
District so links were closer to the Eastern CHC but the Central 
CHC vIas also opposed to the closure. NUPE expressed "serious 
concern" at the proposal, arguing that the birthrate would 
rise again and the facilities at 1.~aine Road would be needed. 
Furthermore,. argued NUPE, new housing was plan.."1:ed in the area 
surrounding l11aine Road which would dravi young people back into 
the area. 
Despite this furore, the ATO pressed on with its proposal. In 
March 1977, they issued a supplement to the consultative 
document, bringing forward the closure until as soon as possible 
after July of that year. This, according to management, \'las 
necessitated by the estimated defici -f of £1 Iidllion on the 
annual bud.e;et \I[hich, as a result of the introduction of cash 
limits t would be the first i tern on the follov:ing year's budget. 
This document also mentioned, for the first time, the alternative 
option of closing dm'm the vlards at King Street and Sacl-:ville 
DGHs and rctainincr I,laine Road. This, however t \'las disr.1issed 
c.~ 
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because the savings would be £Yz million per annun less, and 
because the eovernment's policy was to integrate specialist 
units into a DGH \ . fi th all its back-up facilities. 
The supplement caused a further impetus in the opposition 
movement. The local media continued to report on the issue. 
A "vJorld in Action" TV programme in Nay 1977 covered the 
proposed closure. There was a well-attended public meetin~ in 
= 
the May, in l,t.,rhich a consul taut obstetrician spoke against the 
closure. Both CHCs restated their opposition. The Eastern CHC 
argued that the closure should not go ahead because the area 
around Maine Road had been designated a redevelopment area 
and the planned new housing would bring young couples into the 
area, presumably with a potentially high demand for the services 
provided by r·iaine Road. The CHC also complained of the cost 
which would be involved for residents of the r.Iaine Road area 
\'Iho would have to travel to the other hospitals if the closure 
went ahead. They argued that it was unfair to deprive an 
already under-privileged inner city area of its hospitc~. The 
Eastern CHC proposed that, instead, the maternity wards at 
King Street DGH should be closed. The Central CHC offered, in 
addition, the closure of the maternity wards at Sackville 
General which ",as in the Central District, to keep Eaine Road 
open. 
"The decision to urge the Health Authority to 
keep Maine Road open and reduce beds by 
transferrina the materr.i t::,r beds at Sackville 
General ••• ~ was una.'1imous \.!i thin our Health 
Council and with 
at the meetin,,11 
.:.:.> 
the AHA from the 
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all the groups represented 
(extract from a letter to 
Central CHC, August 1977). 
A special meeting of the AHA had been called in July 1977, to 
consider the u:/o options - the closure of Maine Road or the 
\'lards at Sackville and King Street. Fifteen members (out of 26) 
had attended but only nine voted - 5 to 4 in favour of the 
closure of r.Taine Road. The meeting resolved that the CHCs 
should give further consideration to the bro options, that the 
AHA also give further consideration and seek clarification 
of the medical VieiJol on the issue. 
The CHCs continued to oppose the closure. A letter from the 
consul taut obstetrician at fiIaine Road argued that the hosp i tal 
should be retained because it 'was such a good specialist 
hospital. An outburst of indignation arose from the staff at 
Maine Road about the low turnout for the AHA meeting. 
"Maine Road Action Comnlittee members claimed 
there had been gross under-representation 
with only 11 out of a total of 26 m~mbers 
present at the Special r.1eeting. And they 
were angry that only 8 took part in the 
vote" (local press artic1.e, July 1977. 
In fact, the numbers ,,'ere incorrect - 15 
attended and 9 voted.) 
On the 23rd August anotheX' meeting of the AHA was called. Only 
14 attended but 13 voted and the decision ,',as 9 to 4 in favour 
of retainin(":' Maine Road and closinr! \·rards at Kin~ street and 
= = 
Sach~ille General hospitals. A certain amount of disapproval 
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".';<15 generated around this decision. In January 1978, the lU1ions 
- ffJPE and CORSE - were still refusL~ to accept the closure 
of these '\Ilards. 
"The officer of NUPE stated, on behalf of the 
staff organisations present, that they were 
not accepting the decision taken by the AHA 
to close the obstetric units" (minutes of 
a meeting between unions and management, 
January 1978). 
By July, however, all the remaining problems had been overcome 
and the unions agreed to the closure of both units. The 
maternity wards at Sackville closed in August 1978 and those at 
Kina Street in September. 
<..:..> 
The Background 
Before looking specifically at the reasons behind the opposition 
to the proposed closure of !,'[aine Road and its success , it is 
necessary to examine the background of the health service in 
Northville, and comp ar~ it "lith that of 11idville. 
Northville has grO\'m from an industrial, rather than a rural 
back£round. By the 1970s t however , it was a declining i' depressed 
area. It has, for exa~ple, a record of extremely high rates of 
unemployment. See table 9.2. In addition to this there are 
relatively hiBh numbers of unskilled i'lorkers, single parent 
families, elderly individuals and iIi!~overished far:lilies as 
the Committee of Inquiry conducted into the health services in 
Northville found. 
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Table 9.2 
Local Rates of Unemplo;,~J!1ent in Northvill e and r.:idville 
Year Northville Midville National Average 
~. 
1975 9.6 3.3 4.7 
1976 11.8 4.2 6.3 
1977 12.8 5.0 6.9 
1978 13.1 4.0 6.6 
1979 12.7 3.2 6.1 
1980 14.7 5.6 7.8 
Figures from DoE Gazette. 
There is a general history of militancy, radicalism and trade 
unionisr.1 at Northville, which does not exist at Midville. This 
has e:-:tended to the health service. \Vhereas Uidville had had 
no local disputes since Reorganisation and virtually no 
national disputes. 110rthville has been beset by industrial 
action both national and local •. There had, for example, been 
8 disputes beblTeen October and December 1978. More than 4,000 
days had been lost in official disputes alone betw·een January 
and f,Iarch 1979. Another measure of ihdustrial activity is the 
position of the HHA responsible for the area in the IJI-IS "league 
table" • See table 9.3. The RHA responsible for Northville was, 
in 1980, in the t09 half of the lea:;ue. J.1idville' s RHA, on 
the other hLld, "'las usually in the bottor.. half. 
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Table 9.3 
A Com~ o:'ison of Industrial Acti vi t:~ in the PJ-TAs Respons ible 
for Northville and r-lidville 
Days Lost no. of Staff No. of Stapp ages 
in Sto~pages with Days Lost 
wi th Days Lost 
J an-I~arch 1980 
RHA responsible 249 (4th) 300 (3rd) 8 (4th) 
for Northville 
RHA responsible 
for Midville 35 (11th) 35 (11 t-11) 1 (13th) 
April-June 1980 
Horthville 207.5 (8th) 193 (7th) 9 (5th) 
Midville 40 (11th) 50 (lOth) 1 (11th) 
July-Sept 1980 
Northville 60 (3rd) 12 (6-th) 1 (4th) 
Midville 35 (4th) 66 (3rd) 2 (2nd) 
Oct-Dec 1980 
rIorthville 3122 (1st) 1461 (1st) 5 (2nd) 
r:ridville 0 (=9th) 0 (=9th) 0 (=9th) 
The figures in brackets denote lea..r-:ue position out of 15. 
Figures supplied by DI-ISS. 
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Hilitancy ,:·Tas one problcTi1 that Northville IRA faced. There \'lere, 
hOvlevcr, additional difficulties. One overl.'lhelming pressure was 
that of finance. Cuts in public e:h.'Pendi ture, WJlounced in the \ 
mid-seventies, produced a general concern for financial 
considerations. Additional steps had been taken in the NHS to 
curb expenditure. The Resource Allocation \'Jorking Party (RAtTP) 
had been established to examine they way in \,Thich resources 
were allocated in the health service. In the past, certain 
regions had tended to attract revenue to fund existing capital 
commitments, while others had not and so, a divide between 
rich and poor ,regions had grown uP. RAUP ~las designed to 
re-route money a'flay from the rich regions tm';ards the poorer 
ones. An interin report was made in August 1975 '\'!hich, because 
the Region responsible for Northville "Tas one of the"rich"ones, 
threatened to reduce its allocation hi real terms. The final 
report used a different formula which meant the the Region 
would receive an increase in resources but by this time (1976) 
the 1976/7 budget had already been distributed to the Areas 
- on the ba.sis of the interim report and an expected reduction 
in funds. On this basis, Northville AHA had been deemed as 
overfunded \1ithin the Region and received the minimtun 0.25% 
budgetary increase. 
This situation 'VIas further exaccrbated by another consequence 
of the RA\'i~ report - the \'rithdrmJal of revenue consequences of 
capital scheQes (RCCS) funds. These funds had previously been 
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available for brineing ne .... J hospitals into operation but 'I,:lere 
\dthdrat'm in April 1977. Northville ftulffi \'laS just completing 
\'lork on a ne"'l DGH at that time. which it vlould nOll·1 have to 
bring on-line vlithout additional funds, but with money frora its 
annual budget. 
In the mid-seventies, Northville AHA \lJas facing a difficult 
financial situation in addition to the pressures of Reorganisa-
tion which had created an extra administrative layer. These 
difficulties· "'Jere set in a city 'wi th a tradition· of 'mili t8J.LCY· and 
in an 'industry 'in "'lhich unionisation and union acti vi t-.i had 
been increasing (see chapter ten) and in which many professional 
associations had acquired trade union status (Corr~ittee of 
In~uiry). Management had, hO'lileiler, exacerbated these existing 
problems in a number of \\Tays. They had, for example, mooted 
a move from blTO districts, established by Reorganisation, to 
a single distric'c as early as 1975. The t'vlO district system 
was, according to many, never given a chance to ""ork nor had 
Northville been given a chance to recover from Reorganisation. 
Furthermore, the 18 month delay be:fore consent to .the change was 
given by the Secretary of State ",ras disastrous. According to 
the Comraittee of Inquiry, morale dropped ,,·rhile the best 
rnanaRers fled, leaving the less experienced ones to deal \oJi th 
the ever-increasin~ problems. 
<..:> -
"\'lhatever the intrinsic merits of 'single 
district' over 't'vlO-district' areas the 
mistake lay in seeking so fundamental change 
at a time \'lhen other problems "'jere being 
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faced" (Committee of Inquiry). 
The AHA proposed dras"tic cuts in Northville' s health services in 
an attempt to deal \'Ii th financial problems. 
"Inside eighteen months, two thirds of the 
hospitals in the city have been or still 
are threatened "Ii th closure, reduction or 
redesignationll (Coruni ttee of Inquiry). 
Five hospitals had been closed specifically to provide funds 
for the new DGH and other reductions were planned. Changes of 
such magnitude, in such a' short sp ace of time, are lil{ely to 
bring about uncertainty and suspicion in themselves but, in 
Northville, additional factors worsened the situation. 
Management had not introduced the changes as well as they might. 
"Each time a new planning document has appeared 
it has been a maj or headline in the local press 
before the bulk of the staff, often including 
senior officers in the units concerned, \'Jere 
aware of its contents" ( Committee of Inquiry·). 
"Another criticism of rnanagenent has been its 
failure to share information adequately and 
at the ri~ht time" (Commi ttee of Inquiry). 
Managerial inadequacies were capitalised on by 
"a very forceful and militant ancillary staff 
leadership •••• provided by the l~T officials 
of NUPE' s central branch" ( Committee of Inquiry). 
Who were not convinced of the desirability of the proposed cuts 
in services. The CHCs and the unions I'lere of the opinion that 
Northville ",,'as a deprived area \'lith a high proportion of 
impoverished families and poor facilities find housing. A 
provision of cyood hosni tal care \'las perceived necessary in such 
'"--- ... 
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an area, especially one in \'Thich the provision of prir:lBry 
health care \'las considered inadequate. Furthermore, the pu::,lic 
was not anxious to £ive up its small co~unity hospitals for 
lithe great white elephant" - the nel'! DGH. The people of.-
Northville were used to a large number of small local hospitals: 
"on every street corner, they've had a church, 
a school, a pub and a hospital" (CRG secretary), 
and they were loathe to give up this arraP~ement for a massive 
hospital in the centre of the city, vlhich had taken 17 years and 
more than £50 million to build. 
The combination of inadequa-t;e managenent and militant unions 
did not make for a peaceful life. 
"On the management side, the absence of a 
commitnent to full, open and early consult-
ation gave rise to hostile and sometimes 
ill-informed action •••• On the staff side, 
there is some evidence of a tendency, 
especially on the part of lTUPE. to take 
precipitate industrial action in the face 
of real or supposed managerial action" 
(Committee of Inquiry). 
The result was, in May 1977 when the proposed cuts were 
announced, an 
"explosion of protest amon~ many groups of 
staff, and it brought together the trade 
unions and the GHGs in a Getermination to 
resist the proposals" (Corunittee of Inquiry). 
This protest was follovled by union deputations to the Secretary 
of State for Health \'Tho was forced to agree to the COIi1!!1i ttee of 
Inquiry into Northville ABA i'!hich has been quoted so often 
above. It is this inquiry, reportin.::: at the enc~ of 1977, ,</hich 
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brought so oan.y of the underlyin;;r, con-flicts to li~ht. 
I-t was against this background of militancy, unsatisfactory 
management, and strained industrial relations that the episode 
concerning the proposed closure of Maine Road took place. 
Hanagerial Actions 
I'Ianagement has come in for a great deal of criticism from the 
Committee of Inquiry. Such criticism \lias not confined to this 
- stewards, union officials and employees expressed dissatisfaction 
with management to me. 
"The standard of management is abysmal" 
(union official). 
"From its inception in 1974 the AHA had 
serious problems in maintaining an 
acceptable standard of health care in the 
ci ty" (CHC secretary in an article 
published in 1979). 
"These are bad managers. There are no 
+-. b t ';t" (t ' ) 1,,\'[0 ways a ou.... s ewaro. • 
Management appears to have made mistakes J even from their o'Vm 
point of vim'" in their handling of t.l"],e r,Taine Road issue. 
This v!as the first closure they had undertaken and so, they had 
no experience to dra'Vl on. One mistake was in presenting the 
closure of l.Iaine Road as the only option for so long. Al though 
union officials and the CHCs were a':!are that, if Iiaine Road 
did not close I the uni ts e~t Sackville and King Street would 
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have to, the najority of staff at the hospital and the general 
public Vlerc not, at least until Earch 1977, if not later. 
"Ue were not a\'lare at the time that King 
Street Hospital '",;as threatened" (employee 
at lIaine Road). 
Consequently, the people 'V,rho were fightine for Maine Road \'lere 
fighting for Haine Road only. They VIere not diverted by any 
other course of action, nor were they met \lith any opposition 
from staff at the other units \,Iho were unaware of any threat. 
Members of the ATO no",! say that, if the exercise \'las to be 
repeated, they would present the -Q.\TO options from the beginning, 
""i th the advantages and disadvante~'1:es of each and registering 
their recommendation for the closure of Naine Road. This, they 
, aJ."'gue, \'lould help to split the opposition. 
"I thin!~ \'lith a bit of hindsight it should 
have been presented differently. I think it 
should have been presented as t\'.lO options 
",!ith pluses end minuses against each" 
(member of ATO) 
Another problem tha ATO had to contend with \'las dissension - one 
officer was in favour of retaining Maine Road - the closure of 
the maternity unit at King street would release wards to allow 
the unification of cardiology and cardio-thrassic surgery op 
one site. This strategic plan went against the \'Iishes of the 
other officers and, the individual concerned feels, \'lent a long 
\':ay to\'Jards saving I.:aine Road. Because of the policy of 
consensus manap;emcnt, many people were una\':are of his feelin,o;s 
as the na ~ ori tv decision \'ras in favour of the closure and this 
'" W 
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\'Tas the vie\'! that "ITas made public. It is conceivable that 
the dissension inight have had some effect on those \'rho \'lere 
a',';are of it. 
F2.11agement has also been criticised for the "ray they coopletely 
misread the situation - they were totally unprepared for the 
onslaught they faced because they had not expected it. Unlike 
Midville no "market research" had been undertaken to assess the 
liklihood of opposition. As a consequence, they were ill-equipped 
to deal \'lith the public furore \'lhich did arise. 
"\1e 'were pretty naive in terms of public 
relations •••• we ""ere pretty naive in terms 
of industrial relations •••• \Ire hac1n' t the 
skill to negotiate with all these di1~ferent 
interest groups" (member of ATO). 
So, despite having gained acceptance of the principle of 
rationalisation, manaeement \lere unable to secure the closure 
of Iiaine Road. 
"It is irrational not to realise some 
reorganisation of the obstetric services 
is necessary" (CHC sub-committee report 
on the proposed closure). 
"We realised that there were too Iilany maternity 
beds lli.."d \\"e realised that something would 
have to be done" (steward) 
" 
"Undoubtedly there is a case for the 
ratione~isation of 02<G services in Northville ll 
(union official). 
r,~anagement 8ppears to have failed to convince their emp loyees, 
the unions, the CHCs, the public or the PJ-IA of the need to close 
naine Road, as opposed to the other maternity units. The medical 
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argument for the closure was that maternity units 'Were best 
situated in DGHs \'Ii th the full range of support facilities. 
This, hO\'Tever. \,Tas countered on the grounds that Maine Road "las 
an exception because it was such a good specialist hospital 
".;i th its staff and facilities devo·ted purely to bringing babies 
into the world. This argument was put forward by a consultant, 
who received a lot of publicity and who undoubtedly gained a 
great deal of credibility for the argument. 
Management 'Was also unable to convince others of the financial 
need for the closure,- closing Maine Road would save £~ million 
a year more than the alternative option. To an AHA with severe 
financial problems, this represented a substlliitial saving but 
managers failed to convey this to the public, the CHCs or unions 
and staff. Some managers now feel that ina.dequate emphasis was 
placed on the financial factors. 
"I don't think that finance was put to the 
public as the prime reason. I'm not sure 
it was hammered home sufficiently" (manager). 
"People didn't take enou,gh notice of 
financial considerations" (member of ATO). 
It also appears that the AHA was Lmimpressed by the financial 
argument, despite its precarious position on the financial front, 
as they voted against the option which provided the greater 
saving. 
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The Opposition 
In contrast to the prevarication of I:lanagement. the opposition 
put up a concerted and well-coordinated fig!:.t. It \'las initiated 
by members of the staff at [·Iaine Road , ..... ho established an 
Action Committee in response to the threat to their hospital. 
The nucleus of the Action Commit-tee consisted of two \,lard clerks, 
a \lIard sister and a telephonist. They 1;;Tote to local GPs. 
contacted the !:iP, spoke to the local trades council, appeared 
on TV ruld radio, contacted the press, solicited help froill the 
CHCs, organised a petition and pinned up posters. 
By T:lay 1977, the senior consultant at I'laine Road had joined the 
fight. This VIas an important asset 
"the fact that a senior consultant 
obstetrician VIas speaking for the retention 
Of Haine Road went a long way toward's the 
campaign's success" (member of ATO). 
Considering the complexity of medical arguments, and the extent 
of lay membership of the N~A. it is not surprising that the 
opinions of consultants carry a lot of sway \'Ti th the "JIA as \Olell as 
with the general public. 
"The lay people on the AHA tend to have 
nothing, to say. They rely on medical 
opinion" (CHC secretary). 
The unions were opposed to the closure. rroPE was the only one 
to get itself involved, although it was very much relegated to 
the back seat, as the unionists themselves adr."iit. 
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"It \'.las no trade union that kept that 
hos:pital open" (l\JUPE steward). 
"It \'ras the pressure of public opinion 
that \'lOn that fight, rather than the 
union" (NUPE official). 
"It was public opinion that 
Road open. The unions were 
of it, it '\flaS unbelievable" 
kept I,1aine 
so far out 
(COHSE steward). 
The staff on the Action Committee made a conscious decision not 
to get too involved with the unions, in case it danaged their 
cause. 
"The sort of help the unions meant we didn't 
\'J'ant and didn't need. tIe felt we '\flere doinO' 
it in a dignified and effective way" 
(employee of Maine Road). 
~.:> 
Their argument was that union involvement might cost them the 
support of the public as "Tell as losing them credibility in 
the eyes of councillors, MPs and other local dignitaries. 
Furtherr.lOre, the Action Committee had no intention of embarking 
on an occupation should the AHA decide to gO ahead with the 
closure, but the active participation of the unions might 
indicate to others that such action was planned. 
"They wanted to talk all this rubbish of 
take-over and sit-in" (member of Action 
Committee). 
SOr:1e local ste,vards did have plans for an occupation in the 
event that the c~_osure was approved by the AHA. It is doubtful, 
however, that the staff would have accepted as even some union 
officials have ad[1itted. The staff were anxious to protect 
their patients - preventing closure would achieve that, 
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occupyin~ the hospital, in their eyes, "'lould not. Furthermor-:-~, 
staff were doubtful whether an occupation \-[Quld be effective in 
a mate:(,nity hos:-Jital ",here patients are only adQitted for six 
or seven days. 
Keeping the unions on the side-lines undoubtedly helped the 
Action COITlrnittee \'lin widespread support. Medical opinion might 
have hardened against them if the unions had threatened action. 
The Eastern CHC \'las not keen on union involvement. 
"I didn't want the CHC to get involved with 
the unions ••.• I wanted to make sure that I 
looked at it from the vie\1/' of the patients" 
(CHC secretary). 
Finally, one of the most important ip..gredients of success -
public support mip;ht have been j eopardised by an aggressive 
tmion role. 
"If we had fought it our way. 1 think we 
\'lould have lost the symp athy of the general 
public" (NUPE ste\lJard). 
The backgrolmd support of NUPE did no harm. At the very least 
it provided funds, information and advice ru1d it probably 
helped to ,gain the support of the Labour councillors, some of 
\'lhom would have been members of the ~E.A. 
The main thrust of the opposition's campaie:n \',as at the p;eneral 
public, \vho were quite prepared to offer their support. The 
fact that a lon~ standing institution was at risk and the fact 
that it was a maternity hoslJital aroused a lot of emotion. 
l.:aine Road had survived the blitz and there \'Jere people \'lho 
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\liould ensure th2.t it survived the AHA. It vras the lar.cest 
maternity hospi-'cal in the UK fu'"ld many local people had been 
born, or had their own babies there. The emotional reasons 
held a great deal of m'lay "lith the public although more 
rational reasons were put for\'rard by the CEC - the proj ected 
increase in the birth rate, the redevelopment planned for the 
area, the cost of travelling to other units, the deprivation 
of an inner city area. It seems, hovrever. that it was the mOre 
emotive aspects of the argument that created the furore of 
public feeling. 
"It was won on emotional grounds" (union 
Official) • 
"People form parochial attachments. They 
have an emotional fu'"ld not a clinical viewll 
(consultant) • 
The Area Health Authority 
Why did the AHA change its mind in less than a month and decide 
to retain I'laine Road? The pressure of public op inion was 
undoubtedly a factor. This has been attributed to the fact that 
a third of the AHA are local councillors VIho t when they attend, 
can reverse any decision by sheer '\Feight of numbers. Furthermore, 
it has been suggested that local councillors are susceptible 
to public opinion because of their O\'ln future election prospects. 
"The AHA is susceptible to public pressure" 
(mcm8ger) • 
"I am a\'1are of how councillors can be 
manipUlated by the IJublic" (AHA menber). 
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"The councillors are s\'!a~ed by public opinion" 
(IiliA member). 
"If they (the c01.1I1cillors) turn up in force 
they C8n reverse any decision" (AHA nefJber). 
Interestingly enouZh, there 'l;lere six councillors out of 15 at 
the July meetin,:-;: which confirmed support for the closure of 
IITaine Road, and five out of 14 at the second meeting i.'lhich voted 
for retention, although the proposal for retention was proposed 
and seconded by councillors. So, public pressure must have 
affected the AHA generally and not just the councillors. 
Another pressure on the AHA would have been medical opinion. 
The support of the consultant obstetrician for retention has 
already been discussed. In addition to this a ne'lN consultal1.t 
member of the AHA was present at the August meeting. According 
to the CHC secretary, he pointed out that a closed hospital 
could never be re-opened whereas closed wards could and 
"I feel this influenced a lot of members 
\llhen they voted" (CHC secretary). 
Another nember of the AHA - a professor of surgeI"'lJ - had been 
quoted in the press in July as beine "\'Torried" about the closure. 
I.Iedical opinion must have appeared unaniElous in its opposition 
to the closure. Consequently, the AHA was subjected to bOtil 
medical and public pressure for the retention of l,'Iaine Road. 
Havincr decided on the retention of :r.Iaine Road, the closure of 
-=-
the units at Sackville and King Street hospitals was virtually 
automatic. The tmions end CHCs \':e:-c convinced of the need for 
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rationalisation cmd had to accept the alternative if I,laine Road 
\'/US retained. Staff at these tLnits ",ere taken by surprise and 
were unable to mount an effective o?posi tion campaign. 
Furthermore, as it '''as the closure of vlards and not an entire 
hospital, they VJere unable to command the support of ancillory 
staff whose jobs \'!ould not be jeopardised. 
Summary and Conclusions 
The attempt to close Maine Road failed. This can be attributed 
to a well-coordinated opposition campaign which whipped up enough 
public and medical support to persuade the AHA to vote against 
the closure of T'laine Road. In addition to this, there is 
evidence of man as erial mistakes in the handling and presentation 
of the closure prolJosal. r·10st notable of these,.·.. perhaps, 
\"as the way in which they were totally unprepared for the 
resistance they faced, and their inability to convince anyone of 
the financial or medical arguments for the closl~e, despite 
having achieved a commitment to rationalisation. 
This contrasts sharply with I.Iidville, '.<There management "ras well-
prepared for opposition and able to provide acceptable 
reasons for closure. The vastly different backgrounds of the 
1..-wo MIAs also pl~-ed a part. Northville r,a8 a histoI""J of 
managerial inflexibility and strained industrial relations 
which nade resistance all the more likely. The existence of a 
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r!dli tarlt and unified staff organisa·tion with close links ~.';i th 
other groups C:1S-C have increased the chances of success. 
I.Iidville, on the other hand, had created and sustained co-operative 
industrial relations. In addition to this, the unions and the 
CHC were relatively pm'.Terless •. Uneler these circumstences, 
widespread opposition \'Jas unlikely. 
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Chapter Ten 
The Environrnent 
It has been argued above, in chapter two, that the environment 
has an important part to play in influencing the nature of life 
\'lithin organisations. Conventional organisational analysis has 
met \'ri th criticism from a number of quarters for ignoring this 
relationship, including Nlarxist writers \,lho emphasise 
"the causal primacy of the relationship 
beuleen organisational structure and 
process and the nature of society in 
which they occur •••• conventional 
organisational analysis takes a rathe::." 
bland vievl of this relationship if it 
discusses it at: all" Salaman (1979) P 26-7. 
HOt':ever, as Aldrich argues 
"many questions of interest to oreanisational 
sociologists toda~y require a perspective 
that takes account not only of the internal 
structure of organisations but also the 
forces in their environment" Aldrich (1979) p 1. 
Closure is an area of interest in \'lhich the environment has 
important implications, and this research tries to ensure that 
its impact does not go unnoticed. This 
chapter doclUilents the broader societal features which impinge 
on the issue of closure. The environmental factors which have 
a bearing on a specific orgfu~isation are discussed in the 
foJ 1000linr. chapter, \>Then the individual case-studies are :malysed. 
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The development and structure of a society will have iIilplica-
tions for the closures that occur vrithin it. Gallie (1978) 
has argued that French \1orkers are nore radical and revolutionarv 
oJ 
than their British counterparts. This, argues Gallie, is due 
to differences in the process of industrialisation in the two 
countries. This could mean that French workers are less 
likely to accept announcements of closure than are British 
workers. Lane (1981) has suggested that trade unions in Italy 
have ahlays been more concerned "'lith issues of job security 
and unemployment; than those in Britain. As a result, they are 
better prepared and equipped to fight redundancy and closure. 
The legislation of a country ",Jill have 2. bearing on closure. 
Fryer (1973) argues that, not only does it have direct 
implications, it also embodies certain values and assumptions. 
Fryer argues that the public policy on redundancy in this 
country implicitly acknO\'lledges the manazerial prerogative 
in determining and selecting redundancies, and it conveys an 
impression that redundancies are, at least in some circumstances, 
justifiable, inevitable and desirable. 
Societal factors may have an influence on the way in \I[hich 
announceoents of closure are received. Employees in different 
countries may be more or less disposed to contest closure. 
Such an analysis, however, requires data from other countries 
if comparisons are to be made and conclusions dra\·m. This has 
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proved to be outside the terms of reference of this study. It 
has been possible, hOl:leVer, to document some temporal changes 
by drawing on data from the 1970s. This decade is particularly 
fascinating because it is during this time that economic 
difficulties in Britain have made closure a familiar occurence. 
Interestingly, changes in attitudes to closure have taken 
place within this period. 
The Economic Environment 
The tables below illustrate the decline in the economic fortunes 
of Britain. The problems appear to have been ini-l:;iated by the 
1973-4 oil crisis which triggered off a reduction in industrial 
output in 1974 and 1975. Output has risen again since then 
but not past its 1973 level. In 1979 and 1980 it fell qgain. 
Unemployment has risen dramatically, passing the one million 
mark in 1975 and reaching two million in 1980. In I.1arch 1980, 
it stood at over l~i of the population. The number of unfilled 
vacancies decreased substantially in 1975 and 1976. They 
increased slightly over the next three years but appear to 
have declined again in 1980. High unemployment rates and 
decreasing numbers of vacancies indicate that jobs are being 
shed, and this is supported by the redundancy figures. Again 
there is a trough around 1973-5, follml[ed by a slight improvement, 
followed by another trough tml[ards 1980. Some of these 
redundancies are inevitably due to bankruptcies which rose 
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Table 10.1 
Index of Industrial Production 
Year 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
! 
Average 1975 % Shange 
:= 100 
99.7 +0.1 
99.8 +0.1 
102.0 +2.2 
109.5 +7.3 
105.1 -4.0 
100.0 -4.8 
102.0 +2.0 
105.8 +3.7 
109.8 +3.7 
112.6 +2.6 
105.0 -6.7 
Figures from the Annual 
Abstract of Statistics. 
Table 10.2 
Unemplo;,rment in the UK 
r .J 
Year 01 /0 5~ Change 
1970 2.6 +8 
1971 3.5 +34 
1972 3.8 +8 
1973 2.7 
-28 
1974 2.6 
-3 
1975 4.1 +57 
1976 5.7 +39 
1977 6.2 +8 
1978 6.1 
-1 
1979 5.8 -4 
1980 7.4 +27 
Figures from the Annual 
Abstract of Statistics and 
Department of Employment 
Gazette. 
Table 10.3 
Emplorment Vacancies Unfilled' in GB (OOO's) notified to emElo;z-
ment officers 
1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
Jan 179 144 103 185 285 • • 87 •• 157 214 185 
Feb 181 138 112 219 267 181 97 132 170 215 178 
March 184 130 119 244 267 178 107 143 184 226 175 
April 193 131 130 273 928 173 117 154 202 249 174 
May 204 145 156 323 336 159 125 167 226 275 164 
June 196 135 140 301 324 .,164 122 164 214 266 176 
July 201 132 153 337 330 143 127 161 217 259 132 
Aueust 189 128 154 335 303 136 128 156 212 246 118 
Sept 192. 125 158 353 307 141 139 159 231 252 119 
Oct 183 119 166 365 299 129 138 167 240 245 
Nov 169 114 174 363 271 113 • • 158 230 229 
Dec 159 107 180 348 101 •• 153 219 203 • • 
Total 2230 1548 1745 3646 3614 1618 1187 1714 2502 2627 1421 
Monthly 185 129 145 303 328 147 118 155 208 218 157 
Averape 
Figures from the Annual Abstract of Statistics. 
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Table 10.4 
Number of RedtLl1dancies. Hotified to Local Offices of the E~:'plo;Z-
ment Service Ap,ency 
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 
Jan 8629 8783 28193 22943 15833 
Feb 9258 9891 24108 17105 8639 
March 9093 9554 19824 17549 12244 
April 7321 7934 16360 14205 14888 
Hay 4605 5960 25343 10914 13510 
June 7588 8879 23378 12294 13218 
July 6704 7691 21271 14066 14646 
August 3660 1107S 18848 9290 11881 
Sept 5863 9148 18234- . 9892 12886 
Oct 5026 15854 21043 13770 16678 
Nov 6901 20968 17512 9682 8610 
Dec 6721 13625 15804 12226 
Total 81369 126093 249918 163936 143033 
Monthly 6780 10507 20826 13661 13003 
Average 
Figures from the Department of Employment Gazette (Jan, 1978 p 50) 
Table 10.5 
Number of Redtmdancy Payments 
made under the Redundal1cy 
Payments Act 1965 
h 
1969 238290 
1970 275563 
1971 370221 
1972 296120 
1973 176919 
1974 182161 
1975 340212 
1976 313728 
1977 267234 
1978 255484 
1979 254627 
1980 491168 
NB Only those employees with 
more than two years service 
qualify for payments. 
Figures supplied by DoE. 
Table 10.6 
Insolvencies in Enp,land and ~Jales 
Compan;c Liquidations 
Year Numbers 01 Change 10 
1971 3506 . .) 
1972 3063 -12 
1973 2575 -15 
1974 3720 +44 
1975 5398 +45 
1976 5939 +10 
1977 5831 -9 
1978 5086 -12 
1979 4537 -10 
1980 6876 +51 
Table 10. 7 
General Index of Retail Prices 
% changes on a year earlier (UK) 
1971 (Jan) 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
Figures from DoE Gazette. 
+8% 
+8% 
~·8% 
+12% 
+20% 
+23% 
+17% 
+10% 
+9% 
+18% 
+13% 
during 1974 to 1976 and again in 1980. In addition to this, 
larger concerns are rational ising operations and reducing 
marming requirementso BSC, for example, has shed 130 1 000 jobs 
between 1968 and 1978 (ISTC, 1980), and has closed more than 
17 steelworks since 1974 (see Bryer et al, forthcoming). BL 
--
shed 12,000 jobs in 1978 alone (IHC, 1978) 0 
These figures demonstrate the existence of a recession in 
Britain from around 1974 onwards. There is evidence of a slight 
respite between 1976 and 1979 but only in the form of a 
slm;ing down in the rate of decline, not an absolute improvement. 
An 8.dded complication, particularly during the early part of 
the recession, has been high rates of infl8..tion. 
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Attitudes and Action in the Industrial Sector 
\'lbat effect has the economic recession had on closures and the 
\'lay people respond to them? The recession has inevitably led 
to an increasing number of closures in the industrial sector, 
but there is more to it than this. It has, for example, been 
argued that economic changes can produce attitude and value 
change. 
The research '''hich has been done in this area has focussed on 
the increase in prosperity and affluence which has been enjoyed 
by Western societies in the post-war period. lnglehart (1977) 
arc;ues that this has led to a change in values a",'J2..J from a 
preoccup ation with material and economic issues J tOi>Tards ,a-
Concern for the quality of life. R~:tch (1970) J Yankelovich 
(1973, 1974), Rokeach (1974/5) and Dalton (1976/7) have found 
empirical evidence to support Inglehart's hypothesis. 
Inglehart argues that these post-materialist values have 
persisted into the seventies, despite the recession. 
"Recent economic stagnation does not seem 
to have undone the effects of the twenty 
fat years from 1950 to 1970" Inglehart 
(1977) p 21-22. 
Others, however, have disagreed "IIi th this. Abrams (1974) 
conducted a study to test Inglehart's theories in 1973-4. He 
found that values in Britain were overvlhelmingly materialistic. 
The bulk of Inglehart' s ,",ork "lIas conducted a year or b\ro before 
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Abram's and it seems feasible to su~gest that Inglehart 
c2Dtured the post-materialist values of the late sixties and 
early seventies, whereas Abrams tapped a reversion back to 
materialism as the recession started to truce hold. 
There seems little argument that the 1960s represented a new 
era in which new issues and values began to appear, and in which 
a concern with the quality of life I7lanifested itself. Flower 
power, hippies, eND, student unrest, protests against Vietnam, 
civil rights movements are synonymous with the sixties. 
"The general prosperity and rapid economic 
growth of the 1950s and early 1960s apparently 
tended to lessen concern with bread and 
butter issues. At any rate, economic 
issues tended to be overshadO\\Ted by concern 
about the cold ,·tar, civil rights, law and 
order, urban violence, pollution and the 
involvement of the United states in 
Vietnam" Glenn (1973/4) p 20. 
It seems, ho'wever, that the seventies saw a change in this as 
economic issues began to re-emerge. Glenn (1973/4) notes that, 
whereas the most important problem facing Americans in 1968 
was Vietnam, in 1971 economic problems \'tere mentioned twice as 
often as any other t:YlJe of problem. __ Hie ~ al (1976) point 
out that the maj or issue 1960-4 was race, between 1964-8 it 
was Vietnam, followed closely by race. By 1968-72, however, 
these issues had been crovlded out by economic concerns. 1.1iller 
& Levitin (1976) argue that almost four out of every ten 
Americans, in 1972, identified a foreign or international 
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probleo as the r:.ost important issue facing their country. By 
1976, one in tvTO Americans mentioned inflation and an additional 
one in three cited unemployment. 
The evidence from America, combined with Abram's British data , 
indicates that there has been a return to materialism and that 
this seems to be bound up with the economic difficulties 
facing both countries (for American statistics see the tables 
below). This explanation is all the more persuasive when it is 
remebered that, although the current recession was precipitated 
by the oil crisis, inflation and ~memployment were beginning 
to manifest themselves towards the end of the sixties. 
"By 1976, the issues, events, symbols and 
many of the popular and political leaders 
that had defined the New Politics no 
longer commanded public attention. To a 
nation which had endured more th&"1. two 
years of \'Jatergate and several years of 
economic distress, the concerns of the Ne\v 
Politics seemed distant" Miller & Levitin 
(1976) p 190. 
It appears that values are linked to changes in economic 
fortunes, responding to both increased affluence and declining 
prosperity. The recent recession seems to have brought a move 
away from the post-materialist values documented by Inglehart. 
In industry, this has been marked by a concern for cost-
effectiveness. See Pettigrew (forthcoming) for a comparative 
analysis of hml a company's organisational developnent policies 
and activities were influenced by the UK socia-economic context 
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Table 10.8 
UneoploJ;:ment in America 
Year 01 10 
1970 4.9 
1971 5.9 
1972 5.6 
1973 4.9 
1974 5.6 
1975 8.5 
1976 7.7 
1977 7.0 
1978 6.0 
1979 5.8 
1980 7.1 
Table 10.10 
, 
Industrial Production (America) 
1967 = 100 
Year Index % Change 
1970 107.8 -3.0 
1971 109.6 +1.7 
1972 119.7 +9.2 
1973 129.8 +8.4 
1974 129.3 -0.4 
1975 117.8 -8.9 
1976 130.5 +10.8 
1977 138.2 +5.9 
1978 146.1 +5.7 
1979 152.5 +4.4 
1980 147.1 -3.5 
Table 10.9 
Ch8,j.-:'.O'es 
r~ 
in Consume;r Prices 
(America) 
Year CI Change /':1 
1970 +5.5 
1971 +3.4 
1972 +3.4 
1973 +8.8 
1974 +12.2 
1975 +7.0 
1976 +4.8 
1977 +6.8 
1978 +9.0 
1979 +13.3 
1980 +12.4 
All figures from Economic Indicators. 
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bebreen 1965 and 1981. S~..!ccessive goverruaents have also been 
concerned with economic problems. Cash limits were introduced, 
affecting most 0: the public sector. Four 8.n.t."1.ouncements Vlere 
made on cuts totalling £8220 million in April 1975, and 
February, July a~d December 1976 in an effort to curb inflation 
(Fryer et aI, 1978). 
If owners and managers were concerned with the declining 
economic situation, there is evidence to suggest that employees 
vrere equally worried, particularly by the twin problems of 
increasing unemployment and rising inflation. The number of 
strikes andJdays lost were -higher ·in- the first half -of: -t..l-te--
decade and this nay indicate efforts to protect earnings (see 
the tables below). Although ~he percent~~e of strikes does not 
ShOl" any distinct pattern, the percentage of days lost due to 
pay claims rose from 65% in 1965 to 90~; in 1971 and 1972, and 
remained at over 70% until 1976. Furthermore, the index of 
average earnings ShOVIS that wage rises kept ahead of inflation 
until 1976. These figures suggest that workers took steps to 
protect themselves against inflation for the first half of the 
seventies. 
In addition to pay claims, employees ' ... ere also engaged in 
vlidespread action against closure and redundancy, most notably 
in the form of the factory occupation: the work-in or sit-in. 
This, argue Herruning\'lay t Keyser (1975) \'ras a phenomenon of the 
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Table 10.11 
Industrial Disputes (UK) 
Number of 
Stoppages 
1970 3906 (+25) 
1971 2228 (-42) 
1972 2497 . (+12) 
1973 2879 (+15) 
1974 2922 '(+1) 
1975 2282 (-21) 
1976 2016 (-11) 
1977 2703 '(+3) 
1978 2471 (-8) 
1979 2080 (-15) 
1980 1262 (-39) 
\,IDL *JOO ' s 
10908 (-57) 
13589 (+24) 
23923 (+76) 
7145 (-70) 
14845 (+107) 
5914 (-60) 
3509 (-40) 
10378 (+195) 
9391 (-7) 
29051 '(+209) 
11910 (-59) 
Numbers 
In.volved OOO's 
1793 '(+8) 
1175 (-34) 
1726 .'( +46) 
1513 (-12) 
1622 (-7) 
789 (-50) 
670 (-15) 
1155 (+72) 
1003 (-13) 
4583 (+356) 
789 (-82) 
Figures in brackets denote annual rate of change. 
Average number of strikes 1970-4 = 2886 
1975-9 = 2310. 
Average number of \IIDL * 1970-4 = 14082 
1975-9 = 11648 
*\'JDL = Working Days Lost 
Figures from the Annual Abstract of Statisitics. 
- 198 -
Table 10.12 Table 10.13 
Number of Strikes/1000 Number 07 \'1DL/1000 
ETirp loyees (UK) Employees (UK) 
1970 0.17 1970 467 
1971 0.10 1971 614 
1972 0.11 1972 1326 
1973 0.12 1973 315 
1974 0.12 1974 651 
1975 0.10 1975 260 
1976 0.09 1976 155 
1977 0.11 1977 458 
1978 0.11 1978 414 
1979 0.09 1979 1273 
Average number of strikes/1000 employees 1970-4 = 0.12 
1975-9 = 0.10 
Average number of t'JDL/1000 employees 1970-4 = 676 
1975-8 = 512 
Figures from the Annual Abstract of Statistics, also see Smith 
(1978), tables 6. 7. 
Table 10.14 
Percentages of Strikes and t'JDL over Pay 
Year % Strikes % \'IDL 
1965 49.8 64.7 
1966 53.5 71.4 
1967 53.1 62.3 
1968 46.0 77.6 
1969 40.6 74.6 
1970 35.7 85.3 
1971 47.2 91.3 
1972 40.7. 90.9 
1973 49.1 72.8 
1974 34.2 89.7 
1975 42.2 75.6 
1976 56.6 53.3 
Figures from Smith (1978) • 
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Table 10.15 
Index of Avera,ae E arnin~ ~ .. 0' .1 ,)'::> .• '~(:J Change 
1970 (Oct) 13.5 
1971 11.1 (8) 
1972 15.7 (8) 
1973 15.1 (8) 
1974 20.0 (12) 
1975 23.4 (20) 
1976 13.2 (23) 
1977 8.6 (17) 
1978 13.8 (10) 
1979 (June) 13.4 (9) 
1980 (June) 21.7 (l.8) 
Figures in brackets denote annual percentagn increase in the 
retail price index. 
Figures from DoE Gazette. 
early seventies, as there is no significant historical record 
of the use of sit-ins. Clarke (1979 j has estimated that betvleen 
1971 and 1975 there were 200 factory occupations involving 
150,000 workers. Hemmingway & Keyser sU2'J5est that the use of 
the occupation against closure and redundancy became more 
popular beb~een 1970 and 1975. They found 11 such occupations 
in progress in the first six months of 1975, "There as there had 
been only 5 in the first six months of 1972. This, it has 
been suggested, is because the sit-in is a more effective 
"!c2~:;on than the strike in the case of a closure (Hemminguay & 
YC2'scr, 1975; Greenwood, 1977). Greem'TOod (1977) argues that 
it prevents the disposal of the contents and of the factory. 
He estimates that the sit-in at the rIorton Villiers Triur:rph 
200 
factory in r:eriden prevented the sale of £7 million in assets. 
The ear~y seventies were also notable for the founding of the 
neVI 'V/or1:::er co-operatives at ues in 1971, Fakenh?Jll in 1972, 
Meriden in 1973-5, Kirkby in 1972 and 1974, and SDN in 1975. 
These \'lorker--led orp.;anisations emerged out of occupations as 
the original o"':mers bOljled out, leaving employees to run things 
for ther.!selves. It was the founding of ues, after a well-
publicised occupation, which initiated the increase in the use 
of the sit-in. 
liThe key incident \,lhich sparked a more 
rigo~ous British interest in this form 
of industrial action was -the occupation 
and \'Iork-in at Upper Clyde Shipbuilders 
in 1971" Herruningway & ICeyser (1975) p 5. 
The motivation behind these occupations appears to have been 
a pragmatic response to a worsening economic climate \'lhich 
reduced the chances of finding alternative employment. It \'las 
not a radical attempt to assert a new form of worker-based 
control. As James Airlie, one of the leaders of ves, declared 
and at SDN 
"our only purpose is to save the jobs of 
the men. If, as a by-product, a new form 
of protest or control comes about then that 
is welcome - but it is not our aim" 
Buchan (1972) p 144 
"their united struggle to set up a co-
operative appears to have been rr,otivated 
by pragmatic as opposed to radical 
reasons •••• FroTT'. our analysis it would 
appear that the SDN worlcers realistically 
appraised their O"Tn personal situations 
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against the prevailing disr.1a1 market 
conditions of 1975 GlasgO\!, and resardcd 
the SDII as all organisation capable of 
rescuin,C;; them from a seer.~in~ly ho]eless 
situationll Bradley (1978) p 4.26 
A glance at the local unemployments rates, in the table belC\'T, 
confirms this. All the co-operatives, apart from Fa~enham, 
\'rere established in areas \'!here unemployment was considerably 
higher than the national average. 
The emergence of these nm'! tactics - the occupation and the 
worker co-operative - \'lere liEd ted to relatively small nU!i1bers 
of people and closures. This should not, hmrever, detract 
from their import8.i"1.ce as new weapons, deployed to protect 
employee interests in the facing of increasing economic 
hardship. Furthermore, the support they attracted 
indicates attitudes that were opposed to the \'lidespread 
closure and redundancy that was becoming apparent. The 
car-paign to save UCS from closure, for example, involved 
100, 000 stopping \Jork and 50, 000 joining a del7lonstration in 
Glasgow on 24th June 1971. On 18th August there were 200,000 
strikers fu"1.d 30,000 marchers (Greem'lOod, 1977 p 36). In 
addition to public support, DCS attracted support fror.1 the TUC. 
The Conzress has always fought the question 
of redundancy or closure on a national scale, 
leavin~ speci:~-ic cases either to the unions 
involved or local officials or ste\'!ards. 
Hever before had the TUC cOIiL8itted itself so 
fully to a fight ~~ainst one closure. That 
it gave such support to a Communist-led 
stewards' movement made its involvement 
rel7larl:able" Buchan (1972) P 96. 
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Table 10.16 
Local Unemployment Rates 
Area Year (June) Local Rate National Ave. 
ues, Glasgm'T 1971 6.5 3.2 
Fakenham, Norwich 1972 2.5 3.6 
Kirkby, Liverpool 1972 7.2 3.6 
1973 6.6 2.4 
1974 5.6 2.3 
r.leriden, Coventry 1973 2.3 2.4 
1974 2.4 2.3 
1975 4.4 3.7 
SDN, Glasgo\'l 1974 4.7 2.3 
1975 5.5 3.7 
All figures from DoE Gazette. 
It has been suggested that occupations and co-operatives were 
pragmatic responses to a difficult economic environment. If 
~ 
this is the case, and they were able to attract such widespread 
support, why have they not persisted··into the latter half of 
the decade, as employment difficulties have worsened. As 
Hemming\'Tay & Keyser wrote in 1975 
"there is no obvious reason \,Thy one should 
regard the redundancy sit-in as only a 
temporary phenomenon" p 32. 
It appears, however, that the use of the occupation bas declined 
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considerably, and the phenomenon of the worker co-operative 
all but disappeared. Unfortunately there are no figures on 
the number of occupations since 1975 (this apparen-a lack of 
interest is significant in itself), but a cursory glance 
at the Morning Star indicates a decline. An examination of the 
paper for the first week in September betv.[een 1970 and 1979 
found 8 references to ues in 1971 and 2 to an occupation at a 
Plessey factory. In 1972 there were 4 references to ues, in 
1973, one reference to an occupation of a Seiko factory. 
There were no mentions of sit-ins in 1974 or 1975. In the first 
week of September 1976, there \\fere 3 references to -the Cammel 
Laird occupation. Since then, there has been only one other 
reference - to the increasing problems facing the r.Teriden 
Co-operative. These figures are not conclusive but they do 
suggest either fewer sit-ins, or a lessening of public interest 
in them. This tentative evidence is supported by the fact that 
only one occupation - at the Mecanno factory - has received 
widespread press coverage between 1976-9. Furthermore, there 
have been no ne\'l co-operatives, and only Meriden remains in 
existence. 
Greem'lOod (1977) argues that the disillusion.rr.ent had set in 
before 1975. He maintains that Kirkby, Meriden and SDN did not 
lead to a "substantial protest of even local dimensions" (p 36). 
'rhere have been some attempts to contest closure in the latter 
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part of the 1970s. The most notable of these perhaps, has been 
the c~~paigns to prevent the closure of steelworks by BSC. 
Local action committees, or similar groups, 1tlere formed to 
prevent the closure of Shelton, East Moors, EbbvI Vale, Shotton, 
Hartlepool, Cleveland, Torcross, Corby, Bilston and Consett 
steel \'lorks (see Bryer ~~, forthcoming). These campaigns 
all failed because, argues Bryer, 
"national union leaders failed to mount an 
effective campaign to resist the closures" 
Bryer et al (forthcoming) p 290 
--
and this rendered the locally led action committees ineffective. 
The reason for this inaction was, according to Bryer, the result 
of the failure of national leaders to question the rationale 
behind the closures. Instead, they accepted the economic and 
technical arguments put forward by BSC to justify the closures t 
as this extract from a paper 1trri tten by the Secretary of the 
Steel Committee in 1974 demonstrates. 
"The steel industry in this country is 
passing through a time of rapid, far 
reaching and continuous change. This has 
posed a great dilemma for the unions 
concerned with the industry. 
The unions knm'l full well that all the 
other major steel industries in the world 
are undergoing changes in "response to 
alterations in their environment, brought 
about in particular by the advances made 
in recent years in iron and steel-
making technology, in the nature of 
customers' requirements (eg for neW types 
and qualities of steel), and in the 
re-location of their main source of raw 
material supplies. The objective of 
each national industry in making these 
chan0es is to continually improve its 
L' 
competitiveness in order to be able to 
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capture a larger share of \'lOr ld markets for 
its products, or at least retain that ,:Thich 
it already has. The unions also recognise, 
therefore, that in these circumstances 
comparable changes must take place in the 
British steel jndustry unless it is to be 
condemned to an obsolescent technology 
while its competitors rush headlong into 
a new steelmaking era •••• 
These are the hard truths, of which the 
Steel.Committee have been reminded·time 
after til(le over the past fm'1 years in 'one 
meeting and onotherwith successive 
Ministers and the Chairman and Chief 
Executive of the BSC" Bryer et al 
(forthcoming) p 319-20:, (my italks). 
It appears that the continual justification of closure and 
redundancy on economic, technical and commercial criteria can 
ma~e them more acceptable because they are considered necessary 
or even desirable. This reinforces the values which Fryer (1973) 
argues are implicit in public policy 
"where redundancy is concerned, public 
policy has defined the problem largely in 
managerial terms •••• The assumption has 
not been that redundancy as such is 
~esirable and should, therefore, be 
eliminated. On the contrary, the very 
legitimacy of redundancy has been 
defined in terms of hmIT best to facilitate 
managerial decision-making and encourage 
workers to accept the inevitability, 
indeed, the desirability of redundancy" 
Fryer (1973) p 3. 
If BSC took pains to justify their closures, there is no 
reason to suppose that other companies do not do the same. 
The Camerons and Andersons case-studies provide two examples of 
cOQpanies which took a great deal of trouble to explain the 
- 206 -
reasons behind closure. 
An analysis of the reasons given in press statements for plant 
closures by Courtaulds demonstrates the trouble taken, in the 
early seventies, to justify closure and absolve the Company of 
all blame. One way in which this was done was by pointing out 
the efforts made by Courtaulds to prevent or delay closure. 
"In spite of strenuous efforts over the 
past year! to expand all the subsidiary's 
processing activities, business has 
continued to decline. Costs had risen 
due to higher wages and prices of raw 
materials and it had not proved possible 
to raise selling prices to compensate" 
Times article on the closure of a 
Courtaulds subsidiary (15/7/70) p 19 
"\'1e have spent a lot of money on it but it 
is a costly process and the product has 
been more susceptible to the difficult 
trading conditions than most man-made 
fibres, and prices have been well below 
the cost of the product. We have 
continued to bear losses for a long time 
in the hope that the situation would change, 
but we have got to the point where there is 
no sign of any change in the market 
situation" Times article on the closure 
of a textile plant in North \'Jales 
(23/10/76) p 17. 
"The situation has been aggravated by the . 
chronic over-capacity in this country and 
in Europe. The plant at Em'llais has been 
kept running to maintain emplgyment but 
its operations have been quite uncompet-
itive" The Times (23/10/76) P 17. 
"Although the Company has made strenuous 
efforts to improve trading operations at 
the Grantham factory •••• sienificant 
losses have been incurred for a number of 
years and these have continued long 
beyond comnercial acceptability" . 
The Times (28/10/76) p 21. 
- 207 -
Other closures have been attributed to labour problems, to the 
extent that a change in the \'Jorkforce' s attitude '~las all that 
was rec!uired to prevent closure. Skelmersdale factory which was 
later reprieved, was 
"the inevitable consequence of the cumulative 
effect of labour difficulties" The Times 
(11/10/72) pl and 19. 
"The Company said that the decision had been 
taken because of the industrial disruption 
there •••• A management spokesman said last 
night that any move to re-open the plant 
would depend upon the attitude of the 
workforce" Times article on an acrylics 
plant at Grimsby (20/12/74) p 16. 
I 
Other closures \'rere attributed to rationalisation plans, rather 
than panic measures. 
"The extensive rationalisation of productive 
capacity is the result of a full internal 
revieill by Courtaulds of all its home and 
overseas operations rather than a series of 
panic reactions to market conditions" 
Times article on the closures of factories 
in Skelmersdale, Rochdale and Grantham 
(28/10/76) p 21. 
Rather less trouble was taken to explain the reasons behind 
later closures, or to ensure blame would not be attached to 
the company. Virtually all the closures documented in the Times 
and Daily Telegraph in 1978-80 were explained by short :statements, 
mainly 'attributing them to demand or technology factors. 
"More than 500 employees •••• are to 
lose their jobs because of falling 
orders" Times article on redundancies 
at Aintree and \'Jrexhcii'n (4/3/78) P 19. 
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"Courtaulds blames world over-capacity and 
severe competition f'rom 10'\1}' cost imports 
from America for the decision" The Daily 
Telegraph on the closure of three 
textile plants in Northern Ireland 
(15/9/79) p 36. 
The works is "undoubtedly a victim of 
fundamental technological changes in the 
textile industry" The Times on a Preston 
factory (19/11/79) p 18. 
"Both mills were operating as a loss and 
\'/ere tim in the red" The Times on two 
mills in Cumbria~7/5/80) p 19. 
lip.. group official blamed falling demand for 
yarn •••• resulting in over-capacity and 
increasing losses" The Times on the Lansil 
\'lorks in Lancashire (27/9/80) p 17. 
Courtaulds "blamed the closure of the mill 
•••• on problems caused by cheap imports 
and the relative strength of sterling" 
The Times on an Oldham mill (11/12/80) p 17. 
The continual use of validating statements by firms to justify 
their closures on rational criteria appears to have made them 
more acceptable , although they may still be vie\'/ed as unsavoury. 
There is an abundance of evidence to suggest that firms do try 
to justify their closures and the data also indicate that 
these justifications have been accepted, to the extent, perhaps, 
that Courtaulds no longer feels the necessity to divest itself 
of all blame by attributing it. to someone else or by pointing 
out their efforts to prevent closure. To put it simply, there 
is no need; closure has become a fact of life. 
If closure is vie"/ed as necessary, justifiable or even inevitable. 
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doubt is cast on the legitimacy of opposition to closure. In 
the early seventies, ues promoted the 
"popular legitimacy of the fight for a 
livlihood tl Hemrningway & Keyser (1975) p 5. 
"ues promoted the idea throuGhout this 
= 
country and abroad that unemployment and 
redundancy need not be tolerated" elar~e 
(1979) p 18-9. 
In other \'lords redundancy and closure were contested simply 
because they were morally and socially undesirable. But if 
closure is defined as economically necessary, opposition on 
these grounds mqy be deemed irresponsible or emotional. In 
such a climate of opinion, resistence is likely to be on a 
weak footing, unless it can demonstrate rational, technical, 
commercial or economic reasons \lihy the factory should not close. 
It appears that the legitimacy of closure has been redefined 
over the last few years, in that it has become more acceptable 
for the reasons mentioned above. DO\'lling & Pfeffer (1975) and 
Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) argue that organisations strive to 
achieve social legitimacy for their actions to ensure support 
for their coninuing existence. 
tiThe manipulation of social legitimacy to 
maintain social support can only be achieved 
if one is able to argue convincingly that 
\lfhat the organisation is doing is just and 
worthy" Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) P 195. 
To emphasis the worthiness of their actions, employers may 
ensure that closures proceed in a "respectable" \'la~i. (For 
exa~ples of this, see the analyses of the two industrial case-
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studies in the follovling chapter.) An alternative or, even 
a compler.lentary solution is for employers to redefine 
legitimacy and make the act of closure more acceptable. This 
is exactly what has happened: the more closure is justified, 
the more justifiable it becomes. 
There is another factor which helps account for the relative 
lack of action against closure in recent years. This is the 
decline in power of unions and employees which is also indicated 
by a reduction in the number of strikes and days lost and a 
slowing down in the armual increase in earnings (see tables 
10.11, 10.12, 10.13, and 10.15). It has been argued that the 
high rates of unemployment seen in the 1970s have eroded the 
power of the unions (Eagley, 1965; Sci tovsky , 1978) 
"'.',nen there is a large surplus of labour 
either visibly unemployed or hidden in 
rural or other labour reserves, the 
bargaining position of trade unions is 
relatively demoralised or quiescent" 
Rowthorne (1980) p 154. 
It has been argued that this loss of power has led to the "new 
realism" of which the media currently talk, where employees do 
not make large claims or engage in inpustrial action for fear 
of losing their jobs. 
The increasing acceptability of closure and the declining power 
of the unions has meant that opposition has become more difficult 
to create and sustain. It also means that if opposition does 
Occur , it ",.,rill be more likely· to adopt an economic stance, 
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rather tha."1 a moral one. As closure becomes vie\'Jed as legitimate, 
overt measures taken to prevent it are- more likely to be deemed 
illegitimq~e and so opposition groups, such as those at BSC, 
have to rely on unobtrusive strategies to convince management 
that their decision is ~lrong on rationai grounds. The redefinition 
of closure is the result of attempts to justify many closures. It 
is unlikely to be\'Jithin the ability of one employer to effect 
such general changes in attitude. 
Andersons 
This closure illustrates the developments discussed above, 
shmlTing hoVl employees, disillusioned 1fJith overt measures, 
tried to contest the closure on economic ~rounds. 
~ ;" 
Senior UK management knew about the possible closure only three 
weeks before their employees, consequently they were unable to 
prepare the ground for the reception of the ne~ .. lS. Under these 
circumstances it seems reasonable to suggest that the initial 
reaction of employees was "natural" in the sense that there had 
been no intervention by management to soften the blow. 
The decision of the stewards and their members, on hearin,9: 
the result of the feasibility study, was not to take any form 
of industrial action such as a strike, go-slo\'! or occupation. 
Instead, they formed a joint union committee to discuss how 
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the threat to the factory should be tackled. 
This reaction was surprising for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
unemployment in the area was high. \'Jhen the feasibility study 
"Tas announced in September, 1978, it '\'las 9.2% against a 
national average of 6.4%. In November, 1978, \'lhen the study 
made its report, unemployment in the area was 8.9% against a 
national average of 5.8%. There had, in addition to this, been 
a series of closures and redundancies in the area. For example, 
one company had reduced its workforce from 3,000 to less than 
300. Another family firm had made more than 300 employees 
redundant. A firm of \'Tool sp inners had gone into liquidation 
with 300 workers losing their jobs. Even those ma~ufacturing 
companies continuing to operate were estimated to have reduced 
their manning requirements by between 10-40%. (Details 
provided by the Chief Executive of the District Council.) 
Another reason why the absence of industrial action was so 
surprising '\'las the· fact that the workers at Newlands "lere no 
strangers to overt forms of protest. In 1977, 18% of the 
available hours had been lost due to~industrial action, which 
had included a seven week strike and lock-out. 
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Table 10.17 
Percentage of Available Hours Lost Due to Industrial Action 
Year 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 (to Sept) 
01 
10 
0.16 
3.88 
18.04 
0.45 
0.058 
Figures supplied by the Company. 
In spite of these factors - the impact the closure would have 
on an already depressed community and the previous experience 
of the workforce in past industrial action - the announcement 
of the study and its recommendations did not spark off a 
strike or an occupation. The main reason for this was that 
the stewards had evaluated the abysmal success record of 
previous attempts to prevent closure in this way, and decided 
that their own prospects of victory with this method were 
limited. 
"The Joint Committee had considered the 
fortunes of the co-operatives, work-ins 
and other attempts by trade unionists, 
whose livelihoods were threatened, to 
hold on to their work. They felt that 
a lot of struggle and a lot of publicity 
had produced only a little and sometimes 
nothing for the workers involved" 
( consultant) • 
"We Ive seen sit-ins, \llork-ins, pickets 
and demonstrations, but in the end firms 
have still closed down" (steward). 
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Furthermore, stewards and union officials had been convinced of 
the precarious position of the Company and felt that industrial 
action might jeopardise the entire UK operation. 
"These things had to be done or the Company 
itself would collapse. Nobody ''lants the 
Company to collapse because there are a-
lot of people employed there" (ste'iards). 
"Everyone recognised that to stop work 
would hurt Andersons, since they needed 
production until the French factory \'las 
tooled up" (consultant). 
Despite knowing or believing that they could put pressure on 
the Company, the stewards felt that such a move would be 
counter-productive since it could threaten the jobs of many 
more workers. Although they deemed this sort of action as 
illegitimate, they did not abandon the idea of trying to save 
the factory. As the saga continued, officials and ste\,Tards 
latched on to another way of fighting the closure. This 
method \lIaS, in effect, provided by management' s initial decision 
to use a feasibility study to assess the viability of Newlands. 
This led to the commission of their . own study by the unions, 
who believed it would provide uncontestable economic grounds 
for a reprieve. 
"We thought that we could prove to 
Ander-sons that this was a viable plant" 
(ste\'lard) • 
By doing this, the stewards and officials adopted measures 
which they viewed as legitimate an unobtrusive strate.~y desi£ned 
to presuade manaaement to rescind its decision, instead of overt 
.. '
tactics to force them into a chanr,e of plaIl. This was vim·red as 
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legitimate action by management in so far as they considered 
it far preferable to any form of industrial action and \'iho , 
according to one UK director, would have willingly entertained 
any feasible plans for saving the plant suggested by the 
unions. 
This reaction by employees and unions marks a significant 
difference to the occupations of the early seventies. A repeat 
of this type of action was considered undesirable and 
unproductive. The economic rationale was accepted and 
stewards tried to find economic, rather than moral, argunents 
to contest closure. This illustrates a change in attitudes -
closure is acceptable, although still unpalatable, if it is 
demonstrated to be economically necessary. Therefore 
opposition to it requires a rational base - industrial action 
is illegitimate and moral pressure is inadequate. 
Car:lerons 
The first announcement of the closure at Mountside was in 
I.:arch 1975 but this passed largely unnoticed. A more detailed 
announcement was made the following year. This attracted more 
attention but did not spark off any resistrulce to the closure. 
The timing of these announcements m~v partially account for 
this. The phenomenon of :factory occupation and worker 
co-operatives had virtually ended by 1976. \'lhat ~'!as probably 
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more significant than this "ras the fact that unemployment in 
the city was not unduly high, hovering around or just below 
the national average. In addition to this, workers were 
released gradually over five years so there \Alas no sense of 
flooding the labour market. 
These factors alone, however, do not account for the absence 
of resistance at Mounside. The most important factor by far, 
was the management of the closure - a carefully designed 
exercise. prepared in advance to reduce or preferably remove 
the possibility of opposition. (This aspect of the closure is 
discussed in detail in the follmling chapter.) This demonstrates 
the importance of using a number of levels of analysis: in 
some cases, the environment may be particularly significant, 
in others its influence may be ou~~eighed by internal factors. 
The Health Service 
The previous section has concentrated on the industrial sector, 
this looks at the public sector, in particular the health 
service which displays different patterns of industrial 
activity. 
The extent of industrial activity in the public sector has 
increased throughout the seventies, and has been accompanied 
by dramatic increases in union membership. The tables belm'l 
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Table 10.18 Table 10.19 
Stoppages of \'lork in the NHS Number of \'lDL/1000 Emplo'1rees 
" in Medical & Dental Services 
Year Number of Number of 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
Stoppages 
2 
1 
1 
8 
5 
6 
4 
18 
18 
19 
15 
21 
Figures from the Royal 
Commission on the fillS. 
1978 
1979 
27 
20 
Figures from the DoE. 
Average 
Year 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
\IDL 
500 
200 
80 
7000 
6700 
4700 
98000 
298000 
23000 
20000 
15000 
8200 
15000 
621000 
1970 6.6 
1971 4.5 
1972 91.0 
1973 269.0 
1974 20.3 
1975 16.4 
1976 12.0 
1977 6.5 
1978 11.7 
1979 478.0 
Figures compiled from the 
Royal Commission on the NHS, 
the Annual Abstract of 
Statistics, the DoE. 
Table 10.20 
Number of tJDL/1000 Employees 
in the rlliS in GB 
Q.69 100.0 
0.27 124.7 
0.11 211.4 
8.99 309.1 
8.46 499.2 
5.88 627.2 
117.8 1104.3 
353.5 324.4 
26.84 661.5 
21.80 270.6 
15.86 149.3 
8.44 448.0 
Figures from the Royal Conunission on the NHS P 163. 
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Table 10.21 
Percent~e Distribution of Stopp~es and t'DL bev:!een the Public 
and Private Sectors (u:: ) 
Stoppages UDL 
Year Public Private Public Private 
1966 37 63 12 88 
1967 28 72 17 83 
1968 19 81 15 85 
1969 17 83 30 70 
1970 18 82 32 68 
1971 16 84 50 50 
1972 17 83 48 52 
1973 22 78 21 79 
1974 21 79 48 52 
1975 22 78 10 90 
1976 29 71 18 82 
Between 1966-75 public sector employment was 24-28% of the total 
labour force. 
Figures from Smith (1978), table 13. 
Table 10.22 
Trends in Union Hembership among Public Sector Unions 
1949 1966 1975 
NUPE 150250 248041 (65) 507826 (104) 
COHSE 51319 67588 (31) 143479 (112) 
NALGO 189261 348528 (62) 542918 (55) 
CPCSA/CSCA 155458 146324 (-4.6) 231790 (58) 
l'nJT 184100* 253884 (37) 264349 (4) 
* 1950 
Figures in brackets denote percentage change. 
Figures from Fryer et al (1978). 
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Table 10.23 
The Growth of TUC A=filiate Unions Recruiting Significant Numbers 
of Health Uorkers 
1970 1979 
AS TI·:S 123800 471000 (280) 
CORSE 77808 215033 (170) 
HCSA-l'< 4021 
HVA 5287 10881 (105) 
NALGO 397069 729405 (83) 
NUGHU 803653 964836 (20) 
NUPE 305222 719392 (135) 
TGUU 1531607 2072818 (35) 
* Hospital Consultants and Specialists Association did not 
affiliate with the TUC until 1979. 
Figures in brackets· denote percentage change. 
Fi~ures from Carpenter (forthcoming). 
display these trends. It has been argued that the general 
increase in industrial activity falls into three distinct 
phases (Bosanquet, 1979; Carpenter, forthcoming). 
The first phase (c1970-6) 
This phase was primarily economic in character as workers in 
all areas of public service took industrial action to improve 
their earnings which had fallen behind those of the private 
sector as a result of the incomes policies and ""!age freezes 
of the late 1960s. 
"It is certainly the case that public sector 
unions have become more strongly militant 
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through their dislike of incomes policy" 
Thompson & Bea'.'lf\o:1.t (1978) P 67. 
The result '.'Jas that industrial action VIas taken by council 
workers in the "Dirty Jobs Strike" og 1970, by post office 
workers in 1971, by hospital .ancillary \'lorkers in 1972-3, by 
nurses in 1974 and by consultants and junior doctors in 
1975. This accounts for the boom in working days lost in 
1972 and 1973. 
The second phase (c1976-9) 
Relative high levels of industrial activity and sustained 
increases in union membership have continued through the 
seventies. From 1976 om-lards, however, the enphasis changes 
as· local disputes start to flare up and the nature of industrial 
activity changes from a concern with wages to a concern \'lith the 
effect of the public expenditure cuts. There were four major 
announcements on cuts: in April 1975 of £1100 milliom; in 
February 1976 of £4595 million; in July 1976 of £1012 million 
in 1977/8; in December 1976 of £1513 million in 1978/9. This 
meant a £30 million reduction in the budget for health and 
personal social services beb~een 1977 and 1979 (Fryer et al, 
--
1978. "Cash Limits on Public Expenditure" (Cmnd 6440) 
published in April 1976 imposed cash limits on about three-
quarters 6f central government expenditure other than social 
security benefits (Fryer, 1979). 
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The public sector unions were understandably unhappy about 
the governrnen~s anti-inflation policies. NUPE Has particularly 
active and published its own reply to the government, asking 
for a different direction to be taken. In r~ovember 1976, a 
mass lobby of Parliament took place and 80.000 took part in 
a march against the cuts organised by the public sector unions 
(Fryer, 1979). 1976 and 1977 saw a series of local campaigns 
against the cuts. This was particularly evident in the 
health service as a series of attempts to prevent hospital 
closures was mobilised. There were 64 hospital closures in 
1976 and 83 in 1977. It has been estimated that there were 
around 100 in 1979 (Dean. 1980). This is out of a hospital 
population of some 2,000. The number of London hospitals has 
fallen from 357 in 1968 to 230 in 1979, and between 1979 and 
1980, 11 hospitals and 3,000 beds have disappeared (Sunday Times, 
1980). One form of opposition has been led by the CHCs 
who, by objecting to the closure, can ensure that the final 
decision is t~<en by the Secretary of State. In 1976, six 
proposed closures 'were contested in this manner, by 1977 the 
figure had risen to eighteen (Dean, 1980). 
Another, more dramatic form of protest is the hospital 
occupation, where hospitals are kept open in spite of Qanagement 
decisions. This requires a ''Iell-orchestrated effort as 
ancillary workers, nurses and doctors have to unite to admit and 
treat patients. There have been a number of hospital occupations, 
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particularly in London, for example, at Hounslow Hospital 
(1976-7), Elizabeth Garrett Anderson (1976-8), St Nicholas 
(1976-7), Bethnall Green (1978) and Plaistm'l (1977). Some of 
these have been successful, at least in staving off closure 
for the time being. This recent phenomenon has been characterised 
by newly forged links bebreen different health service unions 
and other external bodies, resulting in a broadly-based and 
united front (Carpenter, forthcoming). 
"The last two years in particular have seen 
health \ITorkers turning to the broader Labour 
Movement for support. This process has 
been the most evident in the struggles 
against hospital closures and the cuts 
generally. Links have been forged with non-
NHS trade unions, Community Health Councils, 
local councillors and MPs, trades councils, 
womens' groups, tena'1.ts' groups and other 
commu~ity organisations" Vulliamy & ivIoore 
(1979) p 26. 
This characterised the situation at Northville. The closure 
"las an issue be-bfreen 1976 and 1977, at the same time as 
campaigns were being initiated throughout the country against 
cuts and closures. The fight against the closure of Maine 
Road Maternity Hospital, although founded by the staff there, 
had a backdrop of support from the CKes, NUPE, local womens' 
groups and tenants' associations. Furthermore, during the 
last few months before the AHA took its decision on the 
closure, there had been a campaign against proposed cuts in 
services. On 24th May 1977, the Dr'.!T had announced a dramatic 
programme of financial measures involving the closure of 
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mnny ",ards and a reduction in manning. 
"This action created an explosion of 
protest amongst many groups of staff and 
it brought together the trade unions and 
the CommLUlity Heal-th Councils in a 
determination to resist the proposals" 
(ComQittee of Inquiry). 
This massive protest was strong enough to elicit a proraise of 
an inquiry from the Ninister of Health. 
The Midville closure took place only slightly later, starting 
in early 1977. Why was this not similarly affected? Bosanquet (1979) 
and Bosanquet & Healy~ p~ve suggested that there are two distinct 
area in the NBS. The majority (90%) fall into the category in 
which there are fe'!.,·l industrial disputes and where both managers 
and employees have successfully adjusted to the problems 
created by Reorganisation in 1974. The reli1aining 10%, however, 
are "incident prone", with a relatively high incidence of strikes 
and other forms of industrial activity, as table 10.24 ShOHS. 
The incident-prone areas tend to be-industrialised areas and 
cities, which have not yet adapted to the difficulties 
imposed by Reorganisation. 
"The Reorganisation of the NHS led to 
administrative and managerial changes 
that disturbed existin~ relationships 
bet\'Jeen management and staff by creating 
new types of managerial post and 
establishing ne\'! line of management" 
(Committee of Inquiry). 
These areas have failed because they have not developed an 
adequate system of industrial relations to deal \';i th the extra 
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Table 10.24 
Number of Strikes in NBS 
Area 1976 1977 1978 (Jan-
June) 
South 4 3 3 
London 6 12 15 
North 5 15 8 
Midlands 4 15 0 
Scotland 2 2 
TJlales & \'Jest 2 2 6 
23 29 29 
Cities/Industrial 15 24 20 
Areas 
Figures from Bosanquet & Healy ( 1979 ) • 
demands. These areas are also characterised by long traditions 
of working-class organisation and militancy. Thus the high 
number of strikes 
"may well be a reflection of the fact that 
the trade union membership is stronger in 
cities and that trade union values and 
allegiances are already developed in 
previous employment and by social contacts" 
Bosenquet & Healy (1970) p 328. 
So, in much the same way as the formation of the Labour 
Movement and the background of militancy provided an impetus 
for Halewood workers in Liverpool to react to the authoritarian 
policies and pressures at Ford (Beynon, 1973), the community 
backdrop of values, experiences, and labour organisation 
interacts with wider societal pressures pf reduced '''ages, 
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Reorganisation, or expenditure cuts to produce a more volatile 
situation. 
The tables below show some comparability bev.'leen the general 
strike propensity of an area and its position in the NHS 
"League Table". So, for example, Mersey RHA has a relatively 
high incidence of stoppages as does !.Terseyside in the folloHing 
table. \Vest Bidlands PJfA is placed high on the rillS list and 
Coventry and the Conurbation have a high rillIT~er of both 
national and local stoppages. At the other extrene, the 
South West and East Anglian regions are low on both lists. 
Obviously conclusions are limited as the reeions and sub-
divisions are divided differently and one set of figures is 
for 1968-73, \IThile the other covers 1980. There is, hO~.'Jever, 
tentative evidence to suggest that the strike-prone areas in 
the NHS tend to be those areas of the country \',here there are 
already high levels of general industrial unrest. 
These findings suggest that the key to eA~laining militancy 
in the NHS lies in recognising the interaction between the 
wider societal pressures and the specific backdrop of 
coomunity values and expectations (and, as shall be demonstrated 
in the next chapter, the management of the particular health 
authority). The issue of public expenditure cuts has tended 
to be taken up in areas, such as Northville, where there is 
already a history of unionisation and militancy. The more 
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Table 10.25 
Industria~ Action in Health Service Regions in 1980 
Region Days lost Staff involved Stoppages with 
in stoppages days lost 
with days lost 
Northern 149 (10) 165 (10) 4 (11) 
North- 688 (6) 609 (7) 21 (4) 
Uestern 
Yorkshire 1026 (4) 881 (5) 27 (2) 
l.~ersey 3638.5 (1) 1966 (1) 23 (3) 
Trent 319.5 (8 ) 341 (8) 14 (7) 
~lest 
-
3183 (2) 1011 (2) 17 (6 ) 
Hidlands 
East Anglian 67.5 (13) 40 (14) 4 (11) 
Oxford 110 (12) 151 (11) 4 (11) 
NE Thames 607.5 (7) 698 (6 ) 20 (5) 
NvJ Thames 214 (9) 209 (9) 9 (8) 
SE Thames 844 (5) 887 (4) 9 (8) 
S~l Thames 1257 (3 ) 892 (3 ) 31 (1) 
\'Jessex 143 (11) 143 (12) 7 (10) 
South l'Jestern 67 (14) 67 (13) 2 (14) 
Boards of 9 (15) 9 (15) 1 (15) 
Govenors 
Figures provided by DHSS. 
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Table 1e'. 26 
Incidence of Days Lost fro;:t Stoppa,o:es by Subdivision 1~~'18 73 (GB) 
Ratio of Subdivision:GB 
annual average 1968-73 
Subdivision All Stoppages Local Stoppages 
SOUTH EAST REGION 
Central & Greateg London 
Outer Metroplitan 
Outer South East 
- Essex 
- Kent 
- Sussex Coast 
- Solent 
- Beds, Berks, Bucks & Oxford 
EAST ANGLIA REGION 
South East 
North East 
North \'Jest 
South \'lest 
SOUTH \'/EST REGION 
Central 
Southern 
\'Jestern 
northern 
l'JEST I.1IDLANDS REGION 
Central 
Conurbation 
Coventry Belt 
The Rural West 
North Staffordshire 
EAST MIDLANDS REGION 
~ottingham & Derbyshire 
Leicester 
Eastern Lowlands 
Northamptonshire 
YORI(SHlRE & HUl1BERSIDE REGION 
North Humberside 
South Humberside 
Mid Yorkshire 
South Lindsey 
South Yorkshire 
Yorkshire Coalfield 
\'Jest Yorkshire 
0.47 
0.36 
0.18 
0.38 
0.08 
0.54 
1.61 
0.19 
0.27 
1.37 
0.11 
0.18 
0.41 
0.13 
0.79 
0.78 
1.39 
4.57 
0.50 
0.53 
0.92 
0.40 
0.39 
0.90 
1.44 
1.76 
0.39 
0.11 
0.94 
3.41 
0.49 
0.31 
0.26 
0.11 
0.24 
0.04 
0.45 
2.08 
0.10 
0.36 
1.69 
0.12 
0.19 
0.43 
0.12 
0.95 
0.80 
1.68 
6.33 
0.65 
0.42 
0.30 
0.23 
0.36 
1.08 
1.95 
2.14 
0.59 
0.07 
0.89 
1.09 
0.37 
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Table 10.26 (continued) 
Ratio of Subdivision:GB 
annual averaae 1963-73 
,y 
Subdivision All Stoppages Local Stoppages 
NORTH VIEST REGION 
South Cheshire & High Peak 
South Lancashire 
I',ranchester 
r.lerseyside 
Furness 
Fylde 
Lancaster 
Mid-Lancashire 
North East Lancashire 
NORTH REGION 
Industrial North East - North 
Industrial North East - South 
Rural North East - North 
Rural North East - South 
Cumberland &: Westmorland 
\'JALES 
Industrial South \'Jales 
- Central & Eastern Valleys 
- \'Jest South \'Jales 
- Coastal Belt 
North East VJales 
North Vlest vlales - North Coast 
North \'Jest \'lales - Remainder 
Central Hales 
South '~'Jest \'Jales 
SCOTLAND 
GlasgoVl 
Falkirk B: S-tirling 
Edin':""buro-h 
~ C) 
Tayside 
Borders 
South tJest Scotland 
North East Scotland 
Highlands 
0.39 0.48 
1.4G 1.01 
0.74 0.92 
3.36 3.64 
5.43 8.57 
0.43 0.36 
0.83 1.34 
1.97 1.24 
0.50 0.58 
1.92 2.05 
1.04 0.94 
0.39 0.07 
0.51 0.64 
0.52 0.34 
2.55 1.32 
2.99 3.56 
0.81 0.79 
1.94 2.54 
0.67 0.73 
0.59 0.75 
0.11 0.09 
0.68 1.00 
1.95 2.57 
1.01 1.00 
1.27 0.92 
0.8'6 0.99 
0.59 0.02 
0.34 0.24 
0.67 0.81 
0.19 0.24 
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peaceful, rural areas have remained untou.ched. 
"The gulf between the incident-prone 
districts and the rest has grm'm eveh 
shar,per. The contrast is most clearly 
seen in the case of closures. Aoainst 
= 
the few publicised disputes - mainly in 
a fe-~'l well-lmO\,ffi districts - there has 
to be set the point that from January 
1976 to September 1977 6240 beds were 
closed"~· Bosanquet & Healy (1979) p 329. 
The case-studies at Northville and i.iidville reflect the 
difference between the 10% and the 90%. The Region responsible 
for Northville is in the top five in the League, ~/hile the 
Region responsible for Midville is in the bottom five. Midville 
has experienced no local disputes since Reorganisation and 
suffered only minimally during the l';inter of Discontent, 
during \'lhich time, October 1978 to March 1979, Northville had 
a total of 30 stoppages causing 4410 days to be lost. 
Furthermore, 67% of these were unofficial and presumably local 
in origin ( figures supplied by the AHA). 
The Winter of Discontent 1978-9 
This marks the beginning of the third phase of industrial 
activity, when a massive national ca~paign against the govern~ 
ment's policy of 5% \lIege increase \'/as added to local action. 
(See, Bosanque~ 1979; Carpenter, forthcoming.) This accounts 
for the increase in the number of strikes and days lost in 
1978-9. It has been argued by Carpenter that the unsympathetic 
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press coveraSe of these events has reduced public sYF~athy. 
This has been accompanied by sterner measures being taken by 
management to combat employee intransigence and so, for eXample, 
occupations at Etwall and Princess Mary Hospitals in Derbyshire 
and I.1argate have been raided, patients removed and the 
hospitals shut. This, argues Carpenter, could lead to the 
demoralisation of health 1IlOrkers, falling membership rates 
and a reduction in industrial activity. 
Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter demonstrates that the wider envir·onment can have 
a general influence on the response to closure. The change in 
values and attitudes over the last decade has been the focus 
of attention. The evidence from the industrial sector 
indicates that, whereas closures in the early seventies 
were greeted with opposition, closure has more recently become 
acceptable. This is probably because there are more closures, 
Which have been validated and justified. The use of strong arm 
tactics to prevent closure appears to have less credibility 
now, as the use of the factory occupation has declined. This 
could be due -:to the decreasing power of the unions which has 
resulted from rising unemployment rates or it could be the 
result of the acceptance of economic justifications and the 
belief among employees that attempts to save factories can 
only succeed if they work from the same basis. 
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The NHS represents a slightly different picture. Industrial 
activity has been high throughout the seventies, although 
there appear to be three distinct phases. The first phase 
\'las priDarily economic in character, the second was a response 
to the impact of the public e:h."penditure cuts. This phase 
consists of many attempts to prevent closures, the majority of 
which are local initiatives. The final phase marks a resurgence 
of national action directed primarily against government wages 
policy. The important point with health service disputes 
is the fact that they have been confined to a few incident-
prone areas, most districts have not shown the same marked 
increase in industrial disputes. 
It is important not to over-estimate the effect of societal 
factors on closures. As the data on the health service 
indicate, general pressures affect onlY certain areas and it is 
the interaction beu~een the wider environment and the context 
-
of the specific closure which is significant. Suffice it to 
say that the environment will have an effect which should not 
be overlooked but, at the same time, the individual closure 
should be carefully examined if we are to learn any more 
about the response to closure. 
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Chapter Eleven 
MANAGERIAL SUCCESS 
In chapter four it was argued that a three-fold level of 
analysis taking into account intra-organisational processes, 
the context and the wider environment is necessary if the 
dynamics of closure are to be properly understood. The 
previous chapter has focussed on the environment, with 
particular reference to the change in attitudes resulting from 
the economic recession which has beset Britain since the 1970s. 
This chapter returns to the individual case-studies to 
document the remaining two levels of analysis: the implications 
of the context and the strategies employed by the various 
interest groups. 
The success of interest groups in achieving their aims vis-a-
vis closure will depend on their possession of power sources 
\'lhich are embedded in the context of a p articular closure. 
Thus the context may be more or less, benevolent to these 
interest groups in terms of the existence or absence of the 
necessary resources. The success of the interest groups will, 
however, depend on their ability to tactically use, . as well 
as possess, these power resources. It is in this 
way that context and strategy become inter-linked. 
- 233 -
This chapter focusses on the nature of these resources and the 
strategies used to mobilise them. It seeks to establish 
exactly what . constitutes power for_groups affected by 
closure, in both overt and unobtrusive terms, and to examine 
hOVI successful interest groups are. in translating these 
potential resources into explicit strategies designed to 
secure or prevent closure. 
Themes and Concepts 
The empirical research documented here focusses primarily on 
the concept of unobtrusive power. The case-studies clearly 
demonstrate - the use of strategies by management \.;hich are 
designed to persuade employees and other groups to accept the 
closure in question. Moreover, where opposition groups have 
taken a stand against closure they, too, have adopted 
unobtrusive tactics. There have been no attempts in these 
case-studies by either managers or opposition groups to use 
overt power to defeat opponents. This is not to s~ that the 
concept of overt power has no relevance for the subject of 
closure; rather it illustrates that the use of unobtrusive 
power has been an important strategy in the context of closure 
for a variety of interest groups. This, in turn, suggests that 
unobtrusive power is a valuable concept to incorporate into a 
political analysis. 
- 234 -
The successful use of unobtrusive power rests on the ability 
to establish the legitimacy of actions and decisions. The 
process of establishing le.gitimacy is important because it 
precludes opposition - a decision or action that has been 
deemed legitimate by a group or individual has, in effect, 
been accepted. In the case .... studies management devised strategies 
in an attempt to demonstrate the legitimacy of their decision 
to close and ~ts implementation in the eyes of 
potential opposition groups. Opposition, on the other hand, 
was characterised by attempts to "delegi timise" the closure, 
persuading other groups that the decision was wrong. 
Dowling & Pfeffer (1975) have suggested that organisations 
strive to gain legitimacy for their goals. operations and 
activities, as this allows them to continue unharrpered by 
outside ir.tervention. Closure is by no means universally 
or inherently legitimate. A society that has previously 
emphasised growth and full employment finds it difficult to 
accept closure, redundancy and unemployment. Furthermore, 
closure leaves people without jobs, unions with fewer members 
and communities without services. F;or these reasons, tulions J 
employees as well as the public and govel"'nments often find 
closure distasteful. If these groups are unable 
to accept closure, employers may find themselves faced with the 
possibility of resistance and all the dangers that this entails. 
Employers wishing to avoid resistance may see a need to demonstrate 
- 235 -
that their decision was a legitimate one. 
Dowling & Pfeffer (1975) argue that one way to secure 
legitimacy for an activity which does not already possess it 
is to redefine legitimacy. This process has been documented 
in chapter ten. It has been pointed out that such a 
fundamental change in attitudes is probably beyond the scope of 
an individual organisation. It occurs as the result of many 
actions on the part of ma~JY organisations \'lhich, over the years, 
gradually lead to a shift in values. 
Another alternative, according to Dowling & Pfeffer, is to 
ensure that the suspect activity is associated with norms, 
symbols and values which do have a strong base of legitimacy. 
This, to a great extent, characterises the case-studies: 
successful managers demonstrated the legitimacy of their 
actions by associating them with symbols which conferred 
legitimacy onto them. A combination of the following symbols 
or mechanisms was . used: 
a) Climate-setting was used by managers at 
Mountside and Midville. It involved establishing managerial 
credibility and good-i'rill before the closure became an issue, 
enabling trust, working relations, communication channels to 
to be effectively used when the closure arises. In the case of 
Mounts ide , climate-setting started with the appointment of John 
Oppen who instigated a general culture change to improve 
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relations between managers and stewards and to introduce 
stewards to participative management. Climate-setting at 
Midville started with the Reorganisation of the health service 
\'Then Dale and his senior managers began to extend cOITlIilunication 
and participation with employees, unions and CHCs. 
b) Tactical opportunism was used by managers at 
Andersons who were unable to engage.';in clir.1ate-setting, being 
aware of the closure only weeks before employees. To 
compensate for this they took advantage of every opportunity 
to demonstrate their good will and persuade er.tployees of the 
necessity of closure. In the case of Andersons, it led to 
managers try ing to find a buyer for the factory and setting up 
Merryvale. 
c) Consultation was used by all successful 
managers who were quick to install and utilise communication 
channels with employees, unions and other groups. 
d) Redundancy compensation was another feature of 
the successful closures. Camerons and Andersons paid amounts 
significantly above the state minimum. Midville . ".'1 as. 
constrain~d by nationally negotiated agreements but offered 
all employees the choice beu'leen redundancy or redeployment. 
These arrangements provided an incentive for er.tployees to 
accept the closure. 
e) The reasons for closure formed part of these 
strategies. Great pains were taken by all menagers to ensure 
that employees v/ere fully aware of the pressures that had 
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caused the closure. These reasons were used to vindicate 
management's decision, to absolve thetl of blame for the closure 
and to delegitimise resistance. 
Closure is an activity of dubious legitimacy but these 
mechanisms represent symbols with high degrees of inherent 
legitimacy which, when associated with a closure, confer 
legitimacy onto it and make it more acceptable. Managerial 
credibility is important - managers who are distrusted are 
unlikely to have their actions readily accepted. Climate-
setting establishes it prior to the closure;- tactical 
opportunism accomplishes the same thing but while the closure 
is in progress. It is worth noting that a ffi8J."1ager who has 
been far-sighted enough ':~o plan in advance will probably be 
sufficiently aware to seize opportunities during the closure. 
To a certain extent, the RSG at I.I01.mtside was an example of this. 
Discussions in this forum gave rise to opportunities to make 
concessions to the stewards ... IThich, in turn, ensured future 
co-operation on their part. 
Strong norms of legitimacy underlie consultation and 
participation in British industry, particularly among union 
groups. Many large "progres~ive" firms such as Cadbury Schvleppes 
and ICI have introduced particiPation schemes. ConSUltation 
is often institutionalised in the public sector - BSC has a 
number of worker directors, health authorities have an official 
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schedule for the consultation of various groups. All e:;!ployers 
are legally bOLmd to give three months notice of redundancies 
which -involve more than 100 people. 
Compensation for lost jobs is also institutionalised in the 
British legal system and, as such, is expected by unions and 
emPloyees. Terms above the legal minimum provide employers with 
the opportunity to demonstrate that they are concerned for the 
\\Tell-being of their employees. Redundancy compensation also 
represents a source of power for managers. It acts as a 
powerful inducement to accept closure, especially when it is 
iIT\Plici ty or explicitly stated that workers stand to lose all 
but the legal minimun should they resist. 
The explanation of the reasons behind a closure has become an 
important element in the management of meaning. A decision 
which is justified on the basis of acceptable criteria is 
itself acceptable. This process underlies the changes in 
attitudes regarding closure documented in the previous chapter 
- as more closures have been explained in terms of economic 
criteria, economic reasoning has beGome more acceptable, and 
closure has become more easy to justify on these grounds. 
These symbols have been used by managers to secure acceptance 
to closure. In doing thiS, actors are using unobtrusive 
measures to influence sentiments as well as achieve a 
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substantive outcOf.1e. In fact, it is by influencing sentiments 
and securing acceptance that the substantive outcome - the 
closure - is achieved. 
The Northville case is included in the following chapter because 
it represents an example of the failure of management to 
demonstrate the legitimacy of its decision. This can be 
attributed to a number of factors. The background of health 
services in Northville - the atmosphere of confusion, tension 
and antagonism lIThich had existed since Reorganisation was, 
from a managerial point of view, climate-setting of the worst 
kind. A climate of mistrust and suspicion is not the ideal 
circumstance into ,.,lhich to introduce the notion of closure. 
Management failed to take advantage of any oPPortunh~±es 
\,lhich might have enabled them to demonstrate their credibility. 
Managers failed to use consultation or flexible redundancy 
arrangements to win employee support. Northville managers 
were unable to justify their decision to close Maine Road 
Hospital on either medical or economic grounds. So, whereas 
managers in the other ca<3e-studies were able to use unobtrusive 
measures to secure a peaceful closure, Northville managers 
did not employ such measures and were defeated in their 
proposal to close the hospital. This is examined in more 
detail in the following chapter. 
The following discussion focusses on the three case-studies 
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in which managers were sUccessful in deBonstrating the legitimacy 
of their decisions and actions - I.:ountside, Midville and 
Andersons. It examines the strategies vlhich were used and 
explains their success. The responses of the opposition 
groups are analysed in the light of these strategies and in 
terms of the distribution of power bet~een the various 
interest groups. 
The analysis in this, and the next, ch~qpter relies on the 
descriptions given in the four case-study chapters. Evidence 
taken from these chapters is not alvrays repeated in detail 
because it is assumed that the reader is already familiar with 
the material. 
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CAI.~RONS I CLOSURE OF r.:GUNTSIDg 
Crunerons I closure of Mountside \'1orks is a case in \I}'hich 
management I S use of unobtrusive measures in an attempt to 
influence both substantive outcomes and sentiments proved 
remarkably successful. 
Substantive and Sentiment Outcomes 
, 
Camerons \'las undoubtedlY anxious that the closure, which \'las 
part of their rationalisation plan, should go ahead as planned. 
Rationalisation plans had been developed after the arrival 
of a new divisional chairman in 1971. Given the existence of 
this plan, Mountside was not a candidate for survival - there 
were better p laces to concentrate production. Management 
also wanted to adhere to a strict rundown schedule which would 
enable them to transfer production without losing business. 
The closure and the scheduling arrangements were, then, the 
substantive out coDes required by management. 
It was realised, hO\'lever, that this would require acceptance 
of the closure by the workforce. Any resistance could disrupt 
production and jeopardise the schedule. Furthermore, should 
disruption spread to other factories, the business of the 
division as a whole would be threatened. 
- 242 -
"\,Ie had considered the possibility of an 
outright strike. That could have been quite 
damaging c.t that point because \lIe had large 
chunks of the division's business, some of 
it perhaps not very profitable but, 
nevertheless important and important from 
the customer's point of view" (Oppen). 
Furthermore, senior mru~agers were anxious that nothing should 
go wrong which might jeopardise future closures. It was also 
Company policy to handle such matters quietly. It was 
"in the minds of senior management that it 
should happen in a careful and relatively 
painless ""'lay" (divisional manager). 
It seems clear from this that Camerons wished .to· secure both 
subs t8J.'1ti ve and sentiment outcomes. In the ir ovm words, the 
aim lJas to "marry business and people needs" (a slogan often 
quoted by managers) and for this they chose to rely on 
unobtrusive strategies. 
Climate-Sett~ 
The key to handling this closure "\fas, management believed, 
setting the right environment for change. To do this they 
selected John Oppen as the new works manager in 1971. He 
knew that 
"in all probability t nw job was going to be 
to close those works". 
It was he who initiated the culture change which built up 
trust and co-operation between managers and stewards before 
the closure. 
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"The culture of I.lountside t'lorks up until the 
early 1970s \'las highly work oriented, 
authoritarian and cost conscious. It \'ras 
hierarchic91, and rigid with highly 
controlled delegation" (managerial 
report on the closure) • 
It was not an atmosphere which \\Tas conducive to the handling 
of a sensitive issue like closure. "':There stewards and managers 
-
would have to' ;,rork together - in an atmosphere of trust. 
Consequen-tly, changes \\Tere made in the first half of the 
seventies to help managers, supervisors and stewards work 
together. It seems that attempts to introduce a new, more 
participative style of management were successful: 
"I belong to the autocratic school. I 
don't believe in asking a shop steward's 
permission to do anything. It's my job 
to manage but then, particularly in a 
closure situation its important that 
everyone knows what's going on insofar 
as they I re allowed, and you've got to 
spend a lot of time talking" (HoD) (my emphasis). 
Both managers and stewards were aware of the changes and of the 
important role played by Oppen. He was definitely considered 
to have been the right man for the job. 
"The previous works manager could not have 
done it because he was a different type of 
manager. I cun not sayi!1-e he was better or 
worse but he was the \\Trong ~"'pe of manager 
for this sort of situation" (manager). 
The ste\:lards also had a great deal of repect for Oppen even 
though he had been instrumental in closing the v/orks. 
"I rather liked him even though he did 
\-;hat he did" ( ste .. vard ) • 
appen's personal expertise is, ichen, ari important ingred~;.ent 
in the success of the unobtrusive measures used at Camerons. 
The culture change was the first step. It provided a 
foundation for the communication and participation which was to 
follow. It o~lo\,led time for teething troubles to be ironed 
out, '-and for groups to acquire experience in the new system before 
being confronted with the additional problems of closure. Such 
a foundation was all the more necessary because of the dramatic 
change involved in moving from the previous autocratic system 
to the nevI participative style essential for the closure. 
Consultation 
Following the 1975 announcement of a closure in five to ten 
years time, staff and manual working parties \<lere set up \'iith 
employee representation to study communication, individual 
and redeployment needs. Their reports were considered by 
management and integrated into the rundown procedures. 
The redeployment group recommended a redeployment manager, and 
one was appointed in December 1975. A redeployment steering 
group (RSG) was also appointed, consisting of general and 
craft stewards. It was viewed as a natural extens ion of the 
joint consultation which had previously been established. 
"AI though 1976 'VIas not a year \'ihich would 
present problems, the worl:s manager :saw 
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the need around mid-year to respond to the 
IJlish of weekly staff to be involved in the 
process of rundown, and •••• submitted to 
"'lorks cornmi ttee a draft remit for a 
redeployment steering group" (managerial 
report) • 
\I!eekly staff sa\'! the RSG as a vehicle \'Jhereby they could make 
some input into the closure and safeguard their interests. The 
RSG had 
"the responsibility for ensuring that the 
vie\'!s, ideas and concerns of weekly staff 
and of the \'lorks committee are fully 
explored and dealt with by the redeployment 
I'!lanager and the personnel department" 
(draft remit for weekly staff RSG). 
The RSG was, however, useful to management for a number of 
reasons. For example 
"although many of the earlier meetings 
proved to have therapeutic value only, the 
group did in fact do much constructive \,lork 
in identifying potential problem areas and 
recommending sensible processes/procedures 
to deal with them" (rh2nagerial report). 
The RSG also kept issues out of the negotiating frame\,lork: 
reconunendations \'Jere made to the works manager Who was 
accepted as the final arbiter. He sometimes said "yes" to the 
demands of the employees representatives but he was also able 
to say "no". This problem solving approach was far more 
flexible than a negotiating framework. It meent that, despite 
some inevitable difference of interest, managers and stewards 
\iere working together to find acceptable solutions, rather 
than bargainine from opposite sides of the table. By having 
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Oppen as final decision-maker, it meant that he could agree or 
disagree on the basis of his calculation of risk, cost end 
acceptability rather than leaving outcomes to be decided by 
the rather less predictable process of negotiation. It also 
meant that matters could be solved internally without setting 
a formal precedent which would have implications for other 
parts of the Company. The RSG allo\\fed compromises and 
concessions to be made outside the official framework. 
The stewards I spoke to· felt that they had been able to change 
things via the RSG. 
"I suppose we must have had some bearing 
on the final outcome" (steward). 
I know we changed things" (steward). 
Undoubtedly concessions were made - one year the stewards won 
the right for employees to leave to go to another job with 
full severance terms. This Vias later "exchanged" for payment 
in lieu of notice which, for some employees, represented an 
additional twelve weeks Pa.Y. The concessions were, however, 
of significant use to management in its atterrq:>t to secure a 
peaceful closure. They represented a calculated gamble which 
Oppen was prepared to take in order to win trust, acceptance 
and concessions from the stewards. Oppen acceded to the demand 
that employees be allowed to leave for other jobs with terms 
because he felt that, in 1977, the recession was worsening 
and fe\'! employees would be able to take advantage of this 
arrangement. He was right - only a handful did: 
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"in the event, however, the risk mvolved 
had been well taken" (managerial report). 
The following year's concession of payment-in-lieu of notice 
proved more costly but was still considered w.orthwhile for a 
number of reasons: it demonstrated managerial good'...,ill; it 
placated the st~TardS; and ft enabled appen to ask for 
concessions in return. 
The RSG represents an element of tactical opportunism - once 
established it '..'1as used by management to demonstrate their 
good will and credibility. 
lilt can be concluded that the RSG was a 
Ji'lassive time wasting activity since many 
of the procedures it developed were little 
used, some convoluted arguments came to 
nothing in the end; nevertheless it was a 
very useful safety valve. It allowed the 
works manager to stand back from the fray 
and act as the final arbiter and as the 
years rolled on what was achieved \'1as a 
remarkable degree of trust on both sides. 
This prevented any real industrial unrest 
occurring or the need to resort to the 
formal negotiating procedure" (managerial 
report) • 
General communication links were established with the workforce. 
A weekly bulletin'. was published and available as a newsheet 
and by internal phone. A communications centre was set up 
where individuals would find out about employees who had been 
redeployed elsewhere in the Company. Cascade information ',las 
reserved for important announcements. Individuals could also 
get information and discuss problems either by contacting their 
steward or by seeing their immediate supervisor. 
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Recltmdancy Compensation 
Another tactic adopted by Camerons \'las the provision of 
incentives to accept the closure. This was an attempt to 
reassure people that they had nothing to fear from the closure 
and could, in fact, benefit. Much of the uncertainty about 
what would happen to people as a result of the closure was 
removed by the statement on job security in January 1975. This 
sta.ted that enforced redundancy would occur only as a last 
resort. Oppen felt that such reassurance was necessary to 
avoid an initial panic reaction: 
"I really did feel that without that 
statement we would have had such initial 
reaction because the assumption '\llould be 
that people Were just going to be thrown 
out" (Oppen) • 
This does appear to have reassured employees a~d union officials. 
II\lJe lmew we wouldn't be turned out onto 
street" (manual worker). 
One union official I sp oke to s aid it \'las a significant -
factor militating against industrial action. 
This strategy was complemented by the provision of generous 
redundancy terms - t\IJ'O to three times the state minimum. \'lhen 
these were further supplemented \'Ii th payment in lieu of notice, 
people were tempted by the money. This is illustrated by the 
fact that a questionnaire in 1975, before the actual amount of 
the terms was knO"ITn, revealed that only 17'~ of workers 'vlere 
interested in voluntary redundancy and 3~1o were prepared to 
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move to stay ..... lith the Company. The fmal figures, however, 
show a very different picture (see tables 11.1, 11.2, 11.3, and 
11.4). The overall amount of weekly paid 1;lorkers and staff 
who were redeployed was only 37.5%. Only 16% of \'lorkers and 
28% of staff \'lere prepared to move outside of the local area 
for other jobs within the Company and, of these, the majority 
went to towns within commuting distance. These figures suggest 
that the redundancy compensation acted as a powerful inducement. 
"I am very conscious of the fact that the 
Company's severance terms are so good that 
you really are bribing people to leave, 
and they couldn't resist that bribery" 
(Oppen) • 
Virtually eve?ybody I spoke to expressed satisfaction with the 
severance terms, apart from one or bIO individuals who had 
long service records but who were relatively young. They felt 
they had been penalised by a packqge which tended to favour 
age over service. 
The Reasons for Closure 
Another strategy that management adopted revolved around 
explaining and justif'ying the closure. For example, the 
presentation given by Oppen to employees and later to union 
officals was 
"extreoely comprehensive. It dealt with 
the reasons for the decision to close the 
\'lorks, emphasised that the plan represented 
a balance between the needs of the business 
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Table 11.1 
Analysis. of Reduction in Neekly Paid Staff Eltmbers by Cause 
1976 1977 1978 
Natural \'lastage 35 24 7 
Voluntary Severance 16 (15.5) 54 (40) 99 (66) 
Redeployment 44 (42.7) 52 (38) 41 (27) 
Internal transfers to staff 8 5 1 
103 135 148 
Table 11.2 
Analysis of Reduction in staff Numbers by Cause 
1976 
Natural \'lastage 7 
Voluntary severance 13 (40) 
Redeployment 12 (37) 
Figures provided by the Company. 
Figures in brackets denote percentages. 
1977 
10 
14 (29) 
24 (50) 
1978 
4 
25 (50) 
21 (42) 
The total amount of \'leeklY paid staff redeployed over the 
three years = 35%. 
The total amount of staff redeployed over the three years == 35%. 
The overall total redeployed was 37.5%. 
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T~le 11.3 
Geographical Analysis of Heekly-Paid Staff Redeployments 
Numbers Redeploved 
.. 
1976 1977 1978 
Local area 34 45 37 
Huddersfield 6 4 3 
Macclesfield 1 
Runcorn 1 
Other 2 4 1 
44 53 41 
Figures supplied by the Compan,y. 
Total redeployed outside local area = 16% 
Table 11.4 
Geogr~lhical Analysis of Staff Redeployments 
Numbers Redeployed 
1976 1977 1978 
Local area 9 14 18 
Huddersfield 2 6 1 
Other 1 4 2 
12 24 21 
Figures supplied by the Company. 
Total redeployed outside local area = 2~~. 
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and the personal interests of the staff" 
(managerial report). 
The main reason behind the closure was the rationalisation 
policy of the division. The explanation of Idountside closure 
v:c:.s not, however, always presented or perceived in terms of 
this policy despite Oppen's attempts to tell the complete 
story. There had been a tendency for divisional management to 
emphasise the environment as having caused the closure. The 
environmental reasons are those associated with the position 
of the factory - close to a hospital and in the middle of a 
residential area - and the old age of the plant. 
"They (the divisd.onal., board) \'lere tending 
to put around that we were c-losi..."1.g IvIountside 
\!Jorks because of the environment - it was a 
nice easy explanation" (Oppen). 
The stewards also demonstrated a preoccupation with the 
environment. Out of the 8 stewards I interviewed, 5 mentioned 
environmental reasons alone, 2 stressed environmental reasons 
but made some reference to profitability and only 1 Sal.'! the 
reason for the closure as being linked to rationalisation 
of manufacturing operations in the division. The situation 
among employees was similar. Of 10 manual employees, all sa\1/ 
the closure as either the result of its proximity to the 
hospital or the old age of the plant. None mentioned 
rationalisation. Of 9 staff employees, only 1 mentioned 
rationalisation, the rest blamed the environment. 
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"\,Ie had ideas about the closure a long time 
ago because of the environment of the place 
- we're near a hospital. \!Je kne~ .. 1 that we 
couldn't get any more sanctions for putting 
ne\'l buildings up end putting more 
investnent in because of the position of 
the \'lorks and also the place itself. Some 
of the sheds are so antiquated t you'd have 
to rip the whole p lace out and start from 
scratch" (steward). 
"The buildings theIT'.selves were coming 
apart" (manual worker). 
tty ou 've got to move \\}'i th the times, you've 
got to develop" (manual worker). 
"It was an out of da-te place" (manual 
worker) • 
"People realised that it \lIas a bit old 
and needed money spending on it" 
(staff employee) 
"Commonsense tells me it's not in a good 
position for a chemical works" (staff 
employee) • 
It is difficult to say whether ·the stress on envirOIllnental 
factors was the result of employees' inability to understand 
the more complex rationalisation argument, whether the 
"visibility" of the environmental argument made it too seductive 
to ignore, or \,/hether managerial emphasis on the environment 
overwhelmed any other line of reasoning. It VIas probably a 
combination of these factors. \'.lhat, perhaps, is more 
important is the fact that the employees and the stewards 
accepted that the closure was necesscu~ on the basis of 
managerial eh~lanations. 
- 254 -
The enviro~.ental explanation proved to be extremely helpful 
to management in their achievement of a peace~ul closure. 
Firstly, it absolved current management of all blame - it was 
not their fault that the plant had been built at that location. 
It "'as not even their fault that investment and modernisation 
had not been undertaken in the 1950s. Therefore managerial 
credibilivJ remained untarnished - in no way could they be 
blamed for the closure. Secondly, these explanations made 
the decision irreversible in the eyes of the employees -
because the plant "'las ~ old it was easy to understand why 
the Company was unable to try and modernise it: it was simply 
too expensive. 
"Everyone appreciated that it \lIas a,"1 old 
works and changes "Jere inevitable. They 
couldn't really spend the money to bring 
it up to date because it was so very old" 
(manual \'lorl:er). 
Even if they had, the hospital vIQuld still have presented a 
problem. The hospital, in effect, delegitimised resistance. 
Many workers felt that it was morally '\:Jrong to site a chemical 
works so close to a hospital, in case there was an explosion 
Or some other disaster which \'lould undoubtedly endanger 
the lives of people inside th"e hospital. 
These environmental reasons were accepted by employees as 
justification for the closure, benefitting management by 
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legitimising and justifYing change - in the form of closure - in 
much the SD~-:1e \'lay as Pnthony Cohen (1975) argues the management 
of myths does. Cohen argues that legitimacy is a valued and 
scarce resource, the fight for which is 8.0'1. integral Part of 
political behaviour because political actors 
"use their pOi.'ler to create legitimacy for 
themselves and, if successful, may find 
themselves more pOVlerful" Cohen (1975) 
p 9. 
The management of myth is one strategy whereby legitimacy can be 
acquired. Myths have a multiplicity of functions but essentially 
they operate in one of t\iJO ways. They can be used to emphasis"e 
the continuity of society, seeking historical precedents for 
behaviour and focussing on the status quo. This, Cohen calls 
cultural extension. Cultural substitution refers to nwths which 
are used to 
"reconcile society to inevitable truths, and 
to resolve or render tolerable the contra-
dictions which appear in social life" p 13. 
By declaring that the past is irrelevant and emphasising the 
need to replace existing structures and values, the mYth manager 
is able to achieve legitimacy for change. 
At Mountside, managers used narratives in the form of the 
presentation of reasons. To some extent they were fictional: 
in their reliance on the environment .(myths 'are corrmonly defined 
2S fictional narratives). These presentations declared the 
Past irrelevant and emphasised that change was necessary and 
inevitable, thereby legitimising the closure. 
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The Context 
r.Ianagerial strategies were obviously important in securing 
acceptance of the closure by employees. These strategies alone 
do not, however, completely account for the absence of 
resistance at I'Iountside. In order to fully explain the response 
o:f' the stewards, and \'lhy management resorted to the use of 
unobtrusive pO\lTer, it is necessary to examine the context in 
which the closure took place - the balance of pOVler between the 
interest groups, the power sources available to opposition 
groups, and their ability (or inability) to mobilise them. 
The Po\ver Sources of (Potential) Op;::>0sition Groups 
'-
The ability of employees, and other groups, to contest closure 
rests, as with their ability to resist any form of managerial 
activity, on their possession and use of power sources. 
What exactly confers power on to these groups? 
Unionisation 
One obvious source of strength for employees lies in a highly 
unionised workforce. As Hyman & Fryer (1975) argue: 
"where a significant prop ortion of the 
relevant employee group are outside the 
union and unlikely to folloi'! its policies 
and instructions, or where there exists an 
alternative force of non-lmionists, the 
ability to exert effective pressure on the 
employer is considerably reduced" p 162. 
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A \'/e11 organised workforce is in a position to contest 
managerial behaviour by threatening or engaging in activities 
vlhich disrupt production: that is the basis of collective 
bargaining (Pizzorno, 1978). Unionisation is also an essential 
element in fighting closure - most forms of resistance to 
closure such as sit-ins and work-ins, demonstrations, strikes 
require an organised workforce if they are to be initiated and 
sustained. 
The involvement of particular unions may confer added power. 
Unions with a nation- or company-wide membership may be in a 
more powerful position than smaller unions lJ/ith only a local 
membership. Sone unions have a reputation for havi..ng a militant 
leadership \'lhich is inclined to confront employers. The 
National Union of r:1ineworkers is, perhaps, an example of this. 
Unionisation i$ only likely to prove a source of pQi,'ler for 
stewards and employees if they have official backing and 
support for their actions. The difficulties in contesting 
managerial decisions without official support haS been noted 
by a number of researchers. See, for example, Mathews (1972), 
Beynon (1973) and Red Notes (1978) regarding Ford, Beynon & 
\'Jainviright (1978) regarding Vickers and Ursell (1976) regarding 
BSC. Bryer et al (forthcoming) have argued that in the fight 
against closure at the Corby steelworks 
!lnational union leaders failed to Qount an 
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effective caIilj.Jaign to resist the closure" 
p 290 
and this rendered the locally led campaigns ineffective. 
In the health service, Carpenter (forthcoming) has argued t..hat 
increasing unionisation has enabled health workers to express 
discontent by tru~ing industrial action rather than in the form 
of high rates of turnover, as previously was the case. 
Furtherr.1ore greater involver;'lent at the local level by stewards 
and other members has resulted in more locally initiated action 
in response to managerial actions. 
It would appear that unionisation provides an important source 
'Of power for employees and stewards vis_8.-vis their ernployers. 
This potential source of pO\'ier has to be mobilised, however, 
by securing active official support and involveQent, if it is 
to be used successfully to contest managerial decisions. 
Wider Support 
Support on a wider basis is also likely to provide power -
supPort from other unions, the TUC, from o-~her areas of the 
Labour 1·i:ovement, from the media and froQ the public can all 
help to bolster attempts to resist managerial decisions. 
Vulliamy & noore (1979) argue that the fights against closure 
in the health service have been characterised by recently forged 
links with other areas of the Labour Movement such as political 
parties, \I/oQens' groups, tenants' association ana cOffiIl;uni ty 
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groups. BosanQuet (1979) insists that such neu'iorks exist in 
the militant "10;;11 of hec~th districts where industrial 
disruption is common. 
ues, one of the first occupations in the fight against closure, 
was characterised by widespread supPort from the TUC, other 
unions, the media and the public. 
"The UCS men were keenly aware that the 
success of the camp aign depended not solely 
on their own efforts, but on the maintenance 
of the movement outside the yards" 
Thompson & Hart (1972) p 65. 
The opposite situation has been considered by Carpenter 
(forthcoming) who suggests that the lack of media and public 
support was a significant factor in the defeat of the health 
service unions in the Winter of Discontent a'rld the subsequent 
decline in nembership levels. 
strategic Position 
Another determinant of povler, according to Hyman & Fryer (1975), 
concerns the strategic position of the workers in question -
how easily they are able to disrupt production and exert 
pressure. Print workers, for example, are in a pO'Vlerful 
position due to the perishability of their product - their 
impact is quickly felt. So, too, are assembly workers in a 
highly integrated system - if they stop work, everything else, 
\'lhich is dependent on them, also stops. 
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The situation is slightly different with closure. Pizzorno 
(1979) argues that such workers have no market power because 
there is no demand for their product, therefore they cannot 
use the strike as a weapon. This may be true of closures of 
firms uith only one factory ... Workers in such a situation may 
be relatively powerless - Lane (1981) argues that it is 
virtually impossible to prevent closure under such circumstances. 
\IJorkers do have strategic leverage, however, if the firm in 
question has surviving factories or units. In this case, 
demand for a product or service still exists and industrial 
action can be used to disrupt its production. Furthermore, 
some closures involve the transfer: of production from the 
closing unit to another - if the transfer is prevented then, 
so is production. 
A multi-plant structure may be a source of power to employees 
because it means they can disrupt production elsewhere, thereby 
putting pressure on their errployers. Such a course of action 
will, however, probably necessitate support from the workers 
of the surviving factories as their help will be needed to 
stop production. 
The above are structural sources of povler which if utilised 
successfully may enable workers to resist managerial actions. 
However, 
"the main determinants of union power are 
of ~~o types: objective and subjective. Of 
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the former, the most significant are the 
strength or density of organisation; and 
the strategic importance of the 'Ilorkers 
covered •••• power also depends on the 
manner in which workers perceive their 
situtation and interes·ts, and the solidarity 
and determination with \'lhich they pursue 
their objectives. 'Workers ".rho perceive 
no major conflict of interests with their 
employers are unlikely to organise 
effectively" Hyman & Fryer (1975) P 162. 
The structural determinants of power discussed above conform 
to the objective aspects mentioned by Hyman & Fryer. There is, 
however, another subjective element to power if workers are to 
confront their employers. This concerns the attitudes of the 
employees - do they perceive a conflict of interest and do 
they perceive resistance as the best means of satisfYing their 
interests? The question then remains which factors make 
employees more or less likely to contemplate resistance? 
Time period 
This has already been discussed in the preceding chapter. It 
has been argued that, in general terms, workers were more 
likely to resist closure in the first half of the decade as 
a pragmatic response to increasing unemployment. In more 
recent years, it was suggested that increasing numbers of 
closures have led workers to believe that resistance is not 
a feasible way of preventing closure. Furthermore, it would 
also appear that increasing unemployment has lo".rered the 
morale of the workforce, making them less likely to engage in 
confrontation. 
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Culture 
Certain organisational cultures may foster attitudes \'lhere 
either no conflict of interest is perceived by w'orkers, or 
where resistance is not considered to be a viable form of action. 
Martin & Fryer (1973) have documented attitudes in a culture 
of paternalism 'INhere workers were deferential, individualistic, 
believed in the virtues of hard work, loyalty, obediance. 
Such attitudes meant that the employees did not contemplate 
resistance to the planned redundancies announced by management. 
In a different culture, for example that noted by Beynon at 
Fords (1973), redundancies would have been far more likely to 
be greeted by resistance. 
The Membership 
The characteristics of the workforce may be significant in 
influencing attitudes to resistance. It has, for example, 
been suggested that women are less likely to fight to save 
their jobs than men in the same circumstances (Barron & Norris, 
1976; Wood, 1980; Wood & Dey, unpublished), although Hardman 
(1975) disagrees with this. 
Factors \'lhich may have significant implications for resistance 
to closure concern age and service. It is these attributes 
which are "re\'larded" by redundancy compensation. Redundancy 
payments are powerful inducements to accept closure (see 
Clarke 1979 who has argued that closures at Speke (BL) and . , 
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East Hoors (BSC) were greatly facilitated by the offer of 
increased redundancy terms). The comb in at ion of generous 
payments and a long-serving old workforce mqy represent a 
serious loss of power for any group wishing to contest the 
closure. 
Shock 
If a closure comes as a complete shock to employees and 
contravenes their expectations, this mqy evoke hostile 
attitudes to a closure and make resistance more likely. 
The fact that the neWs of closure came as a complete shock to 
workers at Brookside (see chapter six) has been viewed as 
a significant factor in the subsequent resist~~ce. 
The factors discussed above represent potential sources of 
power for opPosition groups. Both structural and subjective 
resources will have to be mobilised if resistance is to occur. 
This is true for both overt and unobtrusive resistance. An 
occupation obviously requires_ employee support and ''Iill be far 
. stronger with offical union involvement. An ~obtrusive 
campaign - designed to prove the closure wrong - will also 
require widespread- support if it is to carry anY weight. 
It would appear that usually the balance of power rests with 
management if the relatively low incidence of closure is 
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anything to go by. This may be because potential oPPosition 
groups have inadequate power resources, for example, they 
are insufficiently orgarlised, they have no strategic leverage, 
the membership is not in favour of resistance. It may be 
because power sources have not been effectively utilised, for 
example, stewards have failed to secure active union supPort. 
It may be because management's successful use of strategies 
and pO\lJ'er sources has overwhelmed any advantage opposition 
groups might have had. The aim is now to look at these 
possibilities in terms of the Mountside closure. 
The Power of the Stewards 
The stewards were the opposition group which played the most 
active role at r.1ountside a"1.d had resistance occurred it 
probably would have been initiated by them. In comparison, 
union officials played a relatively minor role and the vast 
majority of employees played only passive roles in that they 
were, indeed, affected by .the closure but they did not take 
part in meetings and discussions in the same way as the senior 
stewards. For this reason I propose'" to examine their power 
(or lack of) to resist the closure. 
""Jhen th:s divis"ional chairman first 
armounced that the \'lorks \'las to close we 
tried our utmost to get the Company to 
chan.ge its mind •••• eventually we had to 
accept the hard fact that the Company's 
case was unansi'lerable" (steward in 
Company magazine). 
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Lane (1981) argues that most cases of resistance to closure 
are initiated by ste~ards. 
Union support 
All manual \'Iorkers were members of a union. The larges t, 
covering the general workers \,las the NUGr.l\'J. The maj or craft 
union \'las the AUE\'I. Both these unions were large and organised 
on a national basis. There '\lIas in this degree of unionisation 
a potential source of pO\,Ier which was never realised because 
of the absence of official backing for any resista~ce to the 
closure. Ste\'lards had originally called their officials in 
wi th an ( albeit vague) idea of stopp ing the closure. Having 
consulted with their national leaders, the local officials 
returned for another meeting where they told their stewards 
that there l,'1aS nothing that could be done. to prevent the closure 
and it was up to the stewards to obtain the best conditions 
they could for their members; the officials \'Iere to be called 
back into negotiations only if there was failure to agree on 
a specific issue, otherwise they would not get involved. 
The union officials I sp oke to expressed the feeling that: why 
\'Iorry about this company when there were plenty of others 
giving only the statu·~ory 90 days notice and paying the minimum 
redundancy terms. Furthermore, officials, particularly those 
representing craft workers, said they had. :felt at the time that 
their members would have no problems finding alternative 
em.uloyrnent. 
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"You've eot to remember that the climate is 
totally different today in 1980. \'Ie had 
no unemployment then, or ve~y little. 
Certainly as craft Wlions \'Ie had no maj or 
problem" (local Wlion officer). 
Another factor which helps to explain the absence of union 
support for resistance , .. Jas the illness of a key AUEVJ official. 
Oppen felt that this individual was the most likely to back 
resistance to the closure but because he was ill and unable 
to attend the two meetings, he did not become involved in the 
issue at all. 
The ste\'/ards felt that, without official support, there was 
nothing left to do but accept the closure. 
"There was clearly not much we could do 
about it - only \'That we did. \lIe discussed 
whether we should take militant action and 
we carne to the conclusion that if we did it 
would just close the sates quicker, so we 
would just have to ride along with it and 
hope we could get the best conditions 
possible for the employees" (steward). 
S~rategic Importance 
Stewfu--ds were of the oP inion that ev.en if they had taken 
industrial action, it would have had little impact on 
management. However, it would aPpear that because management 
was transferring the production of some products elsei'fhere, 
they were vulnerable to any action which would have prevented 
this from proceeding smoothly. Furthermore J had stewards 
been able to extend action onto other factories the business of 
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the division as a \'lhole would be threatened. 
The stewards, however, did not think that this was feasible: 
"the other factories wouldn't; have come 
out for us" (ste'Vlard). 
At the time, however, there was a shop steward combine which, 
al though unrecognised by the Company. brought together the 
stewards from all the different factories in the division. 
This could have been used to solicit support from other plants. 
External Support 
External support \'las almost non-existent. Local papers, for 
example, contained only three short articles on the closure. 
There was no mention of it at all in the national press. The 
local MP did raise a question in the House of Commons but 
phrased it such that the Mountside closure was one small 
factor in terms of the bigger issue of unemployment in the 
North-West. Support from the community was not forthcoming -
an old. dirty chemical works in a res idential area is not a 
powerful symbol around which sympathy and support gathers 
try and save it. 
Attitudes 
The attitudes of the workforce and the stewards did not favour 
overt resistance - they were not militant men. This can be 
attributed to a number of factors. Firstly, the culture and 
reputation of the Company had, over the years, fostered loyalty 
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and moderateness amongst its employees. People liked \'iorking 
for Camerons which was reno'.med for the generous way it 
treated its workers. 
"They're a good comp ~T to work for. 
They really looked after the men" 
(ex-staff employee). 
liThe Company looks after you" 
(redeployed manual" worker) • 
"You couldn't work for a better 
company" (ex-manual worker). 
As a result of these attitudes, little in the way of industrial 
action had been undertal<:en in the past - at most, people could 
remember only one strike in the last twenty years. Furthermore 
the senior stewards were considered by management to be 
"TilOderate" and "reasonable" men and, although sometimes 
difficult, it was felt that they could be convinced of the 
logic of the situation. 
There was another factor which militated against the likelihood 
of resistance to the closure. This ''las the impact of the 
redundancy pccrments on a relatively .. old and long-serving 
workforce (see tables 11.5 and 11.6). Nearly 505; of employees 
"lJere aged 46 years or more and 57% had more that ten years 
service. Such 'ltlorkers would receive substantial payments. 
The redtU1dancy payments thus· became an inducement to accept: 
k ' d Sll "the financial carrot wor eo won er 
(nsnager) 
especially as employees believed that resistnnce \'IQuld jeopardise 
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Table 11.5 
Age Distrib~tion of J.Iountside El'!9loyees _ (%) 
Under 18 0.6 
18-21 3.2 
21-31 8.9 
31-46 39.6 
46-60 42.3 
60+ 5.4 
Table 11.6 
Service Distribution of VIountside Employees (%) 
! 
Under six months 1.2 
6-12 months 1.6 
1-2 years 0.4 
2-3 years 4.3 
3-5 years 8.7 
5-10 years 26.4 
10-15 years 28.5 
15+ years 28.9 
Figures supplied by the Corrpany. 
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the payments: 
"if 'lJle had resisted they could quite 
easily have ceme ~p \'lith the argument: 
lall right, weill give yeu the government's 
rate" ( s te,\lard) • 
This inducement was all the mere successful because, at the 
time that the clesure was an issue unempleyment W'as nov!here 
near .. as high as it is nOI:' and lecal rates \'lere nO' higher than 
the natienal average. (see table 11.7). As a result of this, 
the majority of employees were cenvinced that t..h.ey would find 
another job. In fact these feelings persisted Jeven in 1980 
when interviei.'ling teok place. 
"There I s plenty ef jobs outs ide" 
(genera.! worker) 
"I !mew I could always get another job" 
(craft worker) 
"I knew I could always get a job somewhere" 
(craft worker) 
Because ef the culture, the ecenomic climate and the age and 
service records of the empleyees, their attitudes "'''ere not 
in faveur of resistance. 
IIy ou can't put up a fight' when the menbers 
wouldn I t be \'lith you. A let of members 
would say I What the hell' s it got to do 
\-lith you - you're stopping me fron getting 
my redundancy pay I II (union efficial). 
Furtheroore, there \'laS no element ef shock to trigger hostile 
sentiments as appears to have happened at Brookside. The 
closure ef Nountside had been expected for many years. The 
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Table 11.7 
Unemployment 
Local Rate National Averag~_ 
March 1975 3.4 3.4 
March 1976 5.2 5.4 
July 1977 6.9 6.9 
July 1978 6.8 6.6 
July 1979 5.9 6.1 
July 1980 7.9 7.5 
stewards consequently found themselves without the support of 
their officials or their members for opposition to the closure. 
The Power of Management 
r~anagement possessed considerable power resources. They had 
expertise, if not in closure, in general change prograil1S 
which had been introduced as a result of j oint consul tqtion. 
Oppen personally had a great deal of expertise in handling 
people. Perhaps the most pO\'lerful weapon management possessed 
\'las their redundancy terms. It was the offer of such cash 
inducements that helped to prevent resistance. The Company 
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Table 11.8 
Company Profi t.s 
£OOO's (net profit before tax t 
ending December 31st) 
1970 161.7 
1971 148.5 (-8) 
1972 165.7 (+11) 
1973 358.1 (+116 ) 
1974 517.6 (+44) 
1975 354 (-31) 
1976 562 (+58) 
1977 505 (-10) 
1978 444 (-12) 
1979 627 (+41) 
1980 394 (-37) 
Figures from Extel. 
Numbers in brackets denote percentage change over -!:he 
Preceding year. 
year 
''las in a position to o:ffer these inducements because it was 
profitable (see table 11.8) and possessed the necessary resources. 
Furthermore, the division "'/as part of a much larger organisation. 
This provided a degree of security and allovred r:1anagers to tnJ~e 
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a loneer term vie'.'!. In this way the appointment of Oppen 8J."'ld 
the instigation of climate setting VIas r.:ade possible. 
Another source of pO\l]'er for management was the physical 
condition and location of the worl<:s. Employees had only to 
look at the age of the plant and its proximity to the hospital 
to convince themselves that the closure \I:as justified. The 
visibility of this reasons helped managecent to legitimise their 
decision. 
It would appear that the stewards were relatively poitlerless 
vis-a-vis management. It is important to remember, hO\';ever, 
that they did possess potential power sou=ces in the form of 
their unionisation and strategic position. Because of this 
management perceived a possible thr"eat. 
"\'Je were a little frightened 0= the union 
officials, particularly the AtEl'! officials" 
(OPpen) • 
"There is no doubt about it, 2.~ t.1.at time 
we \lTere very concerned about t"-:e amount of 
interchange between the stewar~s from one 
works to another" (Oppen) 
It is because management perceived a pote!ltial threat from the 
stewards and their members that they saW a need to engage in 
intricate tU10btrusive measures. In other ... ·iOrdS, because the 
ste",rnrds possessed structural sources of :;:'O"der, management 
embarked on an unobtrusive strategy desig~ed to modifY attitudes 
and sentl·men+s mal'l."ng tile mobilisation 0= t..l-}ese resources less . v, .. 
likely. 
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"\'le spent so much time and effort in trying 
to get understanding of \'/hy it happ ened and 
ho ... , 1:1e were going to ~lose it and vlhat help 
\I[e \<lere going to give, that acceptance 
became rather inevitable" (Oppen). 
This argument is supported by an exa~ination of the treatment 
of staff employees. This group had virtually no pO''ler -
unionisation was recent and m . .unbers Vlere low. In 1975 only 
ASTMS had formal negotia:~ing rights. The attitudes of staff 
employees did not favour resist8l1ce. 
"S"caff employees were tu'1likely to engage in 
industrial action - there vias no support for 
such action" (staff representative). 
Individual staff members had yet to be c~~vinced of the benefits 
of a collective 8!"Jproach, they 1tlere. quite h~')py with the 
existing system \'lhere individuals saw management personally to 
ascertain the needs regarding the closure. 
"Staff app eared to have accepted that 
the personalised approach which had been 
adopted demonstrated that the interests of 
each monthly staff person "lere being 
adequately protected" (managerial report). 
Management did not perceive a threat fron the staff representa-
tives and it appears that, because of this, they did not feel 
the need to absorb them into the consultation process in the 
same way as the ste\lTaI'ds had been. This is clearly indicated 
by the fate of the staff RSG: it \'las not established un.til 
1978 and had been disbanded by the end of the year. The ':lorks 
RSG \'las established in 1976 and continued until the closure ','1as 
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cOL1pleted. Furthermore, the staff RSG \'TaB considered unsc,tisfactory 
and unproductive by both management and staff representatives. 
It " .. ould seem that management was convinced of the need to 
involve staff representatives but had they represented a real 
threat , it is conceivable they they would have been dra'.'m into 
the consultation process in the same way as the ste'lliards were. 
The Outcome 
How successful '\lias Camerons in achieving both sentiment and 
substantive outcomes? How effective "lere the . ll."'1obtrusive 
strategies in producing favourable attitudes to the closure? 
The rundo\'m schedule was adhered to and the closure '·las 
carried out as planned, with no industrial action. Furthermore 
morale and productivity seems to be have been relatively 
unimpaired. The results sho\'J'n in tables 11.9, 11.10, 11.11, 
11.12, 11.13 
"support the subj ective view expressed 
by many that, cons idering the lCh-"g· dravm-out 
and wearing process of closing a \,lorks do\'m 
bit-by-bit over five years, morale and 
sense of humour \'1i thin the works were 
maintained at a surprisingly good level" 
(managerial report). 
Another indicator of success is the absence of involvenent 
frof.1 lmion officials \'/ho ''1ere -to be called in, ;n the event of 
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Table 11.9 
Productivi~ 
Year Quarter No. of weekly outp~t/Man 
-- paid staff x 10 
1976 1 225 213 
2 227 220 Ave == 217 3 236 208 
4 215 228 
1977 1 201 234 
2 193 212 Ave = 205 3 184 190 
4 165 182 
1978 1 150 207 
2 134 201 Ave = 205 3 99 192 
4 83 217 
Table 11.10 
Output 
1975 1976 1977 1978 
-
Total Output 
tonnes 2600 2850 2500 1300 
Output/40 hour 
man weel,;: - tonnes 3.55 3.5 3.33 4.26 
Figures supplied by the Company. 
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Table 11.11 
Customer Complaints 
1975 1976 1977 1978 
Total Number 46 28 23 15 
Number Justified 11 4 2 2 
Table 11.12 
Absence Statistics 
1976 1977 1978 
, . 
8.17% 8.05% 6.24% 
Table 11.13 
Accident Frequency Rates 
All disablins Minor 
. 
accidents accidents 
1975 0.864 52.0 
1976 0.687 61.0 
1977 2.257 53.3 
1978 0.895 51.0 
Figures supplied by the Company. 
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disagreemal1.t. All problems \'Tere solved at the local level. 
There uere only blO references to the industrial tribunal for 
unfair dismissal, both of which \'lere resolved by the ACAS> 
officer. 
Sentiments appear to have been successfully influenced. 
Everone I spoke to praised the Corrq:>any and the way it had 
handled the closure and, although the closure "'as felt to be 
IIsad ll and a "sha,i'ne". no criticism Was attached to Camerons. 
The following is a selection of statements from eJT!Ployees 
after having been made redundant or redeployed. 
"The closure was well-managed" 
(redeployed staff e%Dloyee). 
"I can understand the closure II 
(redeployed staff employee). 
"I have no criticisms of the way the closure 
was ha11dled II (general worker) 
"It Vias a shame it had to haPpen, but if it 
had to happen I don't really think it 
could have been done much better. If it 
had to happen it \'las a success" (ex-staff 
employee) • 
"I could never call the Company. I \.,as 
pleased with the \'Iay' it was done" 
(ex-manual worker). 
"It's marvellous ho,\1}' its been done. Every 
help one _ could imagine \'Ias there" 
(red'ep loyed manual worker). 
It \"ould appear that Camerons are justified in concluding that 
"the rundo\'m of the works i~-as a successful 
endeavour from both the business and people 
vie\1TpointsII (managerial report). 
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THE MIDVILLE CLOSURE 
The closure of Withybrook Hospital represents a similar stOF~ 
to fiIountside. 1,1anagement relied on climate-setting, 
consultation, flexible redund&"lcy /redeployment arrangements 
and a clear expl&"lation of the closure in their attempts to 
persuade employees, unions, the CHC, and the AHA to accept it. 
Local management was anxious to effect closure for a number of 
reasons: 
,,( i) Service planning: 
the proposed closure of Withybrook Hospital 
is part of an overall plan to rationalise 
the clinical services throughout the Midville 
district. 
(ii) Maintenance problems: 
only a minimum amount of maintena~ce work 
has been carried out at vlithybrook Hospital 
in recent years because of its uncertain 
future. 
(iii) Financial: 
Midville district's underfunding for 
1977/8 is estimated at £1,040,000. AImual 
eA~enditure for Withybrook is £343,000 •••• 
net savings will be mainly on overheads. 
(reasons for the proposed closure cited in 
the consultative document, July 1977). 
They also wanted to ensure that the good relations, built up 
during recent years with employees, unions and the CHC, were 
not endangered by this closure. In effect, Midville managers 
wished to secure both sentiment and substantive outcomes. 
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Climate-Setting 
Since the Reorganisation of the health service in 1974, the 
Chairman of the AHA (Dale), the Area Administrator (AA) and 
the District Administrator (AA) had all subscrioed to plans for 
increased consul tation with unions, emp loyees End CHCs. 
According to one local manager, the Chairman believed in 
consultation for its own slli<e, because of his political 
convictions and because 
"if you bring people in you can carry them 
along" (Dale) • 
The AA was in favour of consultation because it r:;revented 
problems from arising with the unions. 
"I've always believed that if you shy 
a\'lay from trade unions you have problems 
- so keep a working relationship" (AA) • 
The DA 1Jlas, in the eyes of one local manager, "a great one for 
the staffll. His paternalistic approach revolved around 
including and involving the unions. He had set up the District 
Management Comrni ttee in vlhich managers and union officials met 
on an informal basis to discuss prohlems. 
For a vQriety of reasons moves towards improved industrial 
relations and increased participation had been taking place 
throughout the mid-seventies - before the closure of Wi thybrook 
becaue issue - and it was expected that the closure should fit 
into this framework. without j eopardisine these relations. 
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It also meant, however, that management benefi tteci from the 
trust and cooperation \'lhich had been built up prior to the 
closure in the same way 2S Camerons had. 
Consultation 
Consultation \\]as used by Dale to \'Iin over employees J unions, 
the CHC and the public. 
"Peop Ie are compromised by the personal 
approach" (Dale). 
Dale saw himself as having played a key role in discussions \,lith 
the public, for i.'ihich he believed himself well-qualified 
because of his experience in public ~~d political life. He had 
been a member of the county council for 25 years and, at the 
time of Reorganisation, \lIas leader of his party. The 
newspaper reports of the public meeting called to discuss the 
closure in November· 1977, confirms his prominence: he was the 
most often quoted management representative. 
Consultation with the unions and the CHC were also extensive: 
"there was full consultation with everybody 
including the unions. There werebts of 
meetings. \'le told staff rather than let them 
read it in the papers. This is a general 
policy" (manager). 
Both groups felt that they had been fully consul ted, and that 
they \I[ere free to contact management should any problems arise. 
"Relations are very good here. We are told 
infor~ally - 'Look out! in a month so and 
so's Loing to happen'" (union official). 
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"We couldn I t have faulted management -
they spoke to everyone" (union official). 
Management was thus perceived by these other groups to be 
handling the closure in a respectable and fair way: in a 
legitimate manner. 
The Reasons for Closure 
Man~ement also tried to secure legitimacy for the actual 
decision to close by presenting it as a financial imperative, 
although there were other reasons why it should take place.-
"I know darn well that had we had the money 
we still would have closed it. They the 
unions and the CHC don't realise that. 
vIe were using the financial argument but 
what we were really after was rationalisation" 
(manager) • 
This argument was easy to demonstrate and prove to the potential 
opposition groups who were already well aware that the area 
was grossly underfunded. RAWP had reduced the funding for the 
region as a whole but Midville's richer neighbours received 
more than their fair share of the remaining budget, leaving 
Midville short of funds. Opposition groups accepted that 
Midville was short of fUnds and having done so, the closure 
Was accepted as a means of saving desperately 
needed cash. The rationalisation argument might have been less 
successful in convincing people of the need to close as there 
are conflicting opinions regarding the benefits of large 
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integrated hospitals (see chapter twelve for a more detailed 
discussion of this). 
The financial argument performed the same functions as the 
the environmental reasons had at Mountside. It was easily 
understandable, it justified the closure and it absolved local 
management of all blame by pinning it onto government 
expenditure cuts. This enabled management to convince the 
various interest groups that the closure was necessary. 
"I never had any fear of the AHA changing 
its mind •••• they were haunted by the fear 
of overspending" (Dale) • 
"There was no real opposition to the closure 
in the AHA, given the need to save money" 
(AHA member). 
"There was a good financial case for 
closure" (union official) 
"They just had not got the money to keep 
it going" (employee) 
"The staff knew there wasn't the money" 
(steward) 
Even the CHC 
"while opposing it in principle were 
very understanding of the authoritY's 
problems" (manager). 
In the health service, financial justification may not be 
enough to legitimise a closure if medical opinion is against it. 
Decisions which threaten medical services may be considered 
unjustifiable, regardless of the savings. For this reason, 
the opinions of doctors and consultants become very 
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important. They are the ones \'lho say whether a decision 
jeopardises medical services because they are perceived to be 
the experts by the public and the lay people (this argument 
is discussed in more detail in the following chapter). In the 
case of TJ/ithybrook hospital, however, there was no medical 
opposition to the closure. 
"The chest physicians were quite happy about 
the closure because they had new wards at 
another hosp i tal " (manager) • 
"We had been offered two new "lardS in 
anticipation of the closure, so we weren't 
losing anything" (consultant). 
"There was no medical objection to the 
closure" ( consultant). 
Management was aware of the influential nature of medical 
opinion. 
"It does help to have the consultants on 
your side" (manager) • 
"Medical opinion is very influential. It 
would have made life difficult if they had 
all been against the closure" (manager). 
The CHC was equally aware that lack of medical opposition to 
the closure hampered their chances of saving it. 
"The medics killed that hospital" 
(CHC secretary). 
Redundancy and Redeployment 
Redundancy terms in the NHS are fixed by national agreement so 
management was unable to use the offer of increased terms to 
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secure goodwill. Instead they offered everyone the choice 
b·~'bleen redundan~y with terms or redeployment in a comp arable 
jobs where efforts would be made to ensure that working 
conditions, shifts, hours were the same as those of their job 
at Withybrook. Staff were very appreciative of this. 
"Management \lIas very good about it. They 
gave people the choice of redundancy or a 
job" (employee). 
"All the staff were lucky. They had the 
choice of taking redundancy or another job" 
(emp loyee) • 
The combination of these unobtrusive measures enabled Midville 
management to secure acceptance of the closure by employees, 
unions, and the AHA. Why did management resort to the use of 
unobtrusive power? Part of the reason is that consultation 
and participation was a ma..."1agerial policy and had been so 
since 1974. Part of the explanation, however, lies with the 
response of the CHC which, although accepting that there-. was 
a financial need for it, made a formal objection to the 
Secretary of State. The opposition possessed, in this legal 
right to object, a source of power which management combatted 
with the use of the unobtrusive strategies described above. 
The Power of the 0!'"'position 
It would appear that resistance from unions and employees 
was unlike2.y at r.lidville. Their attitudes could be described 
as moderate rather than militant: 
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liThe unions Were not militant in their 
opposition" (manager) 
liThe unions are not usually militant here" 
(manager) • 
II In those days it wasn I t too difficult to 
put a point of view across to the unions" 
(manager) • 
These attitudes meant that, as a result, 
Midville had always been a relatively peaceful health area -
it was one of the "90%" dicussed by Bosanquet (1979) in which 
industrial action was rare. There had, for example, been no 
local action since 1974, and the only national activity 
ocurred in the Winter of Discontent after the closure. 
The unions did not possess the structural sources of power 
which would enable them to easily resist managerial decisions. 
The unions had no background or experience of resistance. Links 
between the differ.ant unions were weak. For example, regarding 
the closure 
"COHSE did not want our help" (NUPE 
official) • 
Thera was no network of links be.tween unions and other 
organisations which has characterised many of the hospital 
occupations in London. There was not the tradition of 
radicalism and militancy that characterised working class 
organisation in Northville. Nor was ther~ a background of depression 
and deprivation to spark off resistance. Unemployment, for 
example, was low in Midville (see table 11. 14). 
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Table 11.14 
Unemployment 
Local Rates National Averpge 
July 1975 ,3:3 4.7 
July 1976 4.2 6.3 
July 1977 5.0 6.9 
July 1978 4.0 6.6 
July 1979 3.2 6.1 
July 1980 5.6 7.8 
As a result of these factors the unions particularly COHSE, 
which was responsible for Withybrook Hospital, were not 
inclined to take industrial action. 
"We didn't seriously consider a work-in. 
There was nothing to be gained. The staff 
didn't want one" (COHSE steward). 
Despite this apparent powerlessness, the possibility of union 
action renained a serious threat for management. The problem 
for them was that the CHe had the legal right to rej ect the 
closure, in which case the final decision to close would be the 
responsibility of the Secretary of state. In view of the 
- 288 -
number of hospital occupations which had occurred in response 
to proposed closures around this time (1976-8), it was 
conceivable that the possibility of such action at Midville 
could result in the rejection of the closure by the Secretary 
of State to avoid government embarrassement. Dale aimed to 
avoid this by reducing the likelihood of militant action which 
might cause such embarrassement·. This necessitated the use of 
unobtrusive measures - to legitimise the closure and secure 
favo:).rable sentiments towards it. 
"I thought that there was a good chance of 
this being accepted by the Minister: the 
case was well made out; the local opposition 
was understandable; and there lias no real 
threat of the union behaving in such a way 
which would embarre..ss the government" 
(Dale) • 
So, in a similar way to the stewards at Mountside, opposition 
groups, although apparently powerless ,-.were perceived to be a 
threat by management which took unobtrusive measures in an 
attempt to reduce that threat. 
The involvement of the minister which resulted from the CHC's 
objection to the closure still posed problems for management. 
It was a period of great uncertainty"', not knowing whether the 
closure would be approved firstly by the Labour government and 
then by the Conservatives. To try to increase the chances of 
approval, Dale 
"took the battle over personally" 
(manager) • 
He saw the relevant ministers in both governments and used his 
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political experience to convince them of the need for closure. 
Even with these measures, managers feel that they were lucky 
in their timing. If the issue of the closure had been later 
approval might have been more difficult to secure because of 
the new Conservative government's support for small community 
hospitals like Withybrook, which began to emerge after their election. 
"This government believes in small hosp i tals II 
(Dale) • 
"Dr Vaughan Conservative Secretary of State 
for He~~ th and Social Security •••• 
suggests that the number of closures will 
be slowed by reducing the size of new DGHs 
and concentrating on 'making ,the best of 
what exists'" (Guardian P17 4th June 1980). 
This in effect would have represented a shift of pO\'ler in 
favour of the unions and other opposition groups • 
. ' 
The Outcome 
The outcome was largely successful for management alThough a 
delay of 18 months was incurred while approval was sought 
from the Secretaries of State. The unions, the CHC and many 
employees were happy about the handling of the closure. 
"Management handled it very well indeed. 
We have no complaints" (union official). 
"Everyone \'1as very happy about the way it 
was managed" (steward). 
There was, however, some bitterness on the part of some employees, 
most notably those who lived in the village in which Withybrook 
was situated and who would ;:1ave found it difficult to find 
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other convenient \'1ork. 
"\'Je're retiring because we don't want to go 
anywhere else - lIle' d have problems \,lorking 
else\\lhere in any case because there and no 
buses to Midville from where we live" 
(ex-emp loyee quoted in local paper, 
September 1979). 
"As far as We knO;"1 there are no jobs. They 
will offer you a job yes, but we have staff 
here from local villages. How the hell are 
they going to get into rf.idville" (ex-
employee quoted in local newspaper, 
October 1979). 
There ;'\las then an element of individual diss::.tisf~tion \'lith 
the closure although, on the whole, unions, redeployed 
employees and the CHC were happy with the way it had been 
handled and agreed with the need for closure. 
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M1)ERSONS' CLOSURE OF IrSULANDS 
Andersons is another success story in that management was able 
to secure the closure of their factory w:!.thout industrial 
action being taken. It is different from the two preceding 
cases, however, by virtue of the fact that UK management Was 
unable to engage in climate-setting and "'las forced, instead, to 
rely on a policy of tactical opportunism. 
The Need for Unobtrusive Measures 
. 
r.1anagement wished to effect the closure of Ne':Ilands to alleviate 
their precarious financial position of 1978 (see table 11.15). 
Managers argue that the closure was necessary to save $10 million 
on annual overheads. UK management was also anxious that the 
closure should go ahead peacefully, without industrial action 
being taken. 
One reason for this was that action which spread to other 
factories could threaten the existence of the entire Company. 
"It was quite important for the future of 
Andersons in the UK that we could handle 
the problem without industrial action" 
(UK Director) • 
. Another reason VIas that previous industrial disputes in 
British factories had earned the UK operation a bad nar.te '..ITith 
headquarters management: UK managers '-'lanted to redeem their 
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Table 11.15 
Company Net Income 
~ (US) OOO's 
1972 32,390 
1973 58,213 
1974 68,413 
1975 94,677 
1976 117,914 
1977 32,720 
1978 (256,709) 
1979 58,455 
1980 225,200 
Figures from Extel. 
Numbers in brackets denote a loss. 
reputation. 
lilt (trouble) would have hurt And ersons, 
image in the UK \oJithin the Corporation. 
It would have shown we couldn't manage a 
closure \'lhich America could do" (UK 
Director) • 
Nanagers also believed that a peaceful closure was inherently 
better than one marred with industrial action. Industrial 
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action could also have presented problems for the transfer 
of production to the French factory which would ta~e time to 
"tool Upll :for its new product. Some managers felt that the 
CoInParlY' was vulnerable at this time because it still relied on 
Nev/lands for production, so the less trouble in the Scottish 
factory, the better. 
Management tlTanted to effect the substantive outcome and 
influence sentimen-'::s. The latter was all the more imp ortant 
because of the threat the 1florkforce, particularly the stewards, 
Posed. 
The Power of the Stewards 
The stewards possessed a number of resources which put them in 
a very powerful position. 
Unionisation 
The factory was almost completely unionised with regard to 
both manual and .... lhi te-collar workers. Most manual workers were 
members of the AUE\I!, al though a few belonged to the Boilermakers f 
Union. Technical and supervisory staff belonged to TASS (a 
branch of the AUE\'I) and the clerical staff to APEX. The 
differellt unions worked: 'quite closely together, particularly 
AUEU and TASS. This is evident frem the Joint Union Co-ordinating 
Committee (JUCC), set up to combat closure, it compris~ of 
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rep~'e3entatives from all the unions. The unions had had a 
long history of negotiating with the COIT[JaIlY. The raanual 
unions had had negotiating rights since the opening of the 
factory. TASS had had such rights for clerical and technical 
groups since the 1960s and for supervisory groups Sil"lCe the 
eraly seventies. 
The stewards had- ~ active support and involvement from their 
officials at both local and national levels in their bid to 
stop the closure. Union leaders were involved in many meetings 
with manqgement about the closure. They also helped in the 
commissioning. of the acadenic studies of the closure. Stewards 
expressed satisfaction with the support they had received from 
their officials. 
External Support 
Support was forthcoming from factions outside the factory, 
most notably perhaps, from the chief executive of the local 
council and the academics who had been involved in the union 
report on the closure. 
Strategic Importance 
The ste\'1ards at Newlands were in a position to inflict a 
considerable amount of pressure on to Andersons, especially if 
they were able to extend industrial action to other U!( factories. 
There is evidence to suggest that this was a feasible 
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course of action as Ne'lIllands ste\,l2rds had good contacts \'lith 
stei'Tards froQ other factories in the UK. They had arra.'1ged 
meetings with thera- about the closure and had obtained a 
formal pledge of support from them, in the event of industrial 
action being taJ~en against the closure. 
Attitudes 
It would appear: that the 1IJorkers at Neil/lands were far more 
predisposed towards the -taking of industrial action than, for 
example, their counterparts at r.loIDltside and I,Iidville. As 
table 11.16 clearly demonstrates industrial action \'las not 
an infrequent occurrence. One of the previous confrontations 
in 1977 had culninated in a strike and lock-out which had 
lasted seven weel:s. 
If attitudes were genera.lly inclined towards industrial action, 
the depressed nature of the region could have increased the 
likelihood of resistance to the closure. High unemployment 
(see table 11.17) mc,l.de alternative employment hard to find and 
this could have led workers to try and prevent the Newlands 
closure in any \'lay that they could. 
Management perceived the ste\,lards, backed up by their nenbers 
and their officials, to be a very real threat to their plans 
for a peaceful closure in terms of both their structural 
Power resources and attitudes which made the I:lobilisation of 
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Table 11.16 
Percentage of Available Hours Lost due to Industrial Action 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
0.16 
3.88 
18.04 
0.45 
0.58 
Figur·es supplied by the Company. 
Table 11.17 
. -Unernp laymen t 
Local Rates 
July 1975 5.9 
July 1976 7.5 
July 1977 9.4 
July 1978 9.9 
July 1979 9.3 
July 1980 14.3 
National Average 
4.7 
6.3 
6.9 
6.6 
6.1 
7.8 
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these resources a strong possibility. This potential power 
is demonstrated by the initial reactions to the ne\o!s of 
possible closure. It is true that they did not ta~e any form 
of industrial e..ct.ion but thaI; is not to say that they were 
inactive. The ste\';ards I first step Has to form. the JUCC.in 
\'/hich nine stewards represented both staff and manual unions. 
This body was set up specifically to deal with the possible 
closure. They called in union officials and commissioned the 
STUC report. They arranged a denonstration in London and 
lobbied Parliament. They had meetings with a number of 
ITQnisters in both Labour and Conservative governments 
including the Secretary of State for Scotland and the Secretary 
of state for Industry. They contacted their local MP and 
members of the local council. They organised a visit to the 
French factory and made visists to other British factories 
where they solicited pledges of support. 
Ilianaeement perceived a serious threat to their plans of a 
peasceful closm"e from the pO\'1erful workforce. They sa"l -b'IO 
periods as being particularly critical: the initial 
announcement of the feasibility study and the announcenent of 
a complete closure. Management was unable to prepare for the 
former or engage in any type of climate-setting. This was 
because they knew about the feasibility study 
"only two or three weeks before the 
apnouncement was made" (UK Director). 
The initial reaction of the employees \.;as largely a product 
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of environmental forces which convinced the stewards that 
industrial action at this time vTould be futile. 
ttl don't thinK a strike or sit-in would 
have saved the situation. We've looked 
at vTork-ins at various places and they 
just didn't work out" (employee). 
This has been documented in more detail in chapter ten. 
Although management could do little to protect themselves 
against the reaction to the announcement of the feasibility 
study t they were able to take steps to prevent industrial 
action being taken at a later stage. To do this they seized 
on every opportunity to impress upon employees the benefits 
of accepting the closure Clj,:ld to demonstrate their goodwill 
and concern for their employees. 
This strategy has been called tactical opportunism. It \'las 
used in the place of climate-setting and "tTas supplemented by 
the other unobtrusive measures described in the earlier case-
studies. 
Tactical Opportunism_: 
Management used a number of mechanisr:1s to persuade people that 
a peaceful closure was their only hope, and also to demonstrate 
their good-will and credibility. Firstly there were the 
recomn1endations of the feasibility study. The study only 
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recommended that product A be transferred to France - there 
\Alas the possibility that the Company \'lould decide otherwise. 
This possibility ' .. "ould be jeopar<iised if employees took al'1y 
form of industrial action. There \'las also the possibility 
that product B would be transferred to Scotland, which again 
would be unlikely if a strike or occupation took place. 
The international and local work-searches also discouraged 
employees from tal<ing action against the closure. Errployees 
fel t that prospective customers would be frightened off by 
industrial action. These vlork--searches were started in 
August 1979 and were under way at the critical time when the 
Company announced the total closure of the factory. 
The final step \Alas Merryvale - the culmination of the \'lork-
searches. The ne\'1 sub-contracting engineering fir.::1 provided 
jobs for more than 100 ex-employees and there \'las the prospect 
of more in the future. 
These mechanisms gave hope to employees that the peaceful 
acceptance of the closure \A/ould provide some benefit in the 
farm of so~e jobs. They delegitimised any form of 
"resistance which \'lould jeopardise the chance of saving those 
jobs. 
"A fight \';ould have lost product B. A 
fight would have lost the work-search" 
(local nanager). 
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In this \'lay 
"it becomes difficult to engender an,y-
fight against the Company" union 
( official) • 
I.Ierryvale a'l'ld the work-searches 'IITere sytlbols which enabled 
Andersons to delegitimise resistance allG to demonstrate their 
good-will and concern for their employees - here was a company 
which \'las v/illing' to spend time, energy and money on trying to 
save jobs. This image is borne out by newspaper articles on the 
issue. 
"But Andersons does not want to go into the 
sub-contracting business (at Merryvale); it 
is merely shouldering its share of the 
responsibility for a cO!ll.ITlunity whose 
unemployment it has just pushed up from 9.8% 
to 12%. It has also embarked on an inter-
national work-search operation to find a 
tenant for the rest of the factory and 
pledges to sell equipment to any taker at 
a 'nominal' price" (The Engineer). 
Management tried to develop the image that they \';ere concerned 
for their employees and wanted to mitigate the effects of any 
decision they might take. 
"We are obviously very concerned at the 
social and economic imPact of our proposals 
and it was for this reason that the Company 
is proposing to transfer product B to 
Newlands rather than close the factory 
totally" (management reply to STUC report). 
It has been suggested, 'particularly by the academics involved 
in the STUC report, that the offer of product B and the Hor~:­
searches v/ere part of a premeditated strategy designed to 
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procure a peaceful closure. Management maintains that this 
was not the case. The transfer of product B, ·t;-:ey argue, \'ras 
a genuine attempt to save SODe jobs, until falling markets' 
rendered it impractical. It was suggested by one UK director 
that top management was not clever enough to plan -such 
strategies in advance. 
The work-search arose, according to management, out of a series 
of discussions \'lith stewards. The consultants acted as middle-
men, helping to mediate between the two groups. This seems to 
be a feasible explanation because the stewards had considered 
the possibility of bringing in alternative products as early 
as 1978. The JUC had put together an inventory of the factory 
and its potential with a vie\I[ to"'arc'ls bringing in al ternati ve 
products. In the union response to the feasibility study in 
January 1979 it \'las asked 
"why are there no plans for the manufacture 
of compatible alternative products?" 
Ste\'rards had suggested bringing outside contracts for spares 
in-house, introducing completely nell products to the factory, 
and developing ne~'J products for the third world instead of 
redundancy or closure. 
The facts suggest that the stewards and union officials \'lere 
thinking of alternative prodUction as soon as the feasibility 
study results were announced. If this was the case, it would 
seem reasonable to su.egest that the idea of the \'!orl~-searches 
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and r:erryvale emerged over time, as a result of managernent-
erJPloyee discussions, and were not part of a pre ..... conceived 
strategy. r.Ianagernent admits, hovTever, that it was quick to 
tcl<e advantage of these opportunities to demonstrate their 
goodwill and prevent resistance. 
"The work-search came up as an accident 
but we \lJ'ere quick to capitalise on it" 
(UK Director). 
This is what is meant by tactical opportunism - the environment 
is fixed (unlike climate-setting where it is, to a great extent, 
crea:ted), but it gives rise to various opportunities which are 
quickly seized and used to the actor's advantage. 
Consultation 
A second strategy was consultation - management produced a 
study and were then willing to discuss it before reaching a 
final decision. One reason for this was to see if the 
union could come up with viable suggestions for preventing 
redundancies. VIore imp ortantly, hO'v'Tever , it \'las to avoid 
the mistake of making a procedural error. 
"These types of things (procedural 
niceties, protoco~ could have been 
used elilotively to stir up ~e "lorkforce 
far more than disagreement on the 
substantive item. I've seen far more 
disputes brought to a head and lengthened 
by tactical or procedural errors that 
people have Iilade, than genuine differences" 
(UK Director). 
Nanagement was also anxious to avoid criticism for not 
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consulting the trade unions fully. 
The unions and stewards accepted the consultative path and 
prepared their 01lffi report having accepted, to· a great extent, 
the econoiTlic rationale provided by the Company. Unions and 
stewards thought that the only way to save the factory \'las to 
demonstrate that Ne\lTlands was an economically viable plant. 
Unfortunately, they did not have access to the crucial 
figures that were necessary to prove (or disprove) their case. 
"tIe \'lere using a method of argument 
which in the end \'Ve could never win. 
For every set of statistics we 
attacked, the Comp any Viould come back 
and produce other ones" (academic-
member of study group - in published 
article, 1981). 
For management, however, this strategy \'Ias highly successful 
in that the opposition groups were directed a\'la;;l fron more 
overt forms of action. 
"The focussing of our work on the accounts 
may have meant that other avenues were 
not explored" (academic in published 
article, , 1981) • 
In this way, the dialogue which arose around the studies helped 
to defUse the issue so, although union officials believed at 
the time that this strategy was the only way to save the 
factory: 
"it is possible that the contribution 
we made helped to reinforce, quite 
inadverten'tly, a strategy "[[lich, in 
the end, has produced the closure 
of that factory II (academic in 
published article). 
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There \'las one dra\'1back of this strategy for management. 
Because key figures \'lere kept confidential, management \'las 
unable to clearly demonstrate the need for the closure. 
This made it difficult for Andersons to .legitimise their 
decision to close Newlands as the discussion below indicates. 
Redundancy Compensation 
Redundancy payments \'1ere t".ro to three times the legal 
minimum. The academics felt they proved to be too powerful an 
inducement for the old, long serving \'lorkforce (see tables 
11.18 and 11.19). Over 55% of hourly paid and 60% of staff 
were aged 45 years or more. I'lore than 25% of hourly paid and 
48% of staff had over 20 years service. A large proportion 
of the \'.Torkforce would derive substantial benefit from the 
redundancy terms which rewarded age and service. \'Jorkers 
were tempted to accept, especially as they believed that the 
terms would be withdrawn in the event of resistance .. 
"\'.Ie might have gone on strike but it 
wouldn't have done any good - we 
might have lost out on redundancy 
pay" (employee) • 
This considerably \l1'eakened the power of the ste\·,ards because 
it meant that their members would be less likely to support a 
strike or occupation in case it threatened their C01il>ens:ttion. 
This is borne out by events at Andersons' closure of their 
factory at NortO\ffi, where the threat of reduced redurldanc:)' 
payments induced \'rorkers to end their occupation and return to worl~. 
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'~. ) \ TE.hle 11.18 
Age Distribution (56) 
Years Hourly Paid staff 
55-65 26.59 26 
45-54 29.09 35 
35-44 22.66 17 
25-34 16.58 9 
16-24 5.08 3 
. Table 11.19 
Service Distribution (5~) 
Years Hourly Paid Staff 
25+ 16.84 35 
20-24 9.67 13 
15-19 19.66 17 
10-14 20.08 17 
5-9 17.00 8 
1-4 16.17 9 
less than one year 0.58 1 
Figures supplied by the Company. 
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The Reasons for Closure 
I,Ianagenant had only limited success in convincing opposition 
groups of the need to close Newlands. T~anagers argued that it 
was to save money and that, given market conditions, dual 
sourcing \'\Tas not justified. The union report, however, 
maintains that 
"the inclusion of Newlands in the cost-saving 
action prograffiQe is a cosmetic exercise 
designed to placate the financial institutions 
and reassure the investors who have seen their 
share values drop by two-thirds in less than 
two years •••• 
The crisis is not centrally one of markets 
or of excess capacity , although these problems 
do exist. The reason for the precipitate 
search for a means to actually close a plant 
lies in previous bad management decisions •••• 
and pressure froQ international financial 
institutions" (lli1ion report). 
Management replied to this accusation by asserting that 
"no-one in senior management is tr:ying to deny 
that there has been some element of management 
error in the current problems'but I fail to 
see ho\'\T that should be a reason for not taking 
those actions that are necessary to return the 
ComPany to profitability and so protect on a 
long term basis the jobs of the majority of 
employees" (management rep 1::," to the unions). 
Whatever the reasons, the closure or NevIlands was, according 
to management imperative. They were, hO\lJ'ever, unable to convince 
their employees of this partly, perhaps because the arguments 
\'lere complex and partly because the figures which could prove 
their case Vlere kept confidential. 
"I couldn't possibly agree with the decision 
to era to ?rance" (section leader). 
c:> 
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"They shouldn't have closed the factoryJl 
( 1 athe turner). 
1.1 thoueh u..llable to fully legitimise their decision to close 
I'Ie.'!I2.l1ds, managenent did have Some success in explainL.'1g the 
precarious :financial position of' the Company and, to some 
extent,· this delegitimised resistance. 
"The unions were worried that if' they pushed 
too ha..1"Cl there \\Tere 20 J 000 jobs in the UK 
at st~<e" (manager) • 
Symbolic Errors 
r,Ianagers at f.ndersons made some symbolic mistakes which could 
have j eopardised the success of their strategies ~ ~.Iost notable 
of these, perhaps, was the early completion of the fea.sibility 
study. It \V'as annolmced in September 1978 that the study would 
ta1-<:e three months, but it reported back in November. This made 
stewards and officials suspicious. 
"For them to do a feasibilivJ study in such 
a short time \'las impossible" (steward). 
They became convinced that it \'las a "cosmetic exercise" 
designed to prove a foregone conclusion. r.Ianagement ens-Jlered 
this charge by saying that they simply put more man-hours in, 
in order to have the information sooner and put an end to 
~ . ty uncer",a~n • This does not appear to have been accepted as 
all the ste\'Jards and officials I s~ol;:e to remained convinced it 
\'las a sha..'"i1. It r.:~ht have been better for management if they 
had tab2n longer: the symbolic value of which \llould he"/e been 
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to reassure their employees of the integrity of their actions, 
despite having to 'wait loneer for the results. 
A second ex amp Ie "'las the refusal of management to allo\'[ t!'ade 
union participation in the study. This aroused suspicion that 
managerilent \'Jere hiding something. Andersons did not wish to 
involve the unions because of the confidentiality of their 
figures but, had they been involved, the closure might have 
been more acceptable to them. 
"Andersons has a traditional position - they 
make a decision and the union agrees •••• I 
thinl~ they made a mist~·:e. If they'd come 
to the same decision '\',-ith union involver.lent 
it \'lould have been easier to accept" 
( official) • 
In the use of unobtrusive povler, the management of meaning 
becomes very important - the abilit"J to influence perceptions 
is the key to success. In these e.'Xamples, hO\'l.ever, management's 
actions rendered them unable to influence perceptions in such 
a, '-Nay that 1.1as advantageous to then. 
The Outcome 
Desp i te these errors, r.1.cmagement' s strategies enabled ther:l to 
close I~e\'llands 'without industrial action occurrin.:?;. Furtherl"!1ore J 
in the eyes of many people, l"!1anagei':'.ent earnt itself cOIl.3iclera0le 
credibility and praise for the \'lay it had ha.Zldled the closure, 
p2.l"'ticularly for the iT 20' it had set up IoIerryvale. 
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"I believe that there was some sort of 
social conscience, if you can believe 
that in a multi-national corrpany" 
(steward) • 
"They accepted their social responsibility 
- they had a conscience" (local council 
official) • 
"I think they did try not to leave the 
place with a hostile relationshiP" 
(union official). 
ItWhen Andersons decided to close its plant 
at Newlands in Scotland it did not just 
abandon its workforce. Instead it got 
together with them and tried to find a' 
new use for the factory, so that Andersons 
would not leave its workers without jobs 
in an area of already high unerrployment" 
(Engineering Today). 
These sentiments did not, however, extend to mal'1Y or the people 
Who had lost their jobs as a result of the closure amongst 
which there was considerable bitterness: 
"they should have paid more money" 
(ex-emp loyee) • 
"Andersons wasn't fair" 
(ex-employee) • 
"They ,'rere ruthless" 
(ex-employee) • 
"People have been sold short" 
(ex-employee) • 
Al though the officials and stewards thought the Corrp'any had 
acted humanely in tryi~ to save jobs, they still felt that the 
closure had been unecessary. Itwas, perhaps, this inability to 
accept the reasons behind the closure which led to the rumours 
that intervention by the French goverThuent had been the real 
reason why lmdersons had moved production to France. 
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CONCLUSIOU 
These three cases represent managerial success in implementing 
a closure decision without incurring overt resistance. To 
achieve this man~ers used a combination of unobtrusive 
measures designed to impue' their actions with legitimacy. 
Consultation, climate-setting, tactical opportunism, flexible 
redundancy arrangements, generous compensation and the 
explanation of the reasons behind the closure were used to secure 
legitimacy for the closure and credibility for management. 
Such complex strategies were used because manqgers perceived 
a threat to their plans from opposition groups. At r.1ountside 
and MidVille although opposition groups appeared to be 
relatively powerless, they had access to potential power 
sources: the CHC's formal right to object at Midville; the 
possibili ty that the division's business would be disrupted at 
Mountside. At Andersons, the stewards' history of industrial 
action indicated that they presented management with a very 
real threat. Unobtrusive measures w.,?re used in all these 
cases to render the mobilisation of these resources by 
opposition groups less likely. 
Expertise in the ability to use symbols effectively enough to 
influence perceptions, attitudes and sentiments constituted a 
source of power for managers. Such expertise was clearly seen 
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in the actions of D ale and Oppen. The symbolic errors r:1ade at 
Andersons , perhaps, PODlt to slightly less expertise in the 
ability to manage meaning. Their lack of success in convincing 
interest groups of the need to close Newlands is another 
indicator of this. They were not helped by the complex 
arguments involved in the decision, or by their desire to keep 
key figures confidential.. Managers at Mountside and Midville 
benefitted from powerful symbols in the form of understandable, 
visible and acceptable reasons which justified the closure: 
the environment at Mountside; the e)..'J)enditure cutbacks at 
Midville.. Another source of power for managers was redundancy 
compensation which was used to induce workers to accept, leaving 
stewards without the support of their membership. 
The three cases demonstrate differing degrees of success in the 
achievement of sentiments and substantive outcomes. Camerons 
was by far the most successful: the closure went ahead 
according to schedule and there was an almost complete absence 
of bitterness. Midville managers secured their closure but 
were delayed from doing so for eighteen months. Feelings 
among the majority of interest groups were favourable towards 
the closure and management's handling of it but some individuals 
who lost their jobs did display dissatisfaction and bitterness. 
Andersons managed to secl~e a peaceful closure but at the 
cost of Merryvale. Sentiments among stewards and officals were 
ambivalent: on the one hand they praised the Company for trying 
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to save some jobs, on the other they remain unconvinced of the 
need to close Newlands and they still believe that the study 
\'Jas a sham. Furthermore, al though ex-employees lIJho lIlere 
employed at r.Ierryvale are grateful to the Conpany, workers \'Iho 
lost their jobs are very bitter. 
These outcomes can be seen to be the result of a number of 
interacting factors. Obviously, the ability to use unobtrusive 
pO'ller plays a large part.. Different degrees of success at 
Moantside -and Andersons can be attributed to differences in 
the degree of expertise in the management of meaning. 
Unobtrusive strategies, however, are evoked in response to a 
perceived threat from opposition groups. So the overt power 
resources of opposition groups can initiate unobtrusive measures 
and the degree of the threat may have implications for the 
nature of those measures. Andersons, for example, may have 
been willing to make significant concessions because the stewards 
were so powerful. Oppen says (p. 6.25) that had the union 
officials been more actively involved, a greater threat \'lould 
have been perceived and greater concessions might have been 
made. 
Another important element is the perception of their power by. 
opposition groups as this determines their actions which, in 
turn, have a bearing on the outcome. So, for example, the 
actions of the CHC delayed the closure at I·lidville. stewards 
at Nm'llands perceived themselves pO""lerless to take overt action 
- 313 -
resorting, instead, to the unobtrusive strategy which helped 
to produce r.Ierryvale. Had they taken overt action the outcome 
would have been very different as the Norto'l.'1n example indicates. 
The perceptions of pO\,ler by opposition groups may be influenced 
by the unobtrusive strategies of management. but.they are also 
linked to the power resources they actually do possess, past 
experience vis-a-vis management, the culture and other 
contextual factors. 
The eventual outcome is thus a result of many inter-related 
processes and although this chapter has concentrated on the 
use of unobtrusive power, it is important to remember that 
this is closely linked to the power resources of the various 
interest groups and the context in which the closure takes place. 
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Chapter Twelve 
NORTHVILLE: A CASE OF IilAlJAGERIAL FAILURE 
The previous cha..uters dealt with varying degrees of managerial 
success lJ/here the aim of peaceful closure was achieved. The 
Northville closure is an example of ho\'1 managers in the health 
service failed to secure the closure of a hospital. These 
managers, confronted with effective opposition and without 
the support of any unobtrusive strategies of their O\ffi, were 
unable to legitimise their case for closure. 
Sentiments and Substantive Outcomes 
Managers in Northville wished to close Maine Road Maternity 
Hospital because of the falling birth rate. The closure of a 
complete hospital, rather than closing \'1ards within a DGH, 
was an added attraction because of additional savings on over-
heads which would help to alleviate the press ing financial 
problems which had arisen as a resul't of the RAiJlP formula. 
"Prompted by the fall in the birth rate and 
the effects this has had in recent years on 
the demand for obstetric services •••• and 
at a time of severe financial stringency •..• 
the continued ret~ntion of existing facilities 
cannot be justified and the AHA has decided 
that there must be a rationalisation of 
services" (consultative document, September 
1976) • 
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I,:anagenent a~ tlorthville had a substantive outcome \'/hich they 
\'Jished to secure but it appears they \'lere rather less conscious 
of any need to influence sentiments. As the Lidville case has 
shown, the managers of a health authority have to deal with 
a complex nev.'.Jork of interest groups: unions, CHCs, ern;>loyees, 
the AHA, the DHSS ~ the public. Anyone of these groups nay, if 
they oppose the closure, have the resources to force a change 
of strategy. For example, the CHC can formally object, the 
AHA can ignore management recommendations, unions caJl. strike. 
As a result of this managers need to be sensitive to the views 
and feelings of these groups. This was all the more irnport81'J.t 
in Northville where opposition groups had a history of 
confronting man~~erial decisions. 
The Power of .-She oppos~tion 
Northville represents a complete contrast to I·Tidville in terms 
of the power of the unions and the eRC: here they possessed 
considerable resources of power. 
Attitudes 
One significant difference betw.een the t.t/o health areas \'Ias in 
attitudes -if the stewards and officials at IUdville \tlere 
described as moderate, those at Northville \'Iere militant. 
There had been a history of confrontation bev.'/een unions and 
li1Man ement nt Northville as chapters nir..e and ten have sho\·m, 
c, 
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and there had been specific protests against the cutbacks in 
the service prop osed in 1977. These attitudes \'/hich \;G~e 
inclined towards the taking of industrial action, were the 
result of a number of , __ factors. Bosanquet (1979) has argued 
that industrial disruption in a health area is linked to 
mili taJlcy in the area as a \'lhole. In Bosanquet I s terns Northville 
WeJ3 one of the 10% - a militant health area situated i-l"l a city 
with a long history of \I/orking class radicali:3m. These 
traditions \'lere fuelled by the depressed nature of the area. 
Unemployment, for example, waS about twice the national 
average (see table 12.1). Furthermore, as the Committee of 
Inquiry points cut 
"the proportionate contraction in population 
has increased each decade and between 1961 8..Jld 
1971 was 20.8%" 
It also mentions that Northville has a higher proportion of 
"semi-skilled, unskilled and unemployed 
workers and a lower proportion of 
professional and managerial workers. 
There is a lOi/Jer level of O\,ffier occup ancy 
in housing and a larger proportion of 
d\'lellings with outside toilet facilities. 
There is also a higher proportion of elderly 
people, of single homeless and single 
parent families" 
Vlith rezard to the health service there \'/as considered to be an 
imbalance between primary and secondary care which led to a 
"strongly held view that over-bedding •••• 
should not be tackled until there has been 
sufficient improvement in the quality of 
community care services" (Conmittee of 
Inquiry) . 
- 317 -
Table 12.1 
Unemployment 
Local Rates National Avera..se 
July 1975 9.6 4.7 
July 1976 11.8 6.1 
July 1977 12.8 6.6 
July 1978 13.1 6.9 
July 1979 12.7 6.3 
July 1980 14.7 4.7 
The deprivation of this area combined with the background of 
militancy meant that employees and other groups associated ''lith 
the health service were inclined to resist m~~agerial decisions 
which threatened their services. At such times opposition 
groups were able to mobilise the structural sources of their 
power in the form of strong and supportive unions and the 
network of contacts with other groups such as CHCs, ten&!ts' 
associations , community groups and political p a::'ties. It also 
appears that these eroups were able to solicit coverage and 
SupPort from the local media. 
Opposition groups possessed both subjective and objective pO·,'fer 
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resources which they used effectively' against nanagement. This 
is der~.:.nstrated by the 1977 protest \'lhic.'l secured the Committee 
of. InC!uiry. In light of these previous confrontatioI.3 mana..1;ement 
should he:ve been aware of a very '.real- threat to their closure 
plans and, perhaps, paid mo:re attcution. to influencing sentiments, 
mobilising unobtrusive pOlffer to gain' acceptance for their policies. 
7he Absence of Unobtrusive strategies 
Northville managers failed to use ~r forQ of unobtrusive 
power to demonstrate the legitimacy of their decision, of the 
way it was to be handled, or their own credibility. 
Climate-S ettin<0 
A climate had been set prior to the closure but it was not one 
that was conducive to a peaceful closure. The Committee of 
Inquiry has stressed the inadequacy of the industrial relations 
at Northville and criticised the way management had handled 
previous decisions. The resulting distl~ust and suspicion 
meant that nanqgement had destroyed its credibility in the 
eyes of employees, union officials .and CHCs; most of whom 
were unanimous in their criticis~ of management. 
"To the people of Northville it seemed as 
thouo-h the PJIA was determined to bring the 
b 
local health service to its knees by a 
process ofattri tion" (CHC secretaI"J in 
published article, 1979). 
"The left hand doesn't lr.no'!,·' what the 
right hand's doing" (stel'iard). 
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liThe AHA is bc.dly administrated. I have a 
lU:i opinion of the average officer there" 
(union official). 
liThe lillA is consistent in disp.laying a 
remarkable perversity to change its mind" 
(union official). 
"Management \'las very naive about the '\Jlay 
they handl~d staff" (steward) • 
Furthermore past decisions such as the nev! DGH had been greeted 
w.ith derision. 
"The hospital had beco~e a national scal'1.dal" 
(CHC secretary in published article, 1979). 
"The hospital is a bloody disaster. It's 
not the way people \'l;mt to be looked after" 
( consultant). 
As had the move to a single district: 
"The fight for single district '\t18ste~ tine 
and created bitterness" (manager). 
The move to single district has worsened 
industrial relations" (ste'.vard) 
"Perhaps the clearest illustration of the 
M~A's self-inflicted problem is the single 
district problem" (CHC secretary in 
published article, 1979). 
The climate which had been set in Northville was not one which 
was conducive to dealin.z \oJith sensitive issues like- closure: 
mistrust existed beul/een unions and management; managerial 
credibili"bJ was low; and the principle of cuts in health 
services was not accepted by opposition groups. Furthermore 
these groups were in a powerful enough position to oppose the 
closure. They possessed the power resources necess2I'Y for 
overt confrontation and, as we shall see, they were abJe to mOW1t 
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a highly effective campaign, designed to delegitimise the 
closure. 
Tactical Opportunism 
Because management failed to address the question of influencing 
sentiments they also failed to recognise opport1..mities which 
might have helped them gain legitimacy for their actions. 
For exenple, they did. not use the media to publicise and 
promote their case for closl~e. 
"The ATO did not make use of the press. 
They thought a rational debate in the 
council chamber would suffice" (manager). 
Another' tactical error occurred when management missed an 
opportunity to split the·opposition by presenting the two 
alternative courses of action: close Maine Road or close wards 
in the other hospitals. Some of the supporters of Maine Road 
lived near or had some other interest in the maternity \'1ards at 
Sackville General and King Street Hospitals, had they been a\'iare 
that these \'lards would close if I'.raine Road was retained, they 
might have been less willing to lend their support. This 
might have diminished the opposition. to the closure. r.Ianagement, 
hO\';ever, failed to take advantage of the opportunity. The 
1976 consultative document makes no mention of a second option. 
The supplement mentions the option only as 
"alternative courses of action which the 
authori ty has cons idered and so far 
rej ected" (supplement to the consultative 
document, filarch 1977). 
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It is not until the minutes of the special meeting called to 
discuss the closure in July 1977 that the two courses of action 
are presented as alternative options. Until this time many of 
the public and the staff in the three hospitals l.'lere una\4Tare \ 
of the consequences of saving Maine Road. 
Redundancy 
Redundancy never really became an issue at Haine Road but it 
has been pointed out by a manager familiar \'lith both health 
authorities that, l.'lhereas Hidville managers had produced 
a document before the closure stating that the utmost would 
be done to ensure ma~imum benefit for er.ployees, no such 
assura..Y1ce existed for Northville employees. 
Consultation 
Consul tation regarding the closure \41as not brought up as a 
specific complaint in interviews but strong reservations 'I:Tere 
expressed regarding management's general reluctance to share 
information. 
IIYou find out more by reading the paper" 
(steward) • 
"Management says in effect 'I \'lill consult 
with anyone as long as you 1now I've already 
made I!\Y mind up'" (ste\'lard). 
This lack of consultation was also noted by the Committee of 
Inquiry (see chapter nine) and it undoubtedly had a Garae:.::;ing 
effect on the credibility of management. 
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The Reasons for Closure 
r.Tanagement failed to convince anybody - the er.rployees, the 
unions, the CHes, the public or the AHA that the decision to . 
close r·Iaine Road was justified. even though they had comrni tment 
to the general principle of the ra.tionalisation of beds. They 
were unable to convince interest groups of both medical and 
financial reasons for closure. 
I.1edical reasons are, as one would expect,· c a powerful influence 
in the health service with regard to both the public and the 
AHA. 
"The medical network is pO\'lerful" 
(manager) • 
"It i3 difficult to challenge their 
views as laymen" (CHC secretary). 
The agreement of consultants and doctors can legitimise an 
argument \v'here irrefutable reasoning is hard to find. The 
closure of loss-making units in a free-market/capitalist 
economy is far easier to justify than the closure of hospitals 
where lives and emotions are at stClke. General. medical 
principles \'lhich might be used to guide policy decisions have 
a habit of changing over time. For example, the policy of large 
integrated hospitals was stated in the 1962 Hospital Plan and 
the 1967 Bonham-Carter Report, calling for 1500 bed hospitals. 
ThiS, hO\,lever, has been recently turned around by the current 
Conservative Government \'lhich is in favour of small COJil.muni ty 
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hospitals (see Dean, 1980). There is then, no cbsolu-ce 
right or 'I11rang with many medical argurnents and what nay be 
perceived e.s right may be those actions vlhich receive the 
'largest amount of medical approval. 
In the case of the closure of Maine Road, one very visible 
and voluble consultant, working at the hosp i tal, allied 
himself with the opposition. He emerged as a public figure 
appearing in several press articles, on TV and at the public 
meeting. This consultant's opinion Vias reinforced by other 
medics. A neW consultant on the AHA attended his first 
meeting on 23rd August 1977 \'lhen the vote to retain Eaine Road 
Was tal-<en. It appear's that he 
"helped to make them (the AHA members] 
change their minds. He made a significant 
remark: 'If you close a hospital you 
can't l'e-open it so you are losing options 
but it you close 'I.·lardS you can al\'1ays re-
open them·. I feel that this influenced 
a lot of members when they voted" 
(CHC secretary). 
Furthermore the Professor of Surgery, also an AHA member, 
was quoted in the press as saying that he \'las 
"\lTorried that the staff would be unable to 
cope if Maine Road patie~ts were transferred 
to King Street. About half the staff at 
Ji:aine Road 'l.'Jere undergraduates at the 
University and if this teaching centre 
\,Tas closed they would have to do practicru. 
training (outsic.e the citiJ". (local 
press article, July 1977). 
I,!edical opinion thus appeared to be unaniraous in its support 
for the retention of Eaine Road. This made it difficult, if 
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not impossible, for maJlagement -Co nedically justify its 
proposal to close Eaine Road. 
"I think the situation vlould have been 
different ~I the medics hac~'t been against 
closure" (UJ.""1ion official). 
Some managers felt that they did not sufficiently i~ress the 
financial motives on other groups. This may be true of the 
first consultative document which only mentions financial 
pressures as determining the spe'2!d of the closure. By the time 
of the supplement, however, far more emphasis was being placed 
on financial criteria. 
"The current rate of revenue expenditure 
will probably lead to an overspending 
currently estimated at between £~~: million 
and £1 million per year. To rectifY this, 
the Authority will have to reduce its 
expendi ture by at least double the anount 
during 1977/8. The long term consequences 
of repea~d overspending are self-evident 
and the requirement to trim the budget 
paramount. The Northville trend of the 
falling birth rate is reflected nationally, 
and the present surplus obstetric facilities 
represent an illL~ecessary fin&~cia1 
comm.i tment that cannot be avoided" 
(supplement to the consultative document, 
March 1977). 
This document recommends the closure of Haine Road because the 
termination of in-patient services will save an estimated 
£555,000 per annum. By the time the ~{o alternatives are 
being considered the criteria are purely financial: 
"the overall saving in runnin,:;; costs from 
the adoption of option (2) rthe closure of 
the wards at Sackvi11e and King Stree£] 
\,lou1d be Significantly lst.s than that uhich 
\vill accrue fror.1 the closure of I.laine Road 
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by a nargin of· aproximately £;~ million 
per e.rmum" (docuoent assessin-:-r the tvlO 
options, August 1977). 
Despite this emphasis of f'inance by management, the case for 
closure 'was not accepted by other interest groups. It is 
doubtful whether, in Northville, financial arguments constituted 
legitinate justification for the reduction of services. There 
had already been the 1977 protest qgainst cutbacks despite 
the-ofact that 
"the introduction of financial constraints 
was a resp onse to interim RAvlP and cash 
limits. It was a response virtually imposed 
upon the AHA, and one that other AHAs have 
had to make in many regions in the country" 
(Committee of Inquiry). 
The lack of acceptance for financial considerations can be 
explained by the fact that. in the eyes of many, Northville 
consituted a special case because of its high une~loynent, 
urban decline, poverty and inadequate primary care. For these 
reasons, and the fact that the health service is usually 
vieVled as providing a service and no~ making a profit, 
financial arguments lacked credibilivJ. 
"NUPE is alVlayS opposed to closures on 
financial grounds - they probably put too 
QUch weight· on . ,finance " (IruPE official). 
Finance, then, VIas not a viable symbol \'lhich management could 
use to vindicate its decisions in the way that rUdville 
managers had done. 
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Because of their failure to use both nedical and financial 
~gurnents to j ustif'y the closure, management was unable to 
legitimise their proposal in the eyes of the employees, unions. 
CRGs and public \'lho campaigned against the closure, and the 
AHA who voted for retention. 
"There has got to be a very \'lell-argued case 
for closure, people need convincing. They 
are going to have to be satisfied that the 
reasons for the closure are credible" 
(manager) • 
The Opposition's strategy 
If management failed to secure legitimacy for their policies 
it was partly due to the absence of any unobtrusive strategy to 
influence sentiments, it was also due to a highly successful 
campaign by opposition groups to delegitimise the closure and 
\'lin a reprieve for the hosp i tal. 
The opposition canpaign was initiated by the Action Committee 
\'lhich consisted of employees from the hospital. They teok a 
conscious decision to employ tactics which \v-ere designed to 
persuade rather than force a change of heart. This involved, 
to a large degree~ excluding the lli'"1ions. 
"If the decision (by the .L\HJ~ had been .. to 
close \'Je would have gone along \'Ii th it. 
Vie wouldn't have had a sit-in or 
an,ything" (employee - memoer of Action 
COf,lIni ttee) • 
"They (the sta:r:-t) \'lere put under a lot of 
pressure to join in with the left wing of 
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either political parties or unions. 
The unions ','lanted to [lOVe in al1d they 
steered clear of ther.1 11 (CRe secretary). 
The air.1 of the Action Committee \'12$ to mobilise \'lidespread 
public support 'which in turn, they hoped, \-1ould put pressure 
on the AHA. A highly visible presence might have alienated 
the public. 
The cultivation of widespread support proved to be relatively 
easy because the opposition were able to make use of a nuraber 
of pO\'J'erful symbols. The hosPital itselI'"' "las a symbol \-lhich 
engendered support. 
"The hosp i tal had emotional app eal" 
(steward) • 
It was the largest maternity hospital in the UK, many local 
people had either been born there or had their babies there, 
it had survived the Blitz, and its output consisted of 
appealing new-born babies. Such factors may not carr-j much 
weight with managers but they undoubtedly attracted the public. 
Consequently 10,500 people signed a petition. The media 
picked up the story and members of the Action Conunittee 'VIere 
interviewed by local radio and TV. There "'las a fI\lorld in Action" 
prograw~e on the closure. In 21 press articles, members of the 
opposition ",'jere referred to by naIile 33 tiTJes, as opposed to 
16 references to individuals in favour of the closl~e. The 
emotive a..Dpe8~ of the hospital \'las enough to legitimise 
case for retention in the eyes of the publi~. 
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7he success 0: the Action ComrJittee in securing the suppor-c of 
the pubLic resulted in combined pressure fro~ the public. 
ll.T1ions, enployees, medics and CECs for the retention of I,laine 
Road. The fact that the AHA bowed to this pressure, ignoring 
the recommendations of its manc.Jgers, ca.,. only be fully 
explained by referring to the composition of the AHA and its 
relation to local politics. It was here. perhaps, that the 
opposition+s most significant source of pOlITer \'!as to be found. 
The MiA and Local Polit~cs 
The AIiA in Northville appears to be particularly vulnerable to 
public pressure. 
"They (che .AJIA) were not prepared to do 
somethlng that \'J8S So unpopular" (manager) • 
It has been suggested that the reason for this lies in the 
fact that the councillors (liTho make up one third of the 
me8bership) are keen to champ ion public causes. This is because 
there is no clear majority in local government and councillors 
are looking for caUses that will help them to win votes. Their 
substantial representation of the NIA means that 
"if they decide to turn up in force they 
can reverse any decision" (AHA member). 
The belief emong r:lany managers is that 
"it was opposition '0:' the cOUJ."lcil that 
finally persuaded the AHA to go along with 
retention" (manaeer ). 
- 329 -
It W:?$ certainly the case that there was no clear cut majority 
in local politics. 
"Ho other major cit-y in Britain has suffered 
the fluctuating coalitions and p oi;.Jer vacuuDS 
\'ihich Northville has experienced in the last 
eight years. In no other city has the 
balance of power bet'l:leen Liberal, Labour 
2nd Conservative been so keenly spread" 
(article in national ne\'lspaper, JULIe 1981). 
It is conceivable that the furore which resulted from the July 
decision to pursue the closure and the 10\'1 turn-out, pror:lpted 
coullcillors to vote for retention; certainly retention \,las 
proposed and seconded by councillors. Hot/ever there \'Jere only 
5 cotn1cillors present at the August meeting and the vote was 
9: 4 in favour of retention (exact details of voting are not 
recorded) vlhich suggests that other AHA r.1el7lbers, persuaded by 
either public or medica~ opinion, VIere in favour of retention. 
What is clear is that the Northville .AHA we..s governed, to a 
lesser extent, by managerial recommendations than the i:Iidville 
MIA, and this represented an acquisition of po,'fer for oPPosition 
groups, at the expense of management. 
It \'lould appear that, at Northville, opposition groups possessed 
both the structural power necessary "for overt action and the 
symbols necessary to delegitimise the iSsue of closure. 
FurtherGore as previous events denonstrate, these groups \'lere 
cepable of r.1obilising both types of resources to gain their 
obj ectives. Given this distribution of pO\'ler in favour of 
the opposition groups, could l7lanagement ever have succeeded in 
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an unobtrusive strategy? It does not EPpear to have been beyond 
the re:UT:'s of possibility, given th2.t they already had a 
cO:-:lf.1itmer~-:: to rationalisation. It a,.Dpears that they I.-Jere 
totally unprep area. for the public resp onse. 
"I.lanagement misread the situation. They 
had en incontrovertible cepe for rationelisa-
tion. They should have done better market 
research" (union official). 
Had management been prep ared for the public outcry, and 
developed tactics to counter it, it is possible that they could 
have persuaded the AHA to support the closure, perhcps on 
financial grounds. 
It is difficult to say what would have happened had the AHA 
voted to proceed with the closure. The CEe Vlould probably 
have registered a formal protes'c, sending the final decision 
up to the minister. They may have have been threatened or 
actual action from the unions. 
"\'Ie had made plans for aJl occupation" 
(steward) • 
"I would have recoffi.r:lended an occupation 
if there had been no reprieve" (union 
official) • 
Given recent events in northville the Secretary of State having already 
agreed to the COffiIilittee of Inquiry, may well have reversed the 
closure decision. 
I;orthville r:llli'1.p.J;ers were in a relatively powerless position to 
achieve their soal of closing I.Iaine Road, and even atte!:'.,.ots to 
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influence attitudes to't'lards the closure nay '\:Jell have been 
doomed to failure. This is partly due to the power of the 
unions in the area but it is also related to the mistrust al"ld 
bad relations that had devel0l-1ed bet'\'leen manGgenent and 
unions (as \':e11 as other groups) since Reorgcmisation; had 
man8gement been more concerned with sentiments then, and made 
attem,.,ots to justify its actions and deoonstrate its credibilivJ, 
the history of c~"frontation might have been avoided, making 
the ac1:icveTilent of i-ts policies a lot easier. 
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Chapter Thirteen 
sm::[]\lARY AND COHCLUSIONS 
It was argued in chapter one that more research into closure 
was needed because it is an increasingly common occurence in 
Britain and, more recently, in the western world in general. 
I suggested, more specifically, that work needed to be done on 
the process of closure: on the way closures are managed and 
on hov! other groups respond to this. It was proposed that 
comparative work was needed if generalisations and ~~eoretical 
frame\vorks were to be established. In chapter tI'!O, a political 
approach to closure was called for which also took into account 
the socio-economic context in which the closure took place. 
Chapter three focussed more directly on the notion of 
unobtrusive power, arguing that power can be used to prevent 
confrontation. By influencing sentiments the acceptance of 
a decision or action can be assured thus enabling the , 
political actor to achieve his desired outcome. This 
unobtrusive use of power, it was suggested, rested on the ability 
to manage meaning and legitimacy through the use of symbols, 
language, rituals and II\YthS. 
How has this research fared in the light of these demands? 
\'Jbat is its contribution? Thi$ final chapter seeks to clarify 
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and organise the findings of this research and establish its 
contribution. 
The Substantive Area 
! 
What has been learnt vis-a-vis closure? The case-studies have 
demonstrated that, sometimes, managers do try to manage closure 
in such a way as to avoid overt confrontation. Their aim, in 
effect, is to secure favourable sentiments to\<lards the closure 
among potential opposition groups \,lhich, it is hoped, will 
result in their acceptance of it. This represents the use 
of unobtrusive power. 
In the three successful cases, unobtrusive power was mobilised 
in the face of a potential threat from opposition groups who 
had access to various structural sources of power Which, if 
brought into play, could endanger management's plans to secure 
closure and/or jeopardise operations in other parts of the 
organisation. It would appear that there is a relationship 
between overt and unobtrusive power. Groups with some degree 
of overt power represent a threat wl1'ich may lead their 
political opponents to resort to unobtrusive measures in an 
attempt to circumvent that threat. The Camerons case suggests 
that if' no such threat is perceived, managers may feel no need 
to develop unobtrusive measures. 
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Successful.nan2.gers,. although faced \'lith possible opposition , 
'.'lere in relatively pO\\Terful positions \'lith recourse to their 
own sources of power. At Northville, however, management 
a..upears to have been l:"elatively powerless in both overt and 
unobtrusive dimensions. Their inability to secure closure has 
been attributed to their failure to use unobtrusive measures in 
the face of a very powerful opposition. The question remains, 
however, \'lottld they have been successful had they done so? 
It may be that groups devoid of the structural conditions 
necessary for overt power are not in a position to mobilise the 
sources of unobtrusive power or, at the very least, the absence 
of structural power reduces the effectiveness of unobtrusive 
strategies. 
The aim of managers using unobtrusive strategies is to secure 
legitimacy for the closure, thus making it acceptable to other 
groups. Closure has little inherent legitimacy and must, 
therefore, be associated with symbols that have. For symbols 
to be effective they must evoke the required sentiments from 
the opposition groups. The case-studies have shown the symbols 
which are relevant to closure. 
r,Ianagerial credibility is an important prerequisite to a 
successful closure. If potential opposition groups do not trust 
the managers, they are unlikely to accept their decisions. In 
sone cases, managerial credibility can be established prior to 
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the closure through a process of climate-setting. This is not 
al\'!ays possible and managers may have to rely on a process of 
tactical opportunism, by taking advantage of any opportunity 
to demonstrate their good-will and justify the closure as it 
arises. 
Consultation is another important symbol. It has a strong norm 
of legitimacy in the context of British industrial relations , 
and decisions and activities that are arrived at with union/ 
employee involvement are usually more acceptable to those groups 
than ones \'lhich are not. 
Redundancy compensation also has strong norms of legitimacy to 
the extent that it is institutionalised in the British legal 
system. Firms which provide generous and flexible redundancy 
arrangemen-cs are able to demonstrate their good-will. This is 
an important source of power for managers - the case-studies 
demonstrate how compensation acts as a povlerful inducement to 
employees to accept the closure. 
The reasons for closure, if accepted" enable managers to justify 
their decision. Reasons that are easily explained and understood 
can act as powerful symbols for managers as they legitimise the 
closure and delegitimise resistance. In the private sector, 
economic criteria have been a corrunonly used justification (as 
chapter ten has shown). Such reasons may not be so acceptable 
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in the health service. Here the emphasis is on the provision 
of medical services, and cutbacks in this may not be justifiable 
on financial grounds alone. In this setting medical opinion 
becomes important - if in favour of managerial decisions it 
can legitimise them. If, on the other hand, it is opposed to 
them, management may find it very difficult to secure acceptance 
for closure decisions. 
The situation in the NHS is very complex - managers have to 
deal with a multiplicity of interest groups, one of which (the 
CHC) has the legal right to involve the Secretary of State. If 
this happens, health managers may find themselves unable to 
influence the situation: politicians may be more susceptible 
to other pressures such as government policies, the timing of 
the next election, than they are to the unobtrusive strategies 
of local managers. There are differences between public and 
private sectors, some of \I}'hich have been discussed in terms 
of the health service. There are doubtless many more which 
have yet to be fully examined and understood. 
There has been an accumulative effect of all the individual 
atterrpts to justify closure. Continual attempts to prove 
closure an economic necessity appear to have led, in general 
terms, to increasing acceptance of closure. It has been 
suggested that this process may account for the reduced use of 
the occupation to fight closure. An additional factor may be 
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high unemployment which has reduced the power of the unions 
and \,lith it, the likelihood of brca.dly based support often 
necessary to prevent closures. 
It would aPpear that, as a result of these pressures, overt 
attempts to prevent closure have become less common and if 
opposition does occur, it is more likely to be unobtrusive in 
nature. The success of attempts to delegitimise closure will 
hinge on the ability of actors to manipulate the qppropriate 
symbols. This may be difficult in the industrial sector where 
economic arguments may be the only acceptable way to contest 
closures. Figures may not be available to opposition groups 
who are then in the position of having to use a line of 
reasoning that they can never prove. Furthermore, it requires 
opposition groups to be fully conversant with the often complex 
arguments 1Jlhich management use. In the health sector economic 
criteria can be countered on moral, social and medical grounds. 
Other areas of the public sector may use non-economic criteria 
as a basis for decision-making which suggests that there are a 
Wider variety of symbols which opposition groups in the public 
sector can use to fight closure decisions. 
In substantive terms this research has provided some indication 
of how closures may be managed to avoid resistance, why managers 
might feel that this type of strategy is a necessity, and the 
implications this has for the attitudes and actions of those 
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6 rouPS potentially opposed to closure. 
The Theoretical Area 
This research also makes some contribution to the theoretical 
area of pm'Jer and political behaviour. It goes some way 
towards reaffirming existing research in these areas. For 
example, it concurs with the view propotmded by, among others, 
Child (1972), Pettigrew (1973), Salaman (1979) and Pfeffer 
(1981), that a political perspect~ve is a valid qpproach to 
organisational analysis. 
The discussion of overt power affirms the basic tenets 01 the 
resource-dependency approach to power - the possession and use 
of scarce resources, making others dep~ldent upon the actor is 
a source of pO\'1er over them. See, for example, Emerson, (1962), 
I·:echanic (1962), Hicks9n et al (1971), Pettigrew (1973), 
Ranson (1981). The discussion of unobtrusive power accords 
''lith Lukes' view (1974) that power can be used insidiously, 
enabling the powerful to achieve their ends because the 
powerless fail to oppose them. The case-studies reaffirm the 
view that securing legitimacy is a significant facet of. 
politic~l behaviour (see, for example, Anthony Cohen, 1975; 
Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and that 
the manipulation of symbols is an effective way of achieving 
legitimacy (Abner Cohen, 1975; Pettigre'.'I, 1979; Pfeffer, 1981). 
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This research adds to, as well as reaffirms, existin0 
b 
literature. The focus has been on the use of illlobtrusive 
pOi,'ler to secure legitimacy for managerial actions and decisions. 
T-VJO methods have been used to acconplish this: the redefinition 
of legitimacy_; the association of activities with symbols which 
have a high degree of inherent legitimacy. These concepts have 
been fOillld to be useful for the analysis of closure a~d the 
processes have been clearly demonstrated. It is conceivable, 
however, that this framework of overt and illlobtrusive power 
has a far wider application. 
The notion of actors trying to influence feelings as \<[ell as 
outcomes was, perhaps, first developed in the context of 
national politics by such writers as Edelman (1964). This would 
seem to be a fruitful area for the study of unobtrusive pO·,jer. 
In the \'lestern \'lorld, governments rarely use overt pOi;Jer to 
secure their ends. Politicians do, however, make constant use 
of symbols and language to rally support for their manifestos 
and to delegitimise the policies' of their opponents. In the 
long term, the manipulation of symbols by politicians and other 
interest groups redefines the legitfmacy of certain issues and 
so, for exar:iple, abortion and homosexuality have become r~lore 
acceptable, in both legal terms and in terms of societal 
attitudes, \'lhile pollution has becone less so. 
Issues . . L' nal analys1'S other than closure, would 111 orgrull.sal.l.O , 
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also !:oDD .. ear to be conducive to the Use of th14 S .r- • 
...... .lr~lle'.':or.l~. 
Decisions i,'lhich threaten the distribution of resources are 
likely to evoke political behaviour (Pettigrew t 1973; r,:lunrord 
& P ettigre\", 1975). This may take the forn of overt 
confrontation be~leen political opponents but if some actors 
are anxious to secure a particular outcome without :incurrillg 
overt opposition, they may resort to unobtrusive strategies. 
At the more general level, organisational cul"l;ures may reflect 
the use of overt or unobtrusive pOI:ler by managers in their 
attempts to control employees. So, for example, the culture 
at Ford has been related to a confrontation style of management 
(Beynon, 1973) whereas attitudes at Chemco have been attributed 
to a far more subtle use- of power (Nichols & Armstrong, 1976). 
Future ResearCJ.~ 
4 
This p·i.ece of research has then, gone some lJ/ay tovlardS 
fulfilling the demands stated in the earlier part of this book. 
This is not to say that everything has been accomplished - there 
is still rOOill for a great deal of research in the future. 
It is important to recognise that the findings are derived froQ 
only four case-studies. There is undoubtedly a need for 
research into larzer samples if these findings are to be 
consolidated. 
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This research has raised issues which it has not been able to 
anS\'ler fully and \'lhich invite further attention. One such issue 
concerns the relationship be"bleen overt and unobtrusive power: 
what is the exact nature of this relationship, how much does 
one influence the other? A second issue concerns the nature of 
the symbols used to secure legitimacy. Symbols relevant to 
closure in Britain have been identified but are such symbols 
8,.upropriate to closures in other countries where, for example, 
redundancy compensation is not institutionalised and unions are 
more or less powerful? More research needs to be undertaken 
into opposition to closure to find out how unobtrusive measures 
are successfully employed and which symbols are effective in 
preventing closure. A dIfference be-o.'leen public and private 
sectors has already been noted but just ho\'! different are 
public closures to private one? How useful are financial 
criteria in the public sector? What other symbols have been 
sUccessfully used in the public sector? These case-studies 
have all involved large organisations but the closure of a complete 
firm may be different to the closure of part of a large one, 
closure in a family firm may be different to closure in a 
bureaucracy, closure in a declining industry may be different 
to closure in an expanding one. These are all questions that 
need to be answered. 
There is research potential in other substantive areas. One 
closely related area in which the workings of unobtrusive po\/er 
- 342 -
night be found is in closure decision-ma'l.{ing. As has been 
discussed above, other organisational decision-making and 
implementation processes mqy be appropriate to this perspective. 
The questions here are: are ~~obtrusive measures used to 
achieve outcomes and prevent opposition? - If so, \lJ'hiC1;' symbols 
are used? Which symbols are associated with success? More 
resear~~ is needed into the different types of symbols: 
language, myths and rituals. 
There is, then, a great deal of scope for future research but, 
hopefully, this research has made some contribution to the 
existing material on closure and on political behaviour in 
organisations, and has indicated in which direction future 
research should go. 
i -
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